An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment Compensation System by Burgess, Paul L. & Kingston, Jerry L.
Upjohn Press Upjohn Press Collection 
1-1-1987 
An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment 
Compensation System 
Paul L. Burgess 
Arizona State University 
Jerry L. Kingston 
Arizona State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
Burgess, Paul L., and Jerry L. Kingston. 1987. An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment 
Compensation System. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
\ \ \ / /
An Incentives Approoch to 
Improving the Unemploy ment 
orCompensation Syste
Jerry I. Kingston

An Incentives Approach 
to Improving
the
Unemployment 
Compensation System
Paul L. Burgess
and 
Jerry. L. Kingston
Arizona State University
A National Chamber Foundation Report
1987 
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
This report reflects the views of the authors on this subject. It does not 
necessarily represent the views of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employ 
ment Research, the National Chamber Foundation, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, the Private Sector Task Force members or the companies 
that financially supported this study.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Burgess, Paul L.
An incentives approach to improving the 
unemployment compensation system.
(A National Chamber Foundation report)
Includes bibliographies.
1. Insurance, Unemployment United States. 
I. Kingston, Jerry L. II. W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. III. Title. IV. Series. 
HD7096.U5B87 1987 368.4©4©00973 87-23128 
ISBN 0-88099-049-X 
ISBN 0-88099-048-1 (pbk.)
Copyright   1987
by the
W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH
300 South Westnedge Ave. 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
The National Chamber Foundation (NCF) is an independent, nonprofit, 
public policy research organization affiliated with the Chamber of Com 
merce of the United States. Since its inception in 1967, the National 
Chamber Foundation has studied emerging issues vital to the economy 
and the business community, and has served as a catalyst for the discus 
sion and debate of new public and private sector policy initiatives.
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN MADE POSSIBLE BY GRANTS FROM
Burlington Industries
Ford Motor Company
General Motors Corporation
Marriott Corporation
Pillsbury Company
The Board of Trustees
of the
W. E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trustee Corporation
Preston S. Parish, Chairman
Charles C. Gibbons, Vice Chairman
James H. Duncan, Secretary-Treasurer
E. Gifford Upjohn, M.D.
Mrs. Genevieve U. Gilmore
John T. Bernhard
Paul H. Todd
David W. Breneman
Ray T. Parfet, Jr.
The Staff of the Institute
Robert G. Spiegelman 
Executive Director
Judith K. Gentry 
H. Allan Hunt
Timothy L. Hunt
Louis S. Jacobson 
Christopher J. O©Leary
Robert A. Straits 
Stephen A. Woodbury
Jack R. Woods
in
Authors
Paul L. Burgess and Jerry L. Kingston are professors of economics at Arizona 
State University. Both specialize in teaching graduate and undergraduate courses 
in labor economics and in researching a variety of issues related to the 
unemployment compensation (UC) system. Together they have designed and 
implemented several evaluations of the UC program, starting with a 1970 
evaluation of a special reemployment assistance project for UC recipients. They 
have conducted extensive contract research on the UC system for numerous 
state agencies, for the U.S. Department of Labor and for the National Com 
mission on Unemployment Compensation. This research has resulted in more 
than 50 academic articles and technical research reports on the UC system. 
This extensive background on the UC system provides the basis for this book.
Paul L. Burgess holds a B.A. and Ph.D. in economics from the University 
of Colorado at Boulder. Jerry L. Kingston received a B.A.E. from Wayne 
State College, a master©s degree in economics from Colorado State Universi 
ty and a Ph.D. in economics from The Pennsylvania State University.
IV
For their love and support, we dedicate this book 
to our wives, Marie and Gayle.
Acknowledgements
The ideas and conclusions in this volume have resulted from nearly two decades 
of study of the unemployment compensation (UC) program. Neither memory 
nor space permit us to identify all those who have aided us so effectiely and 
influenced our thinking so importantly during this period. Hence, we 
acknowledge here some, but not all, of those who have helped us along the way.
The book itself was made possible by the generous support provided by the 
National Chamber Foundation (NCF) of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This 
support made it possible to devote more than a year exclusively to research 
for this book and other papers related to it. We particularly want to thank John 
Volpe and Gale Thompson of NCF for their support and encouragement. In 
addition, we thank the firms that so generously supported the work for this 
book with both financial contributions and outstanding UC system experts who 
served on our NCF advisory panel. In fact, these firms and individuals are 
elsewhere separately acknowledged because of the importance of their sup 
port. To their credit, this employer community advisory group never attemp 
ted to narrowly focus our attention on just issues of interest to employers, 
although they effectively presented employer views on issues we raised. Un 
fortunately, we were unsuccessful in our attempts to also obtain representatives 
from organized labor to serve on this NCF advisory panel.
The support of our university also was essential in completing this study. 
Arizona State University granted us sabbatical leaves for the 1984-85 academic 
year to devote our full time to research on this book and on related articles. 
The strong support and encouragement provided by the chair of the Depart 
ment of Economics (William Boyes), the College of Business and the Univer 
sity created the environment necessary for productive work on this manuscript. 
In addition, Burgess thanks the Dean©s Council of 100 of the College of Business 
for a 1986 grant to support substantial revisions in portions of the manuscript.
We have a large debt to numerous experts who served as our UC mentors 
through the years, but we directly acknowledge here only some of those who 
most directly impacted on our work for this book. The largest of these debts 
is to the numerous state UC agency personnel who showed dedication and in 
tegrity in participating in the first efforts to accurately identify and analyze 
payment errors in the UC system. Arizona, New York, Oklahoma, Penn 
sylvania and Utah volunteered for participation in the original overpayment 
study we conducted under the sponsorship of the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation (NCUC), despite the fact that finding over 
payments is not likely to make life any easier for UC administrators. These
VI
efforts were strongly supported by NCUC research director Ray Munts, whose 
encouragement and integrity in tackling a difficult issue has always been greatly 
appreciated. Wilbur Cohen (former NCUC chairman, now deceased), Robert 
Goodwin (former Unemployment Insurance Service director) and Robert Ed 
wards (former Unemployment Insurance Service director) also provided in 
valuable assistance and encouragement.
Five additional states Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey and 
Washington volunteered to assist in pilot testing the Random Audit (RA) pro 
gram methodology for the U.S. Department of Labor even before the NCUC 
study had been completed. Among these 10 states that were central in develop 
ing and refining an operational methodology for detecting UC payment er 
rors, we especially wish to acknowledge the cooperationof state UC directors 
David Murrie (Oklahoma), Duane Price (Utah) and James Ware (New Jersey), 
together with project supervisors Mary Pat Frederick (Washington), Natalie 
Londensky (New Jersey) and Evan Mattinson (Utah). Florence Bade, NCUC 
project supervisor in Arizona, deserves special recognition for her tireless ef 
forts in teaching us about the UC system. Her contributions to our UC educa 
tion went far beyond anything that reasonably could have been expected and 
we are indeed grateful.
A total of 11 states recently have been assisting us through the Quality 
Unemployment Insurance Project in the analysis and use of data from the RA 
and Quality Control (QC) programs. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Penn 
sylvania and Utah. We express our gratitude to the UC directors and QC super 
visors in these states too numerous to mention individually for their foresight 
and enthusiasm in productively using the data produced by these special 
programs.
We also thank the field investigators in the NCUC, RA and QC projects 
for carrying out their eligibility verification responsibilities with such integri 
ty. We know that any analysis of the data from these special projects is of 
potential benefit only because the field investigators who produced these data 
were so diligent and professional in their work.
Numerous individuals in the national and regional offices of the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor also have supported our research efforts over the years. Because 
our debts in this regard are extensive, we identify here only three of these 
individuals: Robert Schaerfl (current director of the Employment Service and 
former director of program management for the Unemployment Insurance Ser 
vice), Carolyn Golding (current director of the Unemployment Insurance 
Service), and Robert Johnson (associate regional administrator for Unemploy-
VII
ment Insurance in Region X). We thank each of you and many others on your 
staffs for encouragement, advice and support on matters too numerous to 
enumerate.
The employer community has offered consistent and substantial support for 
both background research and for the preparation of this volume. In particular, 
J. Eldred Hill, Jr. (Unemployment Benefits Advisors, Inc.) always has been 
willing to share his wealth of UC knowledge with us. Thank you again, Eldred, 
for the support and encouragement that turned the idea for this book into reality.
Many individuals, in addition to several identified above, reviewed all or 
parts of several versions of the manuscript. Saul Blaustein, recently retired 
from the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, provided an in- 
depth review of the entire manuscript. We thank you, Saul, for your generous 
contributions of time and expertise. Tom Vaughn, Arizona©s UI director, 
reviewed the entire manuscript and was particularly helpful in aiding our 
understanding of constantly changing administrative financing procedures. 
Gerald Dunn, recently retired as New York©s UI director, and Raymond 
Thorne, Oregon©s Employment Division administrator also were particularly 
helpful to us, both as manuscript reviewers and for insightful evaluations of 
numerous UC-related problems and reform proposals, other reviewers of the 
manuscript to whom we are indebted include Sally Ward, the Employment 
Security administrator of Illinois, and Cheryl Templeman of the Interstate Con 
ference of Employment Security Agencies.
We express our appreciation to the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research for its continuing interest in the UC program, as evidenced by their 
publication of this and many other studies. Robert Spiegelman of the Institute 
read the entire manuscript and offered numerous helpful suggestions. Valuable 
editorial assistance was provided by Judy Gentry. We also gratefully 
acknowledge our continuing debt to Lynnette Winkelman who patiently and 
skillfully typed several versions of this manuscript.
Finally, we must thank our colleague, Robert St. Louis, for his invaluable 
contributions through the years. His influence is reflected in numerous places 
throughout the manuscript since he participated with us in developing and testing 
the methodologies used in both the NCUC and RA studies mentioned above. 
His influence also is reflected by the fact that he is a coauthor of many of 
the articles and reports cited in this book. Beyond these contributions, Bob 
always has given willingly of his time and expertise. In addition, he provided 
valuable comments on several versions of the ideas contained in this book. 
It is difficult to adequately acknowledge such a large debt, but we do absolve 
him of any responsibility for ideas and conclusions with which he does not 
agree.
viii
Preface
This book addresses the issue of overpayments and other quality problems in 
the unemployment compensation (UC) program. In contrast with previous 
treatments of these topics, overpayments are seen as symptomatic of other and 
potentially more serious problems that the UC system must confront as it begins 
its second half-century. As the title of the book suggests, the major issue ad 
dressed is improving adverse incentives for all UC system participants 
(claimants, employers and state UC agencies).
Although many of the ideas expressed in this volume have evolved over near 
ly two decades of involvement in the UC system, this manuscript has been 
in preparation since 1984. In 1985 and 1986, a complete rough draft was widely 
circulated among state employment security agencies, the U.S. Department 
of Labor, the employer community, academic experts and elsewhere. This 
distribution not only produced useful comments but, together with other fac 
tors, may have set in motion some changes in how the federal-state UC system 
actually operates. No matter what the causal forces at work may have been, 
the result has been that our description and commentary on current UC system 
operations has been in nearly constant need of change since the manuscript 
was first drafted.
These circumstances have been particularly evident in the procedures and 
policies used by the U.S. Department of Labor to provide administrative fun 
ding for state UC program operations. The chapter on administrative financ 
ing has been completely rewritten on at least four separate occasions to ac 
commodate either proposed or actual changes. We believe that the descrip 
tion and analysis of these and other features of the federal-state UC system 
are reasonably accurate as of June 1987. Given the pace of change in a number 
of UC program areas over the past year, however, some parts of our com 
mentary may become dated in the near future.
Our intention in writing this book has been to strengthen the unemployment 
compensation program by highlighting its principal problems and suggesting 
reasonable and effective responses. While we believe this effort was an im 
portant first step, we fully recognize that the cooperation and support of all 
UC system participants, including federal and state policy makers and ad 
ministrators, will be required if fundamental improvements in the UC system 
are to be achieved. It is hoped that some of the ideas in this book will en 
courage improvements in this 50 year old system of support for unemployed 
workers.
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Introduction
August 14, 1985 marked the golden anniversary of the federal- 
state unemployment compensation (UC) program. Such a mile 
stone in the evolution of the employment security system invites 
both reflection on past successes and consideration of how the 
system might be improved to meet present and future challenges. 
Both UC benefit provisions and the labor market within which 
the program operates have changed significantly since the 
inception of the UC system. Increased coverage of unemployed 
workers, higher weekly benefits, and the introduction of various 
extended benefit programs have tended to increase UC program 
outlays for any given level of aggregate demand. 1 Substantial 
changes also have occurred in the composition of both the 
insured and total labor forces. The conceptual distinction be 
tween voluntary and involuntary unemployment once thought 
to be quite clear has become increasingly blurred. Further 
more, cyclical fluctuations have become more pronounced, with 
the two deepest recessions since the Great Depression recorded 
within the past 13 years.
In spite of the diverse challenges it has confronted, however, 
the UC system has retained many of its basic goals and 
organizational/operational features. Perhaps the most apparent 
impacts of the above changes have been reflected in the overall 
volume of UC benefit payments and in the consequent pressures 
on UC system solvency. In addition, there has been increased 
emphasis on assessing the labor market impacts of UC benefits
1. Over the past few years the proportion of all unemployed persons receiving UC support has 
declined, and the divergence between the total and insured unemployment rates has been a topic 
of increased attention. For a recent survey of this issue, see National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1986b).
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and on determining the extent to which UC claimants are eligible 
for the support they actually receive. 2
This study focuses on a number of issues related to UC 
eligibility criteria and the extent to which compliance with them 
has been and can be enforced. In addition to the program©s 50th 
anniversary, several other events also suggest that a major 
reconsideration of UC eligibility criteria, enforcement provisions 
and administrative practices may be appropriate. For example, a 
number of UC reform proposals have been suggested within the 
past few years. 3 Beginning in 1984, the U.S. Department of 
Labor (USDOL) initiated an intensive effort to design a Quality 
Control (QC) program for the UC system; the core or initial 
component of this recently implemented program specifically 
relates to ascertaining the extent to which UC claimants are 
entitled to the benefits they receive. 4 Proposals for restructuring 
federal-state administrative funding relationships within the UC 
program also have been advanced recently, including the Reagan 
administration©s 1985 "devolution" proposal that would place 
much greater responsibility on the states for the administrative 
financing of their UC systems. 5 The analysis in this study is 
intended to contribute to these already ongoing efforts to 
improve the UC system.
Study Background/Overview
As background for this investigation, it first is useful to clarify 
some terminology. Payment errors occur in the UC system when 
claimants receive benefit amounts that differ from those to which 
they are entitled, given the provisions of employment security
2. For example, see the following for three very recent analyses of claimant eligibility issues: 
Kingston and Burgess (1986); Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986); and St. Louis, Burgess 
and Kingston (1986).
3. See for example Blaustein (1981).
4. The planning for this program was announced by USDOL to state UC agencies in March 
1984. See U.S. Department of Labor (1984e).
5. Deborah L. Steelman, Special Assistant to the President, Office of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, announced this UC reform proposal at the 1985 national conference of the National 
Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation. See National Foun 
dation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985a). For more recent 
details, see Cogan (1985).
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law and policy. Consequently, payment errors include both 
overpayments and underpayments. UC overpayments are the 
focus of this study because of the availability of much better data 
on this type of payment error and because the available data 
suggest that overpayments are a more serious problem than 
underpayments. Nonetheless, this emphasis should not be inter 
preted to imply that underpayments are unimportant. As ex 
plained in more detail below, relatively little is known about the 
extent to which UC claimants are underpaid, although some 
research directed towards this issue is now underway. Finally, it 
should be emphasized that UC system overpayments are not 
synonymous with "fraud" or "abuse" of the UC program. 
Available evidence suggests that overpayments occur for a 
variety of reasons, many of which do not entail deliberate efforts 
by claimants to obtain benefits to which they are not entitled. 
Indeed, a central theme of this study is that many features of the 
present day UC system contribute to the erroneous payment of 
benefits, apart from any deliberate efforts claimants may make to 
obtain benefits to which they are not entitled.
Prior to 1980, accurate and substantive evidence on the extent 
of overpayments in the UC system was not available. Although 
concerns about overpayments frequently were expressed in the 
public press prior to 1980, the first valid estimates of UC system 
overpayments were produced by a study conducted by the 
authors for the National Commission on Unemployment Com 
pensation during 1979 and 1980. 6 The overpayment estimates in 
that (Kingston-Burgess) study were developed for six major 
metropolitan areas on the basis of intensive eligibility verifica 
tions that were conducted for samples selected to represent the 
vast majority of UC payments made in those areas. The major 
findings of that initial study that UC overpayment rates were 
much higher than even informed observers had expected, and 
that most overpayments were not likely to be detected by 
conventional program procedures led USDOL to pilot test a 
modified, "operational" version of the Kingston-Burgess study 
in five statewide UC programs. An analysis of the results of this
6. See Kingston and Burgess (1981).
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second study by Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis reinforced the 
earlier findings about the existence of a potentially serious 
overpayment problem in the UC program. 7 This evidence and 
subsequent findings produced by the Random Audit (RA) system 
prompted USDOL to expand the RA program to a total of 46 
states by FY 1984, and to design an even more comprehensive 
Quality Control program which was implemented in 1986. 8
This sequence of events has focused both official and broader 
public attention on the problem of overpayments in the UC 
system. Such a focus may be somewhat appropriate because high 
overpayment rates may, of themselves, be a major problem in 
some state UC programs. However, a major theme of this study 
is that high overpayment rates per se are not necessarily the most 
fundamental issue requiring attention by policymakers and UC 
program administrators. Rather, these rates may be symptomatic 
of more basic problems that very likely represent important 
issues for states with both low and high payment error rates. 
Although the basis for this contention may not be immediately 
obvious, the analysis in chapters 2-7 clearly indicates that three 
fundamental problems confront the UC system: (1) adverse 
incentives; (2) program complexity; and (3) partly because of the 
first two problems, ineffective monitoring of claimant compli 
ance with weekly UC eligibility criteria. These considerations 
also indicate that the overall quality of state programs clearly 
cannot be judged on the basis of overpayment rates alone. In 
fact, it is quite conceivable that overall program quality could be 
higher in certain states with high overpayment rates than in 
certain other ones with low overpayment rates.
Economists emphasize how individuals, business firms and 
government agencies respond to incentives in making various 
decisions under whatever constraints apply. Accordingly, the 
basic focus of this study is on how UC system participants are 
likely to respond to the incentives they confront in that system. 
In fact, the analysis indicates that adverse incentives characterize
7. See Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982).
8. See U.S. Department of Labor (1984f) and U.S. Department of Labor (1984g). Even 
though planning for the QC program began in 1984, implementation was delayed until April of 
1986.
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the decision environments of all major UC system participants. 
Adverse incentives include: (1) incentives in federal administra 
tive funding procedures and performance criteria that adversely 
affect entire state UC systems; (2) incentives in individual state 
systems that fail to discourage and may even encourage claimant 
noncompliance with stated UC eligibility criteria; (3) very 
limited incentives for employers to monitor claimant compliance 
with eligibility criteria, especially those that must be satisfied on 
a weekly basis; and (4) limited incentives for state agency 
personnel either to monitor claimant compliance with eligibility 
criteria or to prevent/detect payment errors. 9
The other two fundamental problems stressed in this study  
program complexity and ineffective monitoring of claimant 
compliance with UC eligibility criteria are interrelated issues 
which also affect and are affected by adverse incentives. Pro 
gram complexity creates numerous undesirable impacts, includ 
ing the possibilities of relatively high payment error rates, high 
administrative costs and substantial administrative discretion in 
applying UC eligibility criteria which may result in the inequi 
table treatment of claimants. Program complexity also creates a 
situation in which adverse incentives represent a more serious 
problem than would be the case in a less complex program. In 
turn, program complexity and adverse incentives contribute 
substantially to the difficulties of monitoring claimant compli 
ance with the weekly eligibility criteria (e.g., nonrefusal of 
suitable work, availability for work and active job search). These 
monitoring problems imply that adverse incentives and program 
complexity are more serious issues than would be the case in a 
system in which claimant compliance with weekly eligibility 
criteria could be more easily and less expensively enforced.
The three fundamental problems adverse incentives, pro 
gram complexity and ineffective compliance monitoring repre 
sent the building blocks around which the subsequent analysis is 
organized. The approach taken is to analyze the three problems
9. A related issue revolves around incentives for and detection of internal agency fraud, but 
that issue is not addressed in this study. However, it should be noted that this problem may 
represent a potentially important issue in some states, as perhaps is indicated by the increased 
emphasis by USDOL on this issue in recent years.
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in separate chapters and then to provide some possible responses 
for dealing with the specific problems analyzed in those same 
chapters. The responses suggested typically are quite general in 
nature; in most cases, the specific details of these approaches 
would have to be formulated by state or federal policy- 
makers/program administrators. Furthermore, although a num 
ber of responses are suggested for the particular problems 
identified in individual chapters, it is important to emphasize that 
a systems approach should be taken in devising any overall set of 
reform proposals, either for federal-state relationships or for 
those within individual states. Because of the interactive nature 
of system components, apparently plausible responses to specific 
problems might well generate unintended and unacceptable side 
effects in terms of other program aspects. Consequently, it 
would be difficult even to evaluate the desirability of certain 
changes, except in the context of whatever overall changes might 
be implemented. Moreover, because of uncertainty about the 
exact impacts that most suggested changes would have, it is 
important to emphasize the need for further research and exper 
imental pilot studies to fully evaluate many of the changes 
suggested by the analysis in this study.
Qualifications and Limitations of the Analysis
The UC system is an extremely complex one, with a variety of 
philosophical, social, legal and economic dimensions that merit 
study. Moreover, even the limited issues raised in this study 
could be approached in a number of different ways. Accord 
ingly, it is important to emphasize the limited scope of this 
inquiry. Some fairly specific qualifications or limitations that 
apply to this study include, but certainly are not limited to, the 
following: (1) the problem of UC underpayments is not ad 
dressed in any substantive way; (2) little attention is directed to 
tracing the evolution of most of the system deficiencies ana 
lyzed, and no attempt is made to pinpoint responsibility for those 
deficiencies; (3) only within-system reform approaches that 
would maintain the fundamental features of the existing UC 
system are emphasized; (4) benefit financing and trust fund
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solvency issues are virtually ignored; (5) in many cases, indirect 
(v. direct) evidence is provided to support the analysis; (6) the 
specific applicability of particular aspects of the analysis to 
individual states varies with state-specific circumstances; (7) the 
most recent overpayment statistics from the Quality Control 
program were not available for this analysis; (8) the interstate 
benefit system is not analyzed; and (9) a general knowledge of 
UC system features is assumed.
Underpayments Not Emphasized
This study emphasizes overpayment errors and treats under 
payments only in a tangential manner. This asymmetry reflects 
the absence of substantive evidence about the frequency or extent 
of total underpayment errors, the difficulties encountered in 
designing experiments to produce underpayment evidence, and 
the generally greater concerns that have been expressed about 
overpayments in the UC system. This emphasis on overpay 
ments, however, should not be interpreted to imply that under 
payments are unimportant. Some information on underpayments 
recently has become available as a result of the Random Audit 
programs which operated in as many as 46 states; evidence 
related to UC underpayments is summarized in the appendix to 
chapter 2. Unfortunately, however, this evidence reflects only 
underpayments in benefits actually paid, and excludes underpay 
ments due to erroneous denials of UC claims for which no 
payments were made. Consequently, no comprehensive evi 
dence is available to assess the magnitude of all types of 
underpayment errors in the UC system.
Evolution of and Responsibility for Existing Deficiencies
Virtually no attempt is made to trace the emergence or 
evolution of the existing UC system deficiencies analyzed in this 
study. There also is no attempt to pinpoint responsibility for 
these system deficiencies, since it is assumed that federal and 
state policymakers/program administrators did not deliberately 
set out to create a system with the adverse incentives and other 
problems emphasized in this study. In fact, at least some of these
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individuals probably still do not recognize the existence of a 
number of these adverse features. The very explicit analysis of 
adverse UC program characteristics is provided to clarify these 
issues, and is not intended as a criticism of those who have 
shaped or managed various parts of the federal-state UC system 
over the years. Given the interactive nature of the relationships 
among all system participants including not only federal/state 
UC program personnel, covered employers and claimants, but 
also federal/state legislators, the federal/state judicial system, 
private sector firms that specialize in handling UC program 
matters for employers, organized labor, the academic commu 
nity and yet other groups it would be both futile and unpro 
ductive to attempt to place responsibility for existing system 
problems on certain groups.
Within-System Reform Emphasized The reforms or policy 
responses to the problems analyzed in this study are ones that 
could be implemented within the basic institutional framework 
and traditions of the existing UC system without fundamentally 
altering its basic features and assumptions. In this sense, the 
responses considered necessarily are somewhat limited. Less 
conventional reform approaches are not considered in this study.
The decision to limit reform approaches and policy responses 
to those that could be carried out within the existing system 
reflects two basic considerations. First, it reflects a consensus of 
opinion among many informed observers that such proposals 
would be much more likely to receive serious consideration than 
less conventional responses. Second, the research undertaken for 
this study now has convinced us that, contrary to our opinion at 
the outset, very significant improvements actually could be made 
without altering the basic philosophical approach and institu 
tional framework of the existing UC system. Although many of 
the changes suggested in subsequent chapters likely will be 
considered to be very major ones (particularly by many federal 
and state UC program administrators), our view is that these 
proposals actually involve relatively minor changes, especially 
relative to proposals that would alter the foundations of the 
system itself.
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From the perspective of within-system reform, it appears that 
emphasis should be placed on: (1) reducing the complexity of the 
existing UC system and also finding ways to improve the 
administration of existing (or less complex) provisions; (2) 
improving both federal administrative funding procedures and 
other federal incentives for state UC agencies; (3) improving 
claimant incentives for increased self-compliance with UC 
eligibility criteria; (4) improving the incentives of state UC 
agency personnel and, to a lesser extent, of covered employers 
to prevent and detect payment errors; and (5) improving the 
procedures used to monitor claimant compliance with weekly 
UC eligibility criteria. Many might question the political 
feasibility of taking effective action in some of these areas, but 
the subsequent discussion of the specific within-system 
responses analyzed in this study has not been limited by any 
attempt to consider only proposals likely to be politically 
popular. Apart from whatever may be the political feasibility of 
the suggestions, it is hoped the analysis of system deficiencies 
and policy options presented may serve to stimulate interest in 
UC system reform.
It very well could be that society©s long-run interests ulti 
mately might be better served by completely replacing the 
existing UC system with one that would be quite different from 
even a reformed version of the present system. However, a 
serious analysis of the many issues that would be involved in 
designing an optimal replacement for the existing system is 
completely beyond the scope of this study.
Benefit Financing and Trust Fund Solvency Issues Not Analyzed
The UC program experienced a financial crisis during the past 
13 years which began with the 1974-1975 recession and became 
even more severe with the onset of back-to-back recessions in 
1980 and 1982. By January 1, 1985, state UC systems had 
obtained loans from the federal government that totalled $23.5 
billion. I0 As a result of these and other considerations, trust fund
10. Vroman (1985).
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solvency and benefit financing issues recently have received 
substantial attention. 11 This study, however, was not motivated 
by these considerations. It is the case, of course, that the over 
all volume of UC benefit payments (for a given level of 
aggregate demand) can be set at whatever level policymakers 
choose by simply altering eligibility criteria and benefit levels. 
Hence, some of the proposals considered in this study could have 
some implications for benefit financing issues because they 
could impact on the overall volume of UC program outlays (for 
a given level of aggregate demand). These impacts, however, are 
viewed primarily as side effects of policies intended to address 
the incentives or other issues that do constitute the focal point of 
this study. This approach reflects both the emphasis of our 
previous research and also our view that an analysis of the 
benefit payment side of the UC program ledger can make an 
important contribution in terms of improving the existing UC 
system.
Indirect v. Direct Evidence
In many cases, it is necessary to provide indirect evidence for 
the existence of some of the adverse features analyzed in this 
study. For example, there is no accepted basis for proving that 
the UC program is too complex, especially since certain features 
of existing complexity were specifically introduced by 
policymakers in the hopes of achieving certain goals. Further 
more, merely documenting the existence of adverse incentives 
does not indicate the extent to which system participants actually 
respond to them. Nevertheless, even though much of the 
evidence offered in this study is indirect in nature, our opinion is 
that it provides a sufficient basis for the conclusions reached; 
others, however, will have to make such assessments for 
themselves. At several places throughout this study, we offer 
suggestions for additional research in areas in which more direct 
or substantive evidence may be useful.
11. Two recent studies by Vroman provide an excellent overview of the issues involved. See 
Vroman (1985) and (1986).
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Applicability of Analysis to Individual States
The federal-state UC system includes 53 individual UC 
jurisdictions (the 50 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands). The specific eligibility criteria 
applicable in each jurisdiction are determined by that jurisdic 
tion, subject to conformity with broad federal guidelines. Ad 
ministrative practices and operational procedures vary consider 
ably among the states. Accordingly, the assessment of the UC 
system provided in this study is a generalization that may apply 
to varying degrees to individual UC jurisdictions. Because of the 
diversity of state UC systems, no attempt is made to indicate how 
each portion of the analysis applies to specific states. It is our 
view that the general thrust of most of the analysis would be 
applicable, at least to some degree, to nearly all state UC 
programs.
Unavailability of Recent Overpayment Evidence
Information on overpayment rates in as many as 46 statewide 
jurisdictions is available for FY 1983, FY 1984, FY 1985 and for 
a portion of FY 1986, but is not summarized or discussed in this 
study because the data had not been publicly released at the time 
this study was undertaken. Our judgment, however, is that this 
limitation does not significantly impact on the substance of the 
study. In fact, evidence released in 1987 for more recent periods 
is entirely consistent with the evidence analyzed in this study. 
Furthermore, the dominant themes of this study are related to 
issues, circumstances or relationships of which high UC over 
payment rates are primarily symptomatic. In the absence of 
convincing evidence that fundamental changes have recently 
occurred with respect to the complexity, incentive and monitor 
ing issues, there seems to be no strong basis for assuming the 
analysis would have been significantly altered by the availability 
of more recent data.
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Interstate Benefit System Not Analyzed
About 5 percent of the UC benefits paid in the United States in 
recent years have been paid on an interstate basis. 12 Cooperative 
agreements among the UC jurisdictions permit the interstate 
payment of benefits. Claimants receive interstate benefits from 
the (liable) state in which they had worked and earned their 
qualifying wage credits, but file for those benefits from another 
(agent) state in which they have temporarily or permanently 
relocated.
The present study does not provide for a separate analysis of 
the interstate benefit (IB) payment system. No meaningful 
evidence currently is available on overpayment rates in the IB 
system, although USDOL apparently plans to encompass the 
interstate system in an expanded version of its recently imple 
mented Quality Control program. 13 However, the fundamental 
problems that contribute to payment errors and reduced UC 
program quality with regard to intrastate benefits adverse 
incentives, program complexity, and an inability to effectively 
monitor claimant compliance with UC eligibility criteria  
almost certainly are even more pronounced problems in the IB 
system. In addition, shared administration of an IB claim 
between the liable (paying) state and the agent state clearly 
would be expected to introduce additional complexities and to 
provide for even more adverse incentives for payment accuracy 
than those which exist for intrastate payments. 14
UC Program Knowledge Assumed
As is perhaps already apparent, it is assumed that the reader 
has at least a general understanding of the UC system. No 
attempt is made to provide any detailed description of the UC
12. This estimate was provided during 1985 by the Interstate Benefits unit in the National 
Office of the Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
13. See U.S. Department of Labor (1985e: I-C-4 through I-C-6).
14. For example, neither covered employers nor UC agency personnel in agent states would 
have strong incentives to deny IB claims because the benefits received by interstate claimants: (1) 
would be charged to out-of-state employers; and (2) likely would account for some increased 
spending within agent states, thereby creating additional sales, profits and employment 
opportunities.
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system as it presently operates, although some background is 
provided in selected portions of the study for particularly 
complicated features of the system. It probably still is the case 
that even those with little general knowledge of the system can 
evaluate many of the adverse UC system features stressed in this 
study. In any case, a number of good sources are available for 
those who wish to supplement their UC system knowledge 
before considering the subsequent analysis. 15
Organization of the Study
This investigation is organized in the following manner. 
Evidence of overpayments and some information on underpay 
ments in the UC system are summarized in chapter 2. The 
sources and extent of complexities that characterize the UC 
program, especially those related to UC eligibility criteria, are 
documented in chapter 3. The major theme of this study the 
importance of adverse incentives in affecting the behavior of UC 
system participants is developed primarily in chapters 4, 5 and 
6. The adverse incentives confronted by state UC agencies with 
respect to federal-state administrative funding issues are dis 
cussed in chapter 4, whereas issues related to state compliance 
with federal performance criteria are considered in chapter 5. In 
chapter 6, the incentives faced by UC claimants, covered 
employers and state UC agency personnel are examined, espe 
cially as they relate to the extent of claimant compliance with UC 
eligibility criteria. In chapter 7, the difficulties of monitoring 
claimant compliance with weekly UC eligibility criteria, partic 
ularly worksearch requirements, are analyzed in detail. Possible 
responses to the problems identified in chapters 3-7 are analyzed 
in each chapter. The final chapter contains principal findings, 
policy recommendations and a brief summary of the entire study.
15. See for example Haber and Murray (1966) and Hamermesh (1977).

Evidence on Overpayments 
in the UC System
Prior to 1980, information on UC overpayments consisted 
primarily of official statistics based on overpayments both 
detected and officially processed (i.e., "established") by state 
UC agencies. Later studies indicated that these data tended to 
understate, perhaps by a substantial margin, the true extent of 
payment errors in the UC system. Also, prior to 1980 much of the 
public debate about improper UC payments tended to equate 
"overpayments" with "fraud" and "abuse" and generally was 
expressed in emotionally charged terms. 1 Much more accurate 
estimates and objective assessments of UC overpayment rates 
became available in 1980. Analysis of this more recent evidence 
motivated the assessment of the UC program presented in this 
study.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, the 
information on overpayments available prior to 1980 is summa 
rized, followed by somewhat more detail on the two major 
studies that have provided much more factual evidence. A brief 
discussion of even more recent (but very fragmentary) evidence 
on UC overpayments from USDOL©s Random Audit program is 
presented next. Some concluding comments close the discus 
sion. Information developed since 1980 on UC underpayments is 
summarized in the appendix to this chapter.
1. Becker©s 1953 study represents a clear exception to this characterization of early studies of 
UC fraud and abuse as "emotional" in nature. Drawing on the limited factual evidence available 
to him, Becker provided a logical assessment of the extent of abuse of the UC program. Another 
exception to this characterization is the work of Adams (1971).
15
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Information on UC Program Overpayments Prior to 1980
The first major study of overpayments in the UC program was 
undertaken by Joseph Becker in 1953. In assessing the extent of 
knowledge about improper payments over the first decade or so 
of the program©s operations, Becker stated:
Yet at no time since the system was established has anyone been 
in a position to offer a reasonably accurate estimate ofthe amount 
of improper payments. In 1945, ten years after the Social Security 
Act was passed, not one of the forty-eight States had adequate 
evidence of the proportion of claims and claimants it was paying 
but would not pay if it knew all the relevant facts that is, claims 
and claimants improper by the first and simplest norm, the norm 
of the State©s own law and interpretation. Only three or four 
States had reasonably accurate information regarding even their 
working violators, the easier to detect of the two groups of 
violators, as also the smaller and less important. As regards 
nonworking violators there was nothing. 2
Becker further explained why so little information about overpayments 
was available at that time: the UC program was a young one, and the 
states were much more involved in the essential tasks of collecting 
taxes and paying benefits than in detecting program abuses. Although 
the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies appointed 
a committee to study program abuse as early as 1941, World War II 
intervened, so that the task of obtaining information on improper 
payments had not yet seriously begun by 1948. Some hesitancy on the 
part of the Bureau of Employment Security to give high priority to 
benefit payment control activities, as well as a hesitancy of the states 
to respond positively to those incentives that were provided, further 
limited the development of factual data on overpayments in the UC 
system. 3
Public concern about improper payments did increase during 
the 1945-1947 reconversion from a wartime to a peacetime
2. Becker (1953: 319).
3. Becker (1953: 321-322).
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economy. In 1946, the Baltimore Sun won a Pulitzer Prize for a 
series of articles on the issue of UC program abuse, and the paper 
was credited with the "most meritorious public service rendered 
by an American newspaper during the year."4 Several factors 
likely did contribute to a decline in the integrity of the UC 
program©s payment system during this interval, including: (1) the 
large increase in the number of claims filed; (2) the limited 
ability and interest of program administrators in controlling 
overpayments; (3) lack of cooperation between the UC system 
and the Employment Service; and (4) frequent attempts by 
workers to obtain benefits even if they did not qualify. 5 Further 
more, benefit charges to employers during the war years were so 
low that employers apparently became much less interested in 
the issue of claimant compliance. In addition, state UC agencies 
generally lacked the trained staff required to effectively conduct 
benefit payment control activities. 6
During the first one-and-one-half decades of the program©s 
operation, relatively little factual evidence on UC overpayments 
was available. In assessing the evidence related to the frequency 
with which benefits had been properly paid during this interval, 
Becker concluded that:
The favorable evidence produced by the investigation will im 
press different readers differently. It will probably suffice for 
most of them to conclude that even in the reconversion period the 
system as such was not discredited. . . . Whether one finds the 
favorable evidence sufficient for coming to some conclusion 
depends very much on what advantages one sees in a system of 
unemployment benefits. 7
With respect to the evidence related to the improper payment of 
benefits, Becker reported that:
On the subject of willful violations that is, the proportion of 
working violators who are cheaters the most intelligent state-
4. Becker (1953: xvii).
5. Becker (1953: 154-160).
6. Becker (1953: 155-156).
7. Becker (1953: 304).
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ment that can be made is that no one knows. . . . The figures are 
even less certain for non-working violators. . . . 8
Despite public concerns about improper payments and abuse in the 
early years of the program (especially in the immediate postwar 
period), no factual basis existed to evaluate these claims or to guide 
policymakers.
Several expressions of public concern about the UC program 
also surfaced during the 1960s. A nationwide poll undertaken by 
the University of Michigan in 1961 to determine the extent of 
public support of nine domestic programs revealed that only 29 
percent of those polled favored higher unemployment compen 
sation benefits, and that unemployment compensation ranked 
seventh in terms of public support, followed only by parks and 
recreational facilities and support for agriculture. 9 In a similar 
vein, the results of a 1965 Gallup Poll indicated that three-fourths 
of the respondents believed that the insured unemployed col 
lected benefits even though they could find work; nearly seven- 
tenths of those surveyed supported making UC benefit laws more 
strict. 10
Other indications of public concerns about the UC program 
during the 1960s emanated from the popular press. A series of 
articles appeared in Reader©s Digest, with similar articles ap 
pearing in Harper©s and Atlantic Monthly, l1 Among the concerns 
raised in these articles were: (1) abuse of the program by those 
who did not want to return to work and by those who had not lost 
their jobs through no fault of their own; (2) the encouragement 
by the Bureau of Employment Security that states exclude the 
specific requirement that claimants "actively seek work;" (3) 
inadequate screening of claimants with respect to the reasons for 
their unemployment; and (4) inadequate efforts to prosecute 
fraud overpayments when they were detected. 12 The U.S. 
Department of Labor responded that these allegations were 
essentially unfounded. In his response to the initial Reader©s
8. Becker(1953: 310-311).
9. Adams (1971: 20).
10. Adams (1971:21).
11. These articles are all cited by Adams (1971: 27).
12. Adams (1971: 27-28).
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Digest article, Assistant Secretary of Labor Newell Brown stated 
that, during the 1956-1968 interval, fraud overpayments consti 
tuted only about 0.2 percent of UC program benefits. 13 He 
further stated:
... I am convinced that, for the most part, the allegations are a 
distortion of facts. By innuendo and half-truths a wholly inaccu 
rate picture of the program has been presented.
Just criticisms and suggestions as to where improvements might 
be made in the program are always welcome. But baseless attacks 
on the soundness of a public program or the actions of public 
administrators do not, I believe, make much of a contribution to 
the public interest. 14
The integrity of the UC payment system also was defended by 
UC program administrators surveyed by Adams in 1970 about 
the problems of fraud and abuse. The consensus view of this 
group was that public perceptions of UC program abuse were due 
primarily to misinformation on the part of employers, claimants 
and the general public. Two common problems cited by these 
administrators were the tendencies of the public to confuse 
unemployment insurance with welfare and to believe that UC 
claimants did not have a real desire to return to work. 15 Overall, 
however, those surveyed believed that the UC program was 
well-accepted by the public and that abuse of the program was 
not a serious problem. A similar positive assessment of the 
program was provided by Adams who, on the basis of a detailed 
review of the evidence over the first 25 years of the program, 
concluded that:
... the problem of claimant abuse of the UI program was less 
significant at the end of the decade of the 1960s than it was during 
the immediate post-World War II period when Becker made his 
study. Furthermore, it is likely that the extent of abuse was less
13. Adams (1971: 29).
14. Adams (1971: 29).
15. Adams (1971: 56).
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than the general public thought it was when the Gallup Poll was 
taken in 1965. It is probably less than most people, who are not 
familiar with the facts, are inclined to believe. 16
During the decade of the 1970s, however, extraordinary 
pressures were placed on the UC system. UC benefits that had 
averaged only $2.65 billion annually during the 1960s increased 
to an annual average of $8.6 billion during the 1970s. 17 By 1979, 
the trust funds of 15 states had become depleted, resulting in an 
indebtedness to the federal government of about $3.8 billion. 18 
The reasons for this dramatic rise in UC program outlays 
included: substantially higher unemployment rates; implementa 
tion of several extended benefit programs (that provided for up 
to a total of 65 weeks of regular and extended benefits combined 
during some periods); increases in the size of weekly benefit 
payments; expansions of program coverage; and labor force 
growth. These events tended to heighten public concerns about 
the potential for fraud and abuse in the UC system. Perhaps the 
most notable of the expressions of public concern was the 60 
Minutes broadcast aired on CBS television on April 25, 1976 
that included a segment on abuse of the UC program. Several 
articles quite critical of the UC program also appeared in the 
popular press during the late 1970s. 19
Notwithstanding these expressions of public concern about 
improper payments and abuse of the UC program, relatively little 
factual evidence was available even in the late 1970s to docu 
ment the existence of such problems. In fact, the official reports 
submitted by state UC agencies to the U.S. Department of Labor 
on overpayments actually detected and established for the years 
1975 through 1978 indicated that the combined total of fraud plus 
nonfraud overpayments amounted to between 0.5 percent and 1.5
16. Adams (1971: 92).
17. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 74).
18. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 74).
19. For example, see "Confessions of an Unemployment Cheat," in the May, 1977 issue of 
The Washington Monthly; "Crackdown on Cheaters Who Draw Jobless Pay," in the May 15, 
1978 issue of U.S. News and World Report; and "Unemployment Comp is Middle-Class 
Welfare," in the February 19, 1977 issue of The New Republic.
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percent of total benefits paid. 20 USDOL also reported that efforts 
to control overpayments had been expanded during this period, 
the number of positions designated for benefit payment control 
activities in state UC programs had been increased by 72 percent, 
and additional steps had been taken to assist the states in their 
efforts to detect and recover overpayments. 21
The above survey of information and public perceptions about 
improper payments in the UC program prior to 1980 reveals that 
little documentation was available to support the frequently 
expressed public concerns about fraud, abuse or poor adminis 
trative performance. Lacking factual evidence to the contrary, 
those most familiar with the program continued to believe that 
the integrity of the UC payment system was fundamentally 
intact, even though some problems likely had existed in the 
immediate postwar period. Over the first 45 years of the UC 
program©s history, the absence of adequate factual data severely 
hampered efforts to accurately identify or respond to any 
overpayment problem that may have existed.
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As a part of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments 
of 1976 (Public Law 94-566), Congress established the National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC). In re 
sponse to some of the concerns expressed about the problems of 
fraud and overpayments in the UC program, the NCUC com 
missioned an experimental overpayment study to be conducted in 
six major metropolitan areas. This investigation, denoted as the 
Kingston-Burgess (K-B) study, provided the first relatively 
accurate estimates of overpayments in the UC program ever 
available. Its principal features are considered in some 
detail.
20. U.S. Department of Labor (1979: 16).
21. U.S. Department of Labor (1979: 5).
22. This section draws heavily on Burgess and Kingston (1980), Kingston and Burgess 
(1981b) and Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1981).
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Objectives and Design
The K-B study had two fundamental objectives. The first was 
to obtain accurate estimates of the amounts and rates of over 
payments to fill the informational void with respect to the actual 
magnitude of the overpayment problem during the first 45 years 
of the program©s operation. The second objective was to obtain 
statistically valid estimates of the overpayments detected by 
routine operating procedures to provide a basis for assessing the 
extent to which the overpayment statistics routinely reported by 
USDOL accurately reflected actual overpayment rates in the UC 
program.
The K-B study was conducted during the fourth quarter of 1979 
and the first quarter of 1980 in the following metropolitan areas: 
Buffalo, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, the Queens Bor 
ough of New York City, and Salt Lake City. 23 In each city, a 
probability sample of UC payments (not claims) was selected 
each week and these sampled payments (each for a single week 
of unemployment) were subjected to a detailed audit. Because 
appropriate sampling techniques were utilized, it was possible to 
use the results of these reviews to estimate on a quarterly basis 
the amount and rate of overpayments in these cities.
The procedures used to investigate a claimant©s eligibility for 
the week of unemployment for which UC benefits had been 
paid denoted as the "key week" were extremely thorough 
and involved verification of a claimant©s compliance with all 
aspects of UC eligibility criteria. 24 Factors to be considered in a
23. The city of Nashville, Tennessee also was included in the study at the outset of the project, 
but it was eliminated because severe problems in selecting an appropriate sample never were 
resolved by the Tennessee agency. See Kingston and Burgess (1981: 4).
24. A fairly detailed description of UC eligibility criteria is included in chapter 3. Generally, 
UC claimants must satisfy three types of eligibility requirements. First, claimants must be 
monetarily eligible for benefits; such eligibility is determined by the claimant©s earnings (and in 
some states weeks of work) in UC-covered employment in a one-year period prior to the filing 
of a first claim for UC support. These requirements are established to ensure that benefits are paid 
to persons who have demonstrated a sufficiently strong previous work attachment. Second, a 
claimant must have separated from his/her previous employer for a nondisqualifying reason; 
typically, those laid off due to lack of work are eligible for benefits, but those who separate for 
other reasons may qualify for benefits in some states (sometimes only after penalty provisions 
have been satisfied). Third, claimants also must satisfy a set of continuing or weekly eligibility 
criteria. For each week for which UC support is paid, claimants must be able to work, available 
for work, and (in most states) actively seeking work. In addition, during each week for which
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typical review of a claimant©s eligibility included: (1) the 
claimant©s prior earnings and employment (to determine if the 
claimant satisfied all monetary eligibility criteria); (2) the reason 
why the claimant separated from his/her previous employer (to 
detect separation eligibility issues); (3) whether the claimant was 
both able to work and available for work during the key week, as 
required; (4) whether the claimant was actively seeking work 
during the key week (if required by the state©s law or policy); (5) 
whether the claimant had refused an offer of suitable work during 
the key week (a disqualifying act); and (6) whether the claimant 
had any disqualifying earnings or employment during the key 
week.
The special investigative procedures developed for the K-B 
study to assess compliance with the above criteria included a 
"desk review" of all UC agency files related to the claimant 
whose eligibility for key week benefits was under review, and an 
in-person interview with the claimant. This personal interview 
included the completion of a detailed questionnaire which 
focused on many aspects of the claimant©s eligibility for UC 
program support for the key week. Thereafter, the investigator 
attempted to obtain third-party verification from employers and 
other interested parties to substantiate relevant material facts 
related to the claimant©s eligibility. The benefit eligibility veri 
fication process continued until all issues uncovered by the 
investigation had been resolved. In this sense, the investigations 
were conducted with virtually no time or resource constraints. 
On average, between 8 and 13 hours of direct investigative case 
time were devoted to each sampled case in the K-B study. In 
sharp contrast, UC local office personnel working under normal 
operating conditions probably would process an average of at 
least 50 times more claims for payments during a period of 8-13 
hours. 25
In addition to the above procedures, postaudits also were 
conducted to detect UC claimants who continued to draw
benefits are paid claimants must not refuse suitable work or have earnings (or days of work, in 
some states) beyond limits established by the individual states.
25. In New York, for the years 1980-1984, for example, cost-model funding was provided for 
up to about eight minutes for processing a continued claim. See Dunn and Griffin (1984: 16).
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benefits while working. Postaudits involve the matching of the 
social security numbers of those who receive UC benefits in a 
calendar quarter against the social security numbers associated 
with the wages reported on a quarterly basis by employers in 
wage-reporting states. 26 If a match is found, additional informa 
tion is then requested from the employer(s) to determine the 
particular weeks during the quarter in which the wages were 
earned. On the basis of the week-by-week comparisons of 
earnings and UC benefit payments made in these postaudits, it is 
possible to determine whether claimants receive benefits to 
which they are not entitled because of unreported earnings.
Limitations
Despite the thoroughness of the benefit eligibility verifications 
undertaken in the K-B study, the results very likely tend to 
understate the extent of true overpayments in the study cities. 
First, the initial presumption at the time a case was selected for 
review was that the claimant was entitled to the payment 
received for that week; this presumption resulted from the fact 
that the payment already had been processed through the routine 
UC program operating system, and that the claimant had been 
found eligible for UC support by that process. As a result, this 
initial presumption was not reversed unless documented evi 
dence to the contrary was obtained during the course of the 
investigation. In some instances, such evidence was difficult to 
obtain simply because the benefit eligibility verifications had to 
be conducted many weeks following the key weeks for which 
UC payments had been made. Thus, some true overpayment 
cases undoubtedly were classified as proper payments in the K-B
26. In wage-reporting states, covered employers routinely submit to the state UC agency 
information on wages earned by all of their employees during the quarter, whether or not this 
information is needed at that time to determine whether a particular worker is eligible for UC 
support. By way of contrast, in request-reporting states firms submit wage information to the state 
UC agency only upon request. These requests occur when a former employee of a firm files for 
benefits and his/her eligibility may depend on earnings with that firm. Postaudit procedures are 
facilitated by the types of wage information generally available in wage-reporting states, but other 
sources of wage data or other procedures to detect working violators are used in request-reporting 
states. USDOL has mandated that all states adopt wage-reporting procedures.
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study simply because sufficient documentation to establish an 
overpayment could not be obtained.
A second reason why overpayments were underestimated in 
the K-B study relates to the problems associated with detecting 
those who receive UC support while working. The postaudit 
procedures are effective only if unreported earnings occur in 
UC-covered employment. Unreported earnings in the "cash 
economy" or in the "underground economy" are unlikely to be 
detected by such procedures and thereby constitute a potentially 
significant source of undetected overpayments. Because over 
payments due to unreported earnings are more likely to be 
established as fraud than nonfraud overpayments, this tendency 
towards underestimation of overpayments is much more likely to 
have affected the estimates of fraud than nonfraud overpay 
ments. 27 Nonetheless, the results produced by the K-B study 
clearly represented the most reliable information produced up to 
that date on the extent and incidence of overpayments in the UC 
program.
Findings
The most conservative measure of overpayments used in the 
K-B study included only those cases in which official actions 
were taken by state agencies as a result of the findings of the 
investigative teams. 28 By this measure, the percentage of total 
UC benefits overpaid in the six cities ranged from 3.8 percent in 
City 1 to 24.3 percent in City 6 (see column 2 of table 2 1). 
Estimated overpayment rates exceeded 13 percent of all benefits 
paid in four of the six cities, and at least $1 in $12 of UC benefits 
were overpaid in five of the six cities during the six-month study
27. In contrast to the tendencies for understating true overpayment rates discussed in the text, 
it is conceivable that the inclusion of only timely payments in the K-B study may have tended to 
slightly overstate true overpayments. This would be the case if the excluded weeks were less 
likely than included weeks to be overpaid because of the extra UC agency scrutiny associated 
with at least some of the delayed payments excluded from the study. Timely weeks were those 
paid (or processed, for waiting weeks) within seven (fourteen) calendar days of the week-ending 
date of the compensated week of unemployment in states where certifications for benefits were 
filed on a weekly (biweekly) basis. See Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 21-25).
28. Two more broadly defined measures of overpayments/improper payments in the K-B study 
included additional cases that could be considered improper payments, even though no official UI 
agency actions were taken. For further details, see Kingston and Burgess (1981b:13-15).
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TABLE 2-1
Kingston-Burgess Study Overpayment Rates 
____ October, 1979-March, 1980 _____ ____
Estimated Overpayment Rates for Total 
Dollars of Benefits Paid: 3
City"
1
2
3
4
5
6
Simple 6-City Average
All Overpayments0
3.8%
8.6%
13.3%
16.7%
16.8%
24.3%
13.9%
Fraud Onlyd
0.8%
3.4%
2.5%
4.6%
0.8%
1.6%
2.3%
Source: Kingston and Burgess (1981: 34).
a These rates are estimates for each city©s total dollars of UI payments made to
intrastate claimants. 
b Cities are arrayed in ascending order from 1-6 on the basis of total overpayment
rates. Cities are not identified by name in accordance with an agreement reached with
participating state UC agencies at the outset of the study. 
c Based on overpayments actually established against the weeks of unemployment as
a result of the K-B Study investigations. Claimants had available to them the usual
formal appeals process to dispute any of these overpayments. 
d Although the specific definitions vary somewhat among the states, willful misrep 
resentation of facts by claimants to obtain benefits typically is the distinguishing
characteristic of a fraudulent overpayment.
period. Overall, the simple average of the overpayment rates for 
the six cities amounted to 13.9 percent. For the six cities taken 
together, the most frequent cause of overpayments accounting 
for more than one-third of the total of weeks overpaid was the 
failure of claimants to satisfy the availability-for-work and the 
active worksearch criteria.
The K-B study estimates of fraud overpayments ranged from 
less than 1 percent of all dollars paid to a high of 4.6 percent, and 
these rates exceeded 2.5 percent in half of the project cities (see 
column 3 of table 2-1). The simple average of the fraud rates for 
the six cities was 2.3 percent. As noted above, however, an 
important but unanswered question is the extent of undetected 
overpayments in these six cities due to unreported earnings in the 
cash economy; if detected, such violations very likely would 
have been established as fraud overpayments.
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TABLE 2-2
Kingston-Burgess Study vs. Routine State Agency Overpayment Rates 
October-December, 1979a
Estimated Total Overpayment Rates: 
Percent of Total Dollars of Benefits Paidb
Routinely Detected UC 
Cityc K-B Study Rate Agency Rated
1
2
3
4
5
6
Simple 6-City Average
2.3%
7.0%
14.5%
14.1%
20.1%
25.4%
13.9%
0.5%
1.7%
6.0%
2.0%
2.8%
0.6%
2.3%
Source: Kingston and Burgess (1981: 46).
a Comparisons are confined to the last quarter of 1979 because sufficient data for the
first quarter of 1980 were not available. 
b These rates are estimates for each city©s total dollars of UI payments made to
intrastate claimants. 
c Cities are arrayed in ascending order from 1-6 on the basis of total overpayment
rates. Cities are not identified by name in accordance with an agreement reached with
participating state UC agencies at the outset of the study. 
d For two cities, the entire postaudit process had not been completed at the time
overpayment files were reviewed. Thus, two of the rates (which include completed
postaudit results) reported in this column might be slight underestimates.
Strong evidence that actual overpayment rates greatly exceed 
those detected by routine state UC program procedures also was 
provided by the K-B study findings. For the fourth quarter of 
1979, the percentage of dollars paid in UC benefits that were both 
overpaid and detected through normal benefit payment control 
procedures was calculated for each city and compared to the 
dollar overpayment rate estimated for the same period by the 
K-B study (see table 2-2). For the city with the smallest 
difference (City 3), the K-B study overpayment rate was 2.4 
times larger than the routine state agency rate. For the city with 
the largest difference (City 6), the K-B study overpayment rate 
was 42 times the rate of overpayments detected by routine state 
agency procedures. Overall for the six cities, the simple average 
of the K-B study rates of 13.9 percent was more than six times the
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simple average of the routine state UC agency overpayment rates 
of 2.3 percent. These findings clearly suggest that accurate 
information about actual overpayment rates in the UC program is 
not provided by the reports submitted by the states to USDOL.
Reactions to the K-B Study
The findings of the K-B study were submitted in April of 1980 
to the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation in 
the form of an interim report, 29 so that the results could be used 
by the Commission in preparing its recommendations to the 
Congress. On the basis of this report and other findings presented 
to the Commission, the following recommendations were for 
warded to the Congress by the NCUC: (1) comprehensive audits 
of selected cases should become a regular feature of the UC 
program; (2) USDOL should begin a national study of different 
approaches to establish quality controls consistent with the 
prompt payment of benefits, minimum error rates and cost 
effectiveness; and (3) the Secretary of Labor should include, as 
a part of the audit of state UC agency administrative allocations 
or as part of performance evaluations, provisions for a random 
ized audit of all functions that have an impact on the incidence 
and control of error and fraud. 30
Burgess-Kingston-St. Louis Analysis of Random 
Audit Program Pilot Tests
One response of USDOL to the K-B study findings was to 
refine and pilot test the K-B study methodology in five statewide 
UC programs for an entire year. At the conclusion of these tests, 
the findings were analyzed by Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis 
(B-K-S) and a series of reports summarizing the methodology, 
findings and implications of the Random Audit program pilot 
tests were prepared for USDOL. These reports contain the most 
comprehensive evidence available on payment errors in the UC
29. Burgess and Kingston (1980).
30. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 109-110).
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program. The principal features of the RA program pilot tests 
and of the B-K-S analysis are considered in some detail below.
Overview of the RA Program
The Random Audit program pilot tests were conducted for a 
one-year period beginning April 1981 in the States of Illinois, 
Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey and Washington. 31 Specially 
trained UC program investigators were selected to conduct the 
benefit eligibility verifications for the weekly samples of state 
wide UC payments selected in each of the five states. The 
investigative methodology was closely patterned after that used 
in the K-B overpayment study undertaken for the NCUC. 
Lengthy interviews with claimants, the completion of a detailed 
questionnaire related to various aspects of the claimant©s eligi 
bility for benefits during the key week, and comprehensive 
third-party verifications of claimant statements and certifications 
related to benefit eligibility were conducted. With the exception 
that no postaudits were routinely conducted, these investigations 
were at least as thorough, if not more so, than those conducted 
in the K-B overpayment study.
Principal Findings and Interpretations
In contrast with the K-B study, the B-K-S analysis provided 
some information on underpayments, as well as overpayments, 
in state UC programs. These underpayment estimates, which are 
reported in the appendix table, indicate that underpayments 
occurred in as few as 0.9 percent of the weeks paid statewide (in 
Kansas) and in as many as 13.9 percent of the weeks paid 
statewide (in New Jersey). The simple average of these under 
payment rates for weeks paid for the five states combined is 6.3 
percent. Underpayment rates measured in terms of weeks under 
paid, however, do not accurately reflect the magnitude of such 
underpayment errors in terms of dollars paid. The dollar amounts
31. See Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982) for a much more comprehensive report on 
these pilot tests; Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1984) for a convenient summary of some of 
the major study findings; and Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986) for an analysis of some of 
the major implications of the study findings.
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of the underpayment errors typically were quite small; expressed 
as a percentage of all UC benefits paid statewide, they did not 
exceed 1 percent in any of the five pilot test states. The 
frequency of underpayments of small dollar amounts was due 
primarily to errors in the reporting or recording of claimants© 
qualifying earnings in a one-year period prior to the unemploy 
ment spell. It should be emphasized, however, that even though 
the underpayment rates expressed as a percentage of dollars paid 
tended to be quite small, they exclude a potentially important 
source of additional UC underpayments: erroneous denials of 
benefits (for which no benefits are paid). Consequently, further 
research on underpayments will be required before the actual 
magnitude of all UC system underpayments can be accurately 
estimated. Some additional details on underpayments are pro 
vided in the appendix to this chapter. 32
The focal point of the B-K-S analysis of the RA pilot tests was 
UC overpayments, rather than underpayments. The percentage 
of weeks paid statewide that were overpaid during the one-year 
pilot test period ranged from 10.5 percent to 38.2 percent in these 
five B-K-S study states (see table 2 3). As was the case for 
underpayments, the estimated overpayment rates in each state 
were somewhat lower for dollars of benefits paid than for weeks 
of benefits paid: the simple average overpayment rate for dollars 
of benefits paid for these five states was 13.1 percent, compared 
with the simple average overpayment rate for weeks of benefits 
paid of 19.8 percent. Overpayment rates for weeks paid exceed 
those for dollars paid mainly because of a number of sampled 
weeks with overpayments of small dollar amounts. 33 As was the 
case for underpayments, errors in reporting or recording base
32. Also see Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 33 and 48-49) for further discussion of 
this issue.
33. For example, if an employer misreported a claimant©s base period wages so that a error 
occurred in the calculation of the claimant©s weekly benefit payment, that (entire) week would be 
counted as an overpayment in calculating the overpayment rate for weeks of benefits paid, but 
only the single dollar overpaid would be counted as an overpayment in calculating the 
overpayment rate for dollars of benefits paid. See Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 48-52) 
and Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 325) for a discussion of the circumstances in several 
of the RA states that resulted in frequent overpayments of small dollar amounts.
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TABLE 2-3
Kingston-Burgess-St. Louis Study Overpayment Rates 
April, 1981-March, 1982
Estimated Percentage Overpayment Rates For: 2
State
Illinois
Kansas
Louisiana
New Jersey
Washington
Simple 5-State Average
Weeks Paid
(Total)
16.0%
14.1%
10.5%
38.2%
20.0%
19.8%
Dollars Paid
(Total)
11.9%
12.9%
7.3%
24.3%
9.3%
13.1%
Dollars Paid
(Work search
violations)
5.7%
10.3%
3.6%
17.3%
4.6%
8.3%
Dollars Paid
(Fraud)
1.2%
0.2%
2.7%
1.9%
2.1%
1.6%
Source: Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 47, 58).
a These rates are point estimates for each state©s population of UC payments made to 
intrastate claimants. The rates are based on overpayments actually established by the 
participating state agencies against the sampled weeks investigated. Claimants had 
available to them the usual formal appeal process to dispute any of these 
overpayments.
period wages also were the most frequent cause of overpayments 
of small dollar amounts. 34
Information provided in table 2-3 also indicates that violations 
of the worksearch requirement accounted for a substantial 
proportion of all UC dollars overpaid in these five states. The 
percentage of total dollars of UC benefits overpaid due to 
violations of the worksearch requirement ranged from 3.6 
percent to 17.3 percent, with a simple average for the five states 
combined of 8.3 percent. In each of the states, nearly half or 
more of the total of dollars overpaid resulted from failures of 
claimants to satisfy worksearch requirements. Because of the 
importance of worksearch violations, this topic is discussed in 
considerably more detail in chapter 7.
Estimates of the dollar rates of fraud overpayments also are 
provided in table 2-3; these rates ranged from only 0.2 percent to 
2.7 percent in the five states, and the simple average of these 
rates is 1.6 percent. Although the average fraud rate is much 
lower than the average total overpayment rate estimated for the
34. Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 49-52).
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five states, it actually exceeds the rate of overpayments for fraud 
and nonfraud cases combined (of 1.28 percent) reported by 
USDOL for the UC system as a whole for a nearly comparable 
one-year period. 35 In view of the fact that the B-K-S study 
estimates are based on investigations that did not include 
postaudits to detect instances of unreported earnings the most 
frequent basis for establishing fraud overpayments these re 
sults strongly reinforce the findings of the K-B study that the 
official overpayment rates (especially for fraud cases) published 
by USDOL tend to substantially understate actual overpayment 
rates. The difficulties involved in detecting instances of unre 
ported earnings in the "cash economy" clearly indicate that the 
overpayment rate estimates reported both by USDOL and in the 
B-K-S study understate true overpayment rates, especially fraud 
overpayment rates.
Additional factors also tended to produce low estimates of 
actual overpayment rates in the B-K-S study. The ex post nature 
of the investigations and the initial presumption that key weeks 
were properly paid both contribute to such an underestimation, 
as they did in the K-B study. Also, two of the B-K-S study states 
required that overpayments could not be established for viola 
tions of the worksearch requirement unless claimants previously 
had received formal warnings (usually in writing) that their 
job-seeking efforts were deficient. Other state-specific circum 
stances also contributed to an underestimation of actual overpay 
ment rates36 and to the diversity of the estimated rates. 37
The above considerations indicate that the overpayment rates 
in table 2-3 understate actual overpayment rates in these states. 
Overall, the existence of an overpayment problem of substantial 
proportions for the UC system as a whole is strongly suggested 
by the findings in this section. In fact, the estimated total dollars 
overpaid just in the five pilot test states during the one-year study 
period ($392 million) actually exceed by 60 percent the total of 
all UC overpayments officially reported by USDOL for the entire
35. U.S. Department of Labor (1982a:3).
36. See Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 326) for further details.
37. Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 60).
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nationwide UC system for approximately the same one-year 
period. 38
More Recent Evidence on UC Overpayments
Even before the B-K-S evaluation of the RA program pilot 
tests had been completed, USDOL had determined that the RA 
program would be continued as an operational feature of the UC 
system. In 1982, 10 additional states agreed to participate in the 
program and, as of 1984, a total of 46 jurisdictions were 
included. As a result, much more evidence on overpayments in 
state UC programs currently is available, but relatively little of 
that information has been released by USDOL. 39 However, in 
May of 1987 USDOL released data for the 46 states that 
participated in the Random Audit program during FY 1985. The 
unweighted average overpayment rate for these states was 15.6 
percent. 40 Based on approximately $14.3 billion of UC benefit 
payments during FY 1985, USDOL estimated that overpayments 
could have amounted to as much as $2.2 billion during that 
one-year period. 41 Furthermore, if UC program outlays average 
$16 billion per year over the next four years, as USDOL recently 
has projected, a 15 percent overpayment rate would result in 
overpayments during this interval of about $9.6 billion. 42 These 
estimates indicate the potential magnitude of the overpayment 
problem in the UC program.
Summary and Conclusions
Relatively little factual information was available on overpay 
ments in the UC program prior to 1980. Throughout the first 45
38. The benefit payment control procedures routinely used by state UC agencies resulted in a 
total of $239.4 million in overpayments that were established and reported by all UC jurisdictions 
combined from July 1981 through June 1982 [see U.S. Department of Labor (1982a)]. This 
one-year interval overlaps much of the April 1981 through March 1982 Random Audit program 
pilot test period. Both of the above overpayment figures relate to overpayments in regular state 
UC programs and exclude extended duration and special UC programs.
39. It is the position of USDOL that, because the states that participated in the Random Audit 
program were "volunteers," decisions about the public release of RA program data were (and 
are) to be made by state, not federal, authorities.
40. U.S. Department of Labor (1987: III-J-49).
41. U.S. Department of Labor (1987: III-J-49).
42. U.S. Department of Labor (1987: III-J-53).
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years of the program©s history, allegations of UC fraud and abuse 
appeared periodically, but no solid basis existed to substantiate 
such claims. Those closest to the UC program federal and state 
UC program administrators and those who had seriously at 
tempted to gather and evaluate evidence on UC overpayments  
generally agreed that, with the possible exception of the 1945- 
1947 reconversion period, the program had not been subject to 
excessive overpayments or abuse. Official statistics on overpay 
ments actually detected and established by state UC agencies 
tended to support these optimistic pre-1980 views. By way of 
contrast, those less familar with the program and the public 
at-large expressed greater concerns about fraud, overpayments 
and abuse of the UC system; the lack of supporting documenta 
tion, however, tended to erode the substance of these concerns. 
More reliable evidence on the actual extent of payment errors 
in the UC system has become available since 1980. Findings 
from the K-B and B-K-S studies, in conjunction with the limited 
additional information released by USDOL on overpayments 
detected by the Random Audit program since 1982, provide a 
strong basis for the view that relatively high overpayment rates 
may exist in many statewide UC programs. For example, current 
USDOL estimates indicate overpayments could amount to more 
than $9 billion over the next four years. Such an estimate 
indicates the existence of a potentially major overpayment 
problem in the nationwide UC system. Although overpayments 
are problems in and of themselves, however, they are symptom 
atic of more fundamental defects in the current UC system. The 
analysis in the next five chapters addresses these more funda 
mental issues.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
SUMMARY OF UNDERPAYMENT EVIDENCE FROM THE
B-K-S STUDY
This study does not focus on underpayments in the UC system. 
Nonetheless, some information is available from the B-K-S 
analysis of the RA program pilot tests that indicates the fre 
quency and magnitude of underpayment errors in the population 
of UC payments actually made [see Burgess, Kingston and St. 
Louis (1982: 45-46)]. It should be emphasized, however, that 
these statistics exclude underpayments that occur because of 
erroneous denials of benefits (for which no payments are made). 
Consequently, the information available from the B-K-S study is 
quite limited and may exclude an important proportion of total 
underpayments in the UC program.
Underpayment information for the B-K-S study is summarized 
in the appendix table. The percentages of weeks paid in which 
underpayments occurred ranged from 0.9 percent to 13.9 percent 
for the five B-K-S states. The simple average of these underpay 
ment rates was 6.3 percent. However, the relatively frequent 
underpayment errors in two of the states, New Jersey and 
Washington, merit additional comment.
The relatively high percentage of underpaid weeks in New 
Jersey likely reflects the "request-reporting" system used in that 
state (but not in the other four pilot test states) to obtain 
information from employers on the qualifying wage credits of 
potential UC claimants; under this system, covered employers 
report such wage information only upon request by the state UC 
agency at the time a potential UC claimant files for benefits. 
Delays and inaccuracies that occur in employer responses to such 
requests or inaccuracies in claimant estimates of prior wages tend 
to result in more frequent payment errors because of incorrect 
monetary determinations than would be expected in "wage 
reporting" states (in which employers routinely submit wage 
information on all covered employees on a quarterly basis).
The relatively high underpayment error rate estimated for 
Washington likely resulted from an inconsistency in employment 
security law that required wages to be reported on the basis of the
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amount earned per period, while weekly UC benefit amounts 
were calculated on the amounts paid per period. Following the 
B-K-S study pilot test period, this inconsistency was corrected.
Of particular importance in appendix table 1 is the fact that 
underpayments expressed in terms of dollars paid were much 
smaller than those expressed in terms of weeks paid. For 
example, in New Jersey 13.9 percent of the weeks paid but only 
1.0 percent of the dollars paid were overpaid. Similarly, in 
Washington 11.7 percent of the weeks paid but only 1.0 percent 
of the dollars paid were overpaid. This large difference is due to 
the fact that many (most) underpayments in these states involved 
very small dollar amounts and were primarily due to errors in the 
reporting of qualifying wage credits by employers. In terms of 
dollars of UC benefits paid, the simple five-state average rate of 
underpayments was only 0.6 percent. Consequently, in terms of 
the dollar volume of payment errors, the evidence presented here 
tends to suggest that underpayments are much smaller than 
overpayments. It should again be emphasized, however, that 
these comparisons are based on weekly samples of UC pay 
ments, not UC claims. As a result, a potentially significant 
source of underpayments (claims erroneously denied) is ex 
cluded from this comparison.
As noted in chapter 1, some efforts now are underway to 
estimate underpayments in the population of UC claims filed. As 
one part of USDOL©s new Quality Control program, several 
research designs have been developed for pilot tests of method 
ologies to estimate UC system underpayments. However, esti 
mating underpayment errors tends to be more complex than 
estimating overpayments. For example, some potential claimants 
may receive erroneous information that discourages them from 
even filing a claim for benefits, and such "underpayments" are 
virtually impossible to detect. In some states, computerized files 
of denied claims also are either unavailable or difficult to access. 
Difficulties in estimating underpayments also arise because of 
the sequence of eligibility criteria that must be satisfied by UC 
claimants. For example, even if a claimant were mistakenly 
denied benefits because of allegedly insufficient prior earnings
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Kingston-Burgess-St. Louis Study Underpayment Rates 
________________April, 1981-March, 1982________________
Estimated Percentage Underpayment Rate For: 3
State
Illinois
Kansas
Louisiana
New Jersey
Washington
Simple Average
Total Weeks Paid
3.1%
0.9%
1.7%
13.9%
11.7%
6.3%
Total Dollars Paid
0.8%
0.1%
0.1%
1.0%
1.0%
0.6%
Source: Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 47).
a These rates are point estimates for each state©s population of UC payments made to 
intrastate claimants. The rates are based on underpayments detected for the sampled 
weeks investigated in the B-K-S study. Underpayment rates in the "weeks paid" 
column reflect the percentage of total weeks paid that were underpaid by some 
amount. Underpayment rates in the "dollars paid" column reflect the ratio of total 
dollars underpaid to total dollars paid, expressed as a percentage. Underpayments 
that occur because of an erroneous denial of benefits (in which no benefits are paid) 
are not included in the above tabulations.
or employment, one can not be certain that this claimant would 
have satisfied all other eligibility criteria (e.g., an appropriate 
reason for separating from employment); consequently, an erro 
neous denial of benefits at one point may or may not ultimately 
lead to an underpayment of benefits. As the results of these 
USDOL-sponsored studies become available and are combined 
with information on underpayments in the population of UC 
benefits paid, a more accurate assessment of UC system under 
payments will be possible.

UC System Complexity
Adverse Effects and Responses
The UC system may not be an excessively complex payment 
system compared to many other government programs, such as 
defense contracting, public welfare programs or state worker 
compensation programs. Moreover, complexity per se is not 
necessarily an undesirable feature of a social payment system. In 
fact, the current level of complexity in the UC system obviously 
reflects the interactions of economic, social, judicial and polit 
ical considerations that have shaped the evolution of the system 
over the past 50 years. The complexity of any social payment 
system is, of course, a relative concept which requires some 
basis for evaluation. Appropriate criteria for such an evaluation 
include efficiency and equity considerations, and also the max 
imum level of real resources likely to be committed for admin 
istering program provisions.
What makes UC program complexity a serious problem is that 
it results in a number of adverse impacts, including: (1) high 
payment error rates; (2) unequal treatment of claimants and 
employers who interact with the system under similar circum 
stances; (3) inefficiencies in administering program provisions; 
and (4) public misunderstanding and confusion that may weaken 
support for desirable program goals. In addition, complex 
program provisions necessarily place some discretionary power 
in the hands of state agency personnel who must interpret and 
administer such provisions in the numerous specific circum 
stances that arise. Some of the decisions made by different 
agency personnel under widely differing circumstances undoubt-
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edly result in de facto policy decisions contrary to the legislative 
intent. Given these adverse impacts, and in light of any equity or 
other benefits that existing levels of complexity are believed to 
produce, it is our judgment that the present UC system is unduly 
complex.
The existing level of UC system complexity can be traced to a 
number of factors. Partly, it reflects the results of a multitude of 
political compromises made over the past half century at both the 
federal and state levels to accommodate the conflicting interests 
of employers and workers. Complexity also can be traced to a 
number of federal requirements imposed on state UC programs, 
partly as a result of certain judicial decisions (some of which are 
discussed in chapter 5). Other causes of existing complexity 
reflect attempts by legislators and UC administrative agencies to 
make subtle distinctions about particular claimant circumstances. 
Complexity also has resulted from the increasing emphasis in 
recent years on "legalism" in the administrative procedures of 
social programs and on ensuring due process for social program 
participants, partly as a result of federal and state court deci 
sions. The evolution of UC program complexity is an interesting 
topic in itself, and one that has been dealt with by Haber and 
Murray as well as Rubin. 1 The purpose here, however, is to 
analyze the implications of and responses to system complexity.
There are three obvious approaches for dealing with the 
adverse effects of program complexity: increase the resources for 
administering the existing UC system; reduce the level of 
complexity within the current system; or devise better methods 
for administering existing (or reduced) levels of complexity. 
Because it does not appear that substantially increased adminis 
trative funding would be either feasible or cost effective, only the 
latter two responses to program complexity are analyzed in this 
chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, evidence that the 
existing system is a complex one is presented. Second, some 
major impacts and implications of that complexity are briefly
1. Haber and Murray (1966) and Rubin (1983).
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discussed. Then, some possible responses to those impacts are 
considered. A conclusion completes the chapter. 2
Evidence of System Complexity
The UC program is generally complex with regard to benefit 
eligibility determinations. This section provides a few illustra 
tions of such complexity, including: (1) a simple flowchart of the 
UC eligibility determination process; (2) an example of the 
written guidelines many states use in attempting to concretely 
define UC law/policy in the large variety of different situations 
that arise in determining claimant eligibility for benefits; (3) the 
complexities added to the UC system by federal laws, standards 
and programs; and (4) the time required to verify the eligibility 
of claimants for benefits.
UC Eligibility Criteria Overview
The UC system is designed to provide benefits to workers who 
have recent work experience, who become unemployed through 
no fault of their own, who are able to work, who are currently 
unemployed, and who are available for employment. All state 
systems have eligibility criteria that can be grouped into three 
basic categories: (1) monetary requirements that specify a 
minimum level and acceptable pattern of earnings (or employ 
ment) prior to unemployment; (2) job separation requirements 
that specify acceptable reasons for leaving prior jobs; and (3) 
current unemployment, ability-to-work and availability-for-work 
requirements that specify the weekly conditions under which 
workers are entitled to continue receiving support. Although the 
details included in state systems for each of these three categories 
vary substantially, the categories provide a useful framework for 
reviewing general UC system eligibility criteria. 3
2. We are indebted to Saul J. Blaustein (1986) and H. Allan Hunt of the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for substantial assistance in clarifying the issues and organizing the discussion in this chapter.
3. See The National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation
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Analysis of just the main UC eligibility concepts mentioned in 
the three categories above could be quite complicated, but 
particular state provisions actually involve many additional 
issues that must be addressed in applying these concepts. The 
flowchart presented in figure 3 1 provides a simplified illustra 
tion of the specific provisions of claimant eligibility criteria that 
are quite typical of the major features of most state programs. 
The issues involved in processing particular cases often would be 
much more complicated still. 4
Monetary Eligibility. All states require that claimants meet 
certain minimums for earnings or employment in order to be 
eligible for benefits. A major rationale for such requirements is 
that UC benefits are intended only for unemployed persons who 
have demonstrated adequate work attachment in terms of em 
ployment in the recent past. The specific requirements vary 
considerably among the states, but generally involve steps 1-4 in 
figure 3 1. In some cases, particularly for claimants who have 
only one employer in their base periods and who file in quarterly 
wage-report states (where wages are routinely reported to the 
state UC agency by employers), the entire monetary determina 
tion process can be a relatively simple one.
Even the conceptually simple monetary determination process 
can result in errors for a variety of reasons, however. Errors can 
arise, for example, in determining whether a particular job 
actually involved employment and earnings covered by a state©s 
law. Also, errors in entering either claimant social security 
numbers or wage/employment credits by employers or agency 
personnel can result in payment errors. Multiple employers for 
individual claimants obviously contribute to the complexity 
of accurately determining monetary eligibility to some extent. 
Given that millions of wage items are processed annually by 
even relatively small states, some data entry errors would be 
expected even in states with meticulous data verification
(1985c or 1986a) for a very convenient and annually updated reference for comparing various 
eligibility provisions among the states.
4. For example, the administrator of Arizona©s UC program has strongly emphasized how 
simplified figure 3-1 is in terms of reflecting all of the potential issues in processing claimants 
in Arizona. See Vaughn (1985).
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FIGURE 3 -1
SIMPLIFIED FLOWCHART OF CLAIMANT INTERACTIONS 
WITH ARIZONA©S UMEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM
REOUALIFYING WAGES NEEDED
WHEN CLAIMS TO BEGIN TWO
DIFFERENT BENEFIT YEARS
ARE FILED WITHIN 18
MONTH PERIOD
Abbreviations used in chart: 
WBA - Weekly Benefit Amount 
MBA • Maximum Benefit Award 
BP • Base Period
44 CHAPTER 3
Figure 3-1 (continued)
INVESTIGATE 
REASON FOR 
SEPARATION
YES
FIND CLAIMANT 
ELIGIBLE AND 
NONCHARGE 
EMPLOYER
1
C GO TO STEP 7 J
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Figure 3-1 (continued)
6d.
EMPLOYERS CHARGED FOR 
VOLUNTARY QUITS WITH GOOD CAUSE
AND DISCHARGES WITHOUT DIS 
REGARD OF EMPLOYERS INTERESTS
46 CHAPTER 3
Figure 3-1 (continued)
DISQUALIFICATION FOR
WEEK OF REFUSAL AND
UNTIL CLAIMANT EARNS
8 TIMES WBA
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE TO
OBTAIN BENEFITS IN PRECEDING
24 MONTHS WILL DISQUALIFY
CLAIMANT FOR NOT MORE
THAN 52 WEEKS
ON TRANSITIONAL CLAIM
WAITING WEEK IS 1st WEEK
AFTER BREAK IN FILING
Source: Adapted for Anderson et al. (1977) The specific provfeions i 
flowchart were included in Arizona's law as of June. 1977.
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procedures. 5 In addition, wage-reporting errors may result from 
complex reporting forms. 6 Because of the difficulty of accurately 
determining benefit amounts in a timely manner for claimants in states 
with wage-request (rather than wage-report) systems, higher monetary 
determination error rates would be expected in these states; consistent 
with this expectation, the one wage-request state included in the B-K-S 
study had a much higher monetary determination error rate than any of 
the other four states. 7 As another example, an inconsistency was found 
in one of the B-K-S study states which required employers to report 
wages when paid but required benefit determinations to be based on 
wages when earned. 9
The brief discussion above indicates that even the potentially 
simple process of determining a claimant©s monetary eligibility 
for benefits can entail a number of possible complexities which 
can result in either overpayments or underpayments. Some 
evidence about the frequency with which monetary errors occur 
is available from the B-K-S study. For example, the simple 
averages for weeks with monetary errors in the five statewide 
study populations are: 14.8 percent for errors in weekly benefit 
amounts; 18.9 percent for errors in maximum benefit awards; 
and 31.3 percent for errors in base period wages. 9 Although all 
of these errors clearly cannot be attributed to complexity, 10 their 
numbers might be reduced to some extent by reducing the 
complexity of the monetary determination process.
Job Separation Issues. A second general category of eligibility
5. For example, about 1.5 million UC wage items had to be processed in the relatively small 
state of Arizona in a recent year. See Vaughn (1985).
6. For example, Raymond Thorne, the,. Employment Division administrator for Oregon, 
believes that wage reporting errors may result from complex forms. As a result, Oregon has 
redesigned its wage-report forms to reduce such errors. Experience with these revised forms 
indicates that errors have been reduced. See Thorne (1985a and 1985b).
7. New Jersey was the only wage-request state included in the B-K-S study. It was found that 
36.1 percent of the cases in New Jersey had incorrectly calculated weekly benefit amounts, 
compared to a simple average of 9.5 percent of the cases in the other four states. See Burgess, 
Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 49-50).
8.- Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 51-52). On the basis of these findings, Washington 
subsequently changed its law to rectify the inconsistency noted in the text.
9. Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 49-50).
10. Special circumstances in both Washington and New Jersey accounted for the unusually 
high error rates found in those states.
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criteria includes provisions intended to target benefit payments to 
persons who have become involuntarily unemployed through no 
fault of their own. In contrast with the relatively objective 
monetary eligibility determination, attempting to determine why 
workers have become unemployed is an elusive issue approached 
in most states by complicated criteria that can only be measured 
subjectively. 11 Although the general concept that UC recipients 
should be unemployed through no fault of their own is a 
relatively simple one, making the specific distinctions required 
to implement the concept is a difficult task. For persons 
unemployed for reasons other than a layoff due to lack of work, 
some additional review of job separation circumstances usually 
is required prior to the payment of UC benefits (see step 6 of 
figure 3-1). This review is designed to deal with the numerous 
exceptions which distinguish disqualifying and nondisqualifying 
separations from employment.
One example of the complexity of job separation issues is the 
seemingly simple concept of a voluntary quit. Most might agree 
that people who voluntarily quit their jobs should not be entitled 
to receive UC benefits, at least not immediately after they quit 
their jobs. However, even if agreement were reached on that 
concept, how would UC personnel determine the difference 
between a voluntary and an involuntary quit? Moreover, identi 
fying voluntary quits necessarily raises the difficult issue of 
whether employees were forced to quit for "good cause" 
because of employer actions. What would constitute the differ 
ence between "good" causes and other causes in such cases (see 
step 6c of figure 3-1)? Obviously, the validity of a cause for 
quitting will depend on subjective judgments to some extent, 
even though state laws/policies attempt to distinguish between 
"good" and other causes for quitting. For example, some states 
pay benefits to workers who voluntarily quit their jobs if their 
actions were the result of compelling personal reasons (see step 
6a of figure 3-1.) 12 In fact, as of January 1, 1985, most states
11. Packard (1972) provides a good discussion of these issues.
12. One of several such exceptions in Arizona was made for persons who were compelled to 
quit their jobs to accompany their spouses who were moving out of state to accept new 
employment. See Anderson et al. (1977: 13-14).
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recognized some such exceptions to the general rule that a 
claimant who voluntarily quits a job is not entitled to receive UC 
benefits. 13
Another dimension of the complexity in evaluating job sepa 
ration circumstances is that workers who are discharged for 
"willful misconduct" or "disregard of an employer©s interests" 
are not eligible for benefits (see step 6d of figure 3-1). Such 
issues can be particularly difficult to evaluate because of the 
difficulty of correctly identifying the elements that comprise 
willful misconduct. In fact, Packard contends that such issues 
represent the "most mysterious area" of unemployment com 
pensation. 14
Another example of a difficult job separation issue is provided 
by the labor dispute provisions that are contained in all state laws 
(see step 6b of figure 3-1). "Interested parties" to a labor dispute 
oftentimes are not entitled to receive UC benefits for any week of 
unemployment caused by the dispute. Although it might not 
seem to be a difficult matter to make the required determinations, 
substantial complexity actually could arise in determining who 
initiated the labor dispute, whether a particular claimant has a 
"direct interest" in a dispute and in deciding other issues that 
arise in adjudicating labor dispute issues. 15
Weekly Eligibility Criteria. Assuming that a claimant were 
monetarily eligible for benefits and had become unemployed for 
a nondisqualifying reason, then a number of other criteria must 
be satisfied on a weekly basis in order to remain eligible for 
benefits. Included among these weekly requirements are provi 
sions that are intended to ensure that claimants receive benefits 
only if they: (1) continue to remain unemployed (rather than 
become reemployed); (2) are available for work, including an 
active job search in most states; (3) are able to work; and (4) do 
not refuse offers of suitable employment. Each of these weekly 
eligibility requirements is briefly discussed below.
All states specify that during the week for which they claim
13. National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985: 
55-58).
14. Packard (1972: 644).
15. See Anderson et al. (1977: 14) for a brief discussion of some of these issues.
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benefits, claimants shall not have worked or, if they did have 
some limited employment, shall not have earned over a specified 
amount of wages (see step 5 of figure 3-1). All states allow for 
partial weekly benefits by reducing the full weekly benefit 
payable by a portion of any wages earned during the week. 16 To 
correctly enforce such provisions, it is necessary, on a weekly 
basis, to accurately: record the amount of any earnings reported 
by the claimant; apply the state formula to determine the amount 
of the deduction to be made from the full weekly benefit amount; 
and calculate the partial benefit payable, if any. The main 
difficulties involved in monitoring claimant compliance with 
weekly reporting criteria obviously relate to detecting earnings 
or employment, not to making the calculations necessary. 
However, detecting employment that claimants wish to conceal 
is an especially difficult task for the UC system, with the 
exception that unreported earnings in UC-covered employment 
can be detected easily through the postaudit procedures described 
in chapter 2. 17
Another major requirement for weekly benefit eligibility in all 
states is that claimants be available for work (see step 7b in 
figure 3 1). Enforcing this requirement is one of the most 
difficult administrative tasks confronted by state programs, 18 
because availability for employment depends largely on a claim-
16. The discussion in the text does not address the differential treatment accorded to claimants 
under a relatively new concept work sharing provided for in seven states (including Arizona) 
as of January 1985. Under such programs, claimants put on reduced hours (rather than on layoffs) 
by employers with reduced workloads may qualify for UC benefits to compensate for the hours 
lost. See National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation 
(1985: 50-51).
17. Another issue that revolves around the unemployment v. employment issue is the treatment 
of vacation or sick pay that is received after a worker leaves his/her job (see step 7a in figure 
3-1).
18. An extreme and somewhat bizarre, yet illuminating, example of the difficulties that can be 
involved in determining claimant availability is provided by the issues that arose during the more 
than five years that elapsed before the eligibility of an opera singer who resided in Arizona was 
finally settled. The issues involved in this case included: (1) her education and experience as an 
opera singer over an eight-year period; (2) how and where she practiced her voice lessons; (3) 
whether she was qualified for lead roles or supporting roles; (4) whether the appropriate 
worksearch area for her was local or international; (5) her attempts to find work in Spain, 
Germany and elsewhere in Europe; (6) her auditions before a leading conductor in the United 
States and for an opera company in her local community; (7) the agencies where she was 
registered for work; and (8) her access to transportation for finding work. See Arizona 
Department of Economic Security (1982).
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ant©s state of mind. As a result, a variety of provisions designed 
to test claimant availability for work are included in state 
programs. For example, all states require that most claimants 
register with state Job Service offices as one determinant of 
availability for work. 19 In addition, as of 1985, an active job 
search requirement was included in the UC laws of 40 states as 
a test of claimant availability for work,20 but this provision is 
extremely difficult to administer. As noted in chapter 2, the 
major source of overpayments found in both the K-B and B-K-S 
studies was the failure of claimants to satisfy active search/avail 
ability requirements, and there can be little doubt that the 
complexity involved in defining and enforcing these require 
ments is an important contributor to such overpayments. More 
over, certain adverse incentives contained in state laws/policies 
also contribute to the difficulty of enforcing availability/search 
requirements. In fact, this latter issue is such a major one that it 
is dealt with in considerable detail in chapter 7.
Another requirement for weekly benefit eligibility is that 
claimants be able to work (see step 7c of figure 3 1). Although 
this requirement may be somewhat easier to administer than the 
availability requirements just discussed, a number of fairly 
complicated issues still may arise in particular cases. 21 For 
example, questions may arise with respect to the nature of the 
work the claimant is expected to perform. Some states require 
that claimants be able to perform "suitable" work, but the nature 
of potential employment is not specified in other states. Other 
dimensions of the ability issue may relate to whether work is full 
time or part time, whether certain health-related restrictions are 
relevant and whether claimants are considered able to work
19. Even the apparently simple concept of Job Service registration involves a number of 
potential exceptions in applying this requirement. For example, union members who seek work 
solely through hiring halls often are excused from Job Service registration. Similarly, workers on 
short-term layoffs with definite recall dates normally are excused from Job Service registration. 
There are many other potential exceptions. Including the various possibilities involved in this 
issue in figure 3-1 would result in adding several decision points to the flowchart, emphasizing 
the point that figure 3-1 is an extremely simplified overview of the decisions actually involved.
20. U.S. Department of Labor (1985a: Table 400). Some of the states without a statuatory 
worksearch requirement, however, included this criterion in their Benefit Policy Rules (e.g., 
Arizona).
21. For a good discussion of some of these issues, see Roche (1973: 77-79).
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during illnesses or disabilities. In short, ability-to-work provi 
sions can be much more complex to administer than might 
appear to be the case.
Consistent with the philosophy of paying benefits only to 
involuntarily unemployed individuals, all states require disqual 
ifications for claimants who refuse to accept "suitable work 
without good cause." Moreover, because such a disqualification 
is viewed as a serious matter, the penalties imposed for refusing 
suitable work typically are quite substantial and may include 
benefit postponements, benefit reductions and requirements that 
claimants first work and earn given amounts before receiving 
future UC benefits. 22 Although the rationale for imposing fairly 
substantial penalties for refusing suitable work can be easily 
understood, it actually can be quite difficult to determine 
precisely what constitutes an offer of suitable work. For exam 
ple, in some states, a disqualification for a refusal of suitable 
work could not be established without first showing that a job 
offer was "outright, unequivocal and genuine." 23 A few of the 
other factors that may be involved in the concept of suitable work 
include: how a job affects the health and safety of a worker; how 
long an individual has been unemployed; whether the claimant 
has voluntarily left or previously refused a similar position; the 
wages, hours and potential employment duration of the job; and 
the job requirements as they relate to a claimant©s education and 
job experience. 24 As a result, determining whether a claimant 
has refused suitable work often becomes a complex and subjec 
tive process. 25
A claimant who meets all of the eligibility criteria in steps 1-7 
of figure 3-1 would be eligible for one week of UC support. 
However, as indicated in step 8 of figure 3-1, an Arizona 
claimant served a "waiting week," the first week of unemploy 
ment for which no UC benefits were paid but in which all
22. For a summary of state disqualification penalties, see National Foundation for Unemploy 
ment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985c: 62-64).
23. Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: Section 533330).
24. See for example Felder (1979: 12) and Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: 
Article 53).
25. Roche (1973: 74).
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eligibility criteria were satisfied. Such a waiting period was 
included in the laws of 43 states as of January 1985. 26 It also 
should be noted that, once a claimant meets all of the criteria for 
actually receiving a payment in most states, either a portion or all 
of the weekly UC benefit amount that otherwise would be paid 
could be used to offset any recoverable overpayments owed by 
the claimant (step 9 in figure 3-1). 27 Otherwise, a check would 
be issued to the claimant (step 10).
Claimant Appeals of Adverse Decisions. The Social Security 
Act requires all states to make available fair hearings for appeals 
by persons whose claims for benefits are denied. 28 Claimants are 
entitled to appeal adverse decisions at various points in the 
eligibility determination process. Although a system of appeal 
ing adverse decisions obviously is a desirable feature of any 
social payment system, it necessarily adds to UC program 
complexity, particularly given the possibility that appeal deci 
sions may conflict with general practice within the operational 
UC payment system. As shown in figure 3-1, the possibilities for 
claimants to appeal adverse decisions add many possible "de 
tours" to the process. Moreover, although not shown in figure 
3-1 because of its focus on claimant interactions with the UC 
system, employers also can appeal adverse decisions at several 
of the points. The process of obtaining a final appeal decision 
may last for years because of the built-in complexities and 
delays, particularly if formal court proceedings become in 
volved.
Conclusions. The above summary indicates the significance of 
complexity in the UC program. With perhaps a few technical 
exceptions, the separation and monetary eligibility issues in steps 
1-4 and 6 (and waiting-week provisions in step 8) of figure 3-1 
must be reviewed only once for one benefit year or for a single
26. National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985c: 
43).
27. State agencies distinguish between recoverable overpayments subject to repayment by 
claimants who receive them and nonrecoverable overpayments that are not subject to such 
repayment. Overpayments that result from administrative errors by UC agency personnel 
typically would be included in the latter category.
28. For a good discussion of the fair hearing provision contained in the Social Security Act, 
including the minimum due process safeguards required, see Rubin (1983: 50-54).
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spell of compensated unemployment. However, the eligibility 
criteria in steps 5 and 7 (and overpayment offsets in step 9) must 
be evaluated for each week of compensated unemployment 
claimed. Moreover, it should be emphasized again that correctly 
adjudicating many of the individual steps can be an extremely 
complex and subjective process and may involve disagreements 
even among well-trained personnel.
Written Guidelines For Interpreting Eligibility Criteria
A second illustration of the complexity of UC eligibility 
criteria is provided by a review of the written guidelines many 
states utilize to provide specific interpretations of the general 
provisions of their state laws for personnel who must evaluate 
eligibility issues. As indicated by the discussion in the prior 
section, the potential number of issues and circumstances for 
inclusion in such guidelines is extremely large. So many subtle 
variations can arise in applying typical state laws/policies that it 
would be nearly impossible to account for all possibilities, even 
in such guidelines. Nonetheless, the alternative to providing 
detailed guidelines likely is a situation in which many of the 
hundreds or thousands of ad hoc decisions made each day by UC 
personnel would be mutually inconsistent and sometimes con 
trary to law or UC agency policy.
An examination of the actual guidelines for particular states 
illustrates further the UC program©s complexity. As an example, 
the topical content and extensive detail of selected portions of the 
written guidelines for interpreting Arizona©s eligibility criteria 
during the 1979-1980 K-B study period are shown in table 3-1. 
The five major eligibility issues included in this table voluntary 
leaving, misconduct, able/available, refusal of work and labor 
disputes involved 79 major sections, 147 subsections and 148 
pages of text in Arizona©s manual of "benefit policy rules" or 
BPR manual.
A simple listing of the main section and selected subsection 
titles from Arizona©s BPR manual for just one of the eligibility 
issues voluntary leaving includes 7 major sections: termina 
tion of employment; time; union relations; voluntary; wages; 
definition of work; and working conditions. The following nine
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TABLE 3-1
Selected Portions of Written Guidelines for Interpreting 
Arizona©s Eligibility Criteria During K-B Study Period
Topic
Voluntary Leaving 
Misconduct
Able/Available
Refusal of Work
Labor Disputes 
Totals
Number of 
Major Sections
7 
19
25
17
11
79
Number of 
Subsections
31
44
30
24
18 
147
Number of 
Text Pages
45 
29
38
20
16 
148
Source: Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.).
subsections are included to further define the major section on 
time: general; days of week; hours; irregular employment; layoff 
imminent; leave of absence or holiday; overtime; part-time work; 
and shift-work. Even within each of these time subsections, 
further detail occurs as illustrated by the following five catego 
ries included in the subsection for hours: general; irregular hours; 
long or short hours; night work; and prevailing standards. The 
large number of items involved in such apparently simple 
concepts illustrates the complexity that arises in attempting to 
precisely specify how general provisions of UC law are to be 
administered. Regardless of whether states have written guide 
lines, there can be little doubt that such complexity is a 
characteristic of most, if not all, state systems.
Federal Laws, Standards, and Programs
The federal element of the UC system also adds to the 
complexity of the program in each state. As Rubin notes in a 
recent analysis of the federal-state relationship, Congress has 
adopted a diverse set of federal standards, which reflect no 
consistency in terms of underlying principles. 29 In fact, the 
federal standards that have resulted from the original Social 
Security Act plus the more than 40 subsequent pieces of federal 
legislation, summarized in the appendix to this chapter, have
29. Rubin (1983: 20).
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affected the unemployment compensation program in a variety of 
ways. The end result has been a complex array of federal 
standards, and effective state enforcement of many of them 
probably could not be realistically expected by even the most 
zealous advocate of federal standards. Explaining the content 
and administration of these federal standards is such a complex 
undertaking that it comprises 102 pages of Rubin©s extensive 
analysis of the federal-state UC relationship. 30
One illustration of the complexity created by federal standards 
at the state level is the instructions USDOL produced as guidance 
to states on how to administer the worksearch requirements 
revised by Congress for the federal-state shared Extended Ben 
efit program:
Section 202(a)(3)(C) defines "suitable work" for the purposes of 
those provisions as meaning any work within the unemployed 
individual©s capabilities. There is an exception to the determina 
tion of work©s suitability as so defined; however, if the individ 
ual©s prospects for obtaining work in his customary occupation 
"within a reasonably short period" are good, in which case 
suitability will be determined under provisions of the State law 
applicable to regular benefit claimants.
In GAL 21-81 and UIPL 14-81, the recommendation was made 
that the prospects for obtaining work in an individual©s customary 
occupation be determined with reference to a period not exceed 
ing four weeks beginning with the first week for which extended 
benefits are claimed. If classified as having good prospects but 
they are not realized by the end of the period specified as 
reasonably short, the individual©s prospects may be determined 
again with respect to an additional reasonably short period. In 
Change 2 to UIPL 14-81, the recommendation was replaced by a 
requirement that the period not exceed four weeks.
Experience with administration of the "suitable work" provi 
sions of Section 202(a)(3)(C) of SESAs for over a year has 
indicated the desirability of allowing States to determine the 
meaning of the phrase "a reasonably short period" flexibly in the
30. Rubin (1983: 69-170).
Evidence of System Complexity 57
context of their respective patterns of employment and unemploy 
ment during particular economic cycles. Accordingly, "a reason 
ably short period" will be, for these purposes, the number of 
weeks specified by or pursuant to State law in the extended 
benefit eligibility period applicable to each claimant. We continue 
to recommend that the period be limited to four weeks beginning 
with the first week for which extended benefits are claimed. Such 
a limitation will no longer be deemed a requirement, however.
The foregoing relaxation of the period established for deter 
mining whether an individual©s prospects for obtaining work in 
his customary occupation are good does not constitute an exemp 
tion from the requirement to make such a determination in every 
case. It merely allows flexibility in determining the length of the 
period that may be considered "reasonably short" for purposes of 
Section 202(a)(3)(C). In addition, when an issue arises with 
respect to failure to apply for or to accept an offer of suitable 
work, an appealable determination must be made of the correct 
ness of the classification of the individual©s job prospects as good 
or not good. Whatever the classification, it continues to have an 
impact on the determination with respect to failure to "actively 
engage in seeking work" in Section 202(a)(3)(A).
Under Section 202(a)(6) these same requirements apply with 
respect to regular benefits for which the State may be entitled to 
claim Federal sharing in the costs. This change of position does 
not affect other modifications to UIPL 14-81 announced in 
Change 2. 31
These detailed instructions are cited at length to convey some sense of 
the difficulties that state programs are likely to have in following 
federal guidelines. 32
A significant aspect of the impact of federal intervention on 
state programs is that it has become increasingly frequent in recent 
years. One indication of this trend is provided in the summary of 
federal legislation contained in the appendix to this chapter. Dur-
31. U.S. Department of Labor (1982b). It perhaps should be noted that Golding (1985) 
contends this is a worst-case example of the complexity created by federal standards.
32. A second illustration is provided by the nearly 30 pages of instructions issued by the 
Unemployment Insurance Service to implement congressionally mandated restrictions on paying 
benefits to certain aliens. See Rubin (1983: 86-88).
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ing the first quarter of a century after enactment of the Social 
Security Act (through 1959): (1) only 14 major pieces of legis 
lation directly affecting the UC system were passed; (2) less than 
one page is required to summarize the major changes included in 
the laws enacted; and (3) five of the 14 laws enacted can be 
primarily attributed to either wartime impacts or to providing 
benefits to veterans. In contrast, during the second quarter of a 
century after the enactment of the Social Security Act 
(1960-1984): (1) more than 30 major pieces of federal legislation 
that directly affected the UC system were passed; (2) over two 
pages are required to summarize the major changes included in the 
laws enacted; (3) only one of the more than 30 laws can be 
primarily attributed to wartime impacts or to providing benefits 
to veterans; and (4) during just the years from 1980 through 1984, 
13 separate pieces of federal legislation were enacted (only one 
fewer than the number enacted during the first quarter century of 
the program), and these acts alone require over a page to sum 
marize. It should be noted that the U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) also recognizes the increasing impact of federal leg 
islation on state UC programs. For example, USDOL estimated 
in February 1985 that 77 changes in federal law since 1981 have 
resulted in an approximate total of 2,000 changes in the laws of 
the 53 UC jurisdictions. 33
In addition to paying regular claims covered by its own 
law/policy and dealing with the federal standards just discussed, 
each state also has the responsibility of paying benefits under 
various federal programs, including permanent federal programs 
established for ex-armed forces personnel (the UCX program) 
and for other former federal employees (the UCFE program). 
The states also have paid benefits under numerous other federal 
programs, including the federal-state shared Extended Benefit 
(EB) program permanently enacted in 1970 and the Federal 
Supplemental Compensation (FSC) program that expired in 
March 1985. 34 Complexity is increased by these additional
33. O©Keefe (1985:4).
34. Examples of other programs include the Trade Adjustment Assistance and Special 
Unemployment Assistance programs. These and several other programs are referenced in the 
summary of federal legislation in the appendix to this chapter.
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programs because certain eligibility provisions in them differ 
from those in regular state programs. The complexity created by 
attempting to administer federal programs and initiatives (only a 
few of which are mentioned above), combined with relatively 
limited administrative funding levels, adds to the possibility of 
payment errors both in these additional programs and in regular 
state programs. 35
Time Required for Eligibility Verifications
Perhaps the most striking indication of the effects of UC 
program complexities is the average time required in both the 
K-B and B-K-S studies to determine as fully as possible whether 
one claimant was eligible for a single week of compensated 
unemployment. An average claim took somewhere between 8 
and 13 hours of direct case time to complete in these two special 
studies. As noted in chapter 2, typical case loads for personnel 
routinely processing continued claims in the operational UC 
system probably would be at least 50 times the case loads 
assigned to UC personnel in these special studies. 36 Even given 
the intensive verifications involved in the K-B and B-K-S 
studies, some payment errors were likely not detected in those 
studies. Thus, it hardly is surprising that UC agency personnel 
frequently make payment errors in processing claims, given the 
time constraints under which they must operate.
Some Impacts and Implications of Complexity
Many adverse consequences of existing UC system complex 
ity were neither intended nor anticipated by policymakers or UC
35. Oregon©s Employment Division administrator contends that the "overlay of complex, 
constantly changing" federal programs contributes to overpayments in both such federal 
programs and also in regular state programs. See Thorne (1985b).
36. It also should be noted that the case loads in the two special studies may tend to overstate 
the resource commitment required to ascertain a claimant©s compliance with the criteria for a 
single week. The potential overstatement arises because a complete review of the original 
monetary determination and separation circumstances was a standard part of the investigation in 
these special studies, whereas compliance with only the weekly eligibility criteria would be 
assessed in routine processing.
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program administrators. Nonetheless, these consequences do 
occur and merit serious consideration.
First, the complexity of the system means that it would be 
extremely costly to fully administer and completely verify 
claimant compliance with existing provisions. It seems neither 
socially desirable nor likely that administrative funding alloca 
tions will be increased sufficiently to provide for effective 
enforcement of existing UC program provisions. An obvious 
implication of this is less effective program administration than 
could be achieved in a less complex system.
A second consequence of existing complexity is that neither 
claimants nor UC program personnel know with certainty 
whether payments should be made in many cases because of 
uncertainties about the appropriate interpretation of existing 
requirements. Both the K-B and B-K-S studies found instances 
where trained experts within a particular state disagreed on the 
correct interpretation of particular cases.
A third result of system complexity is that higher payment 
error rates for both overpayments and underpayments are likely. 
Viewed in this light, the relatively high payment error rates 
found in the K-B and B-K-S studies certainly are not as 
unexpected as they might otherwise seem. Some payment errors 
clearly are inevitable because of incorrect interpretations of UC 
law/policy in complex cases. Given other system characteristics 
and administrative funding limitations, it would be expected that 
payment errors, which result from both accidental and inten 
tional misreporting, would be more frequent in more complex 
systems. This expected impact on payment accuracy also has 
been emphasized by others familiar with the UC system. For 
example, Dunn and Griffin state:
The key element in effective control over payments and other 
elements within the unemployment insurance system is adequate 
numbers of trained, properly supervised, permanent staff who are 
fully aware of the criteria which govern the establishment of 
eligibility, the determination of benefit rates, and the other 
elements which underlie the minimum requirements for unem 
ployment insurance eligibility. The complexity of the program and
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the factors which underlie determinations of eligibility mandate 
that the individuals have adequate training to attain the back 
ground necessary for this function. In most instances a minimum 
of six to twelve months is required before a claims examiner can 
be considered to be fully trained. 37 (emphasis added)
A fourth result of UC system complexity is that administrators 
and other "front-line" agency personnel may be either forced or 
permitted to exercise considerable discretion in interpreting 
legislative intent. These persons may respond to either perceived 
or real public and political pressures to alter the UC eligibility 
and payment process in certain ways. It is obvious that the 
subjective judgments resulting from this process cannot be made 
consistently across either all states (for federal laws/policies) or 
among all employees within a state (for state laws/policies). 
Inconsistencies almost necessarily will arise, both because of 
confusion and because of philosophical differences in interpret 
ing complex criteria. 38 Moreover, it may well be that policy mak 
ers are not fully aware of the extent to which control of UC 
system policy is subject to administrative discretion necessarily 
exercised by UC personnel. An important result of a less 
complex system would be an increased likelihood that adminis 
trative outcomes would reflect the intentions of policy makers, 
rather than sometimes reflecting judgments made by UC pro 
gram personnel.
A fifth result of such a complex UC system is that horizontal 
inequities are more likely. This effect is a further consequence of 
the discretion exercised by administrative personnel and the 
inconsistencies in their judgments. Employers and claimants 
who interact with the UC system under similar circumstances are 
not all accorded similar treatment in terms of the ultimate 
outcomes of those interactions. Such adverse impacts of program 
complexity also have been emphasized recently by Corson, 
Hershey, and Kerachsky. 39
37. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 12-13).
38. Corson et al. (1986: 133-34) also emphasize the substantial discretion that can be 
exercised by agency personnel in the existing UC system.
39. Corson et al. (1986: 133-34).
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A sixth impact of program complexity is that it reduces 
incentives for UC system participants to ensure claimant com 
pliance with stated criteria because of the high costs involved in 
monitoring such compliance. It is reasonable to assume that state 
agency personnel are less motivated to prevent or detect over 
payments because UC eligibility criteria may be perceived as too 
complex for effective or equitable enforcement. Also, claimants 
clearly would find it both more difficult and costly to engage in 
self-compliance efforts in a system with relatively complex 
provisions. Similarly, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
relatively high costs of attempting to monitor claimant compli 
ance with relatively complex requirements tends to discourage 
employer monitoring efforts. In fact, incentives for UC system 
participants to engage in relatively little monitoring is such an 
important issue that it is dealt with in considerable detail in 
chapter 6.
A seventh potential impact of UC program complexity is much 
more speculative. Although no study has been conducted that 
would allow definitive conclusions, it seems likely that complex 
ity has two opposite effects on the propensities of potential 
claimants to file for UC benefits. 40 On the one hand, complexity 
probably encourages some ineligible claimants to file claims 
because the capacity of the system to enforce its complex 
requirements is very limited. More generally, voluntary claimant 
compliance with stated criteria undoubtedly is reduced and claim 
filing by ineligible claimants probably is increased by percep 
tions that stated and effective eligibility criteria differ markedly. 
In contrast, it also seems reasonable that some potentially 
eligible claimants do not file for benefits because they are 
unwilling to incur the costs of interacting with a system as 
complex as the existing one.
40. It should be noted that USDOL has questioned the existence of this seventh impact, and 
also has suggested that substantive evidence should be provided on any such claim filing effects 
(see Golding 1985). Although anecdotal evidence may be found to support the existence of such 
claim filing effects, the studies required to document their existence and magnitudes have not yet 
been designed or conducted.
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Responses to Effects of System Complexity
Effective treatment of the adverse consequences of program 
complexity is a difficult task. One approach would be to simply 
acknowledge and accept the consequences of administering a 
relatively complicated system with limited resources. Making 
the reasonable assumption that some measures to deal with UC 
system complexity should be undertaken, at least three general 
options appear to merit consideration. The first would be to 
provide a large increase in the resources devoted to administering 
the existing UC system (without simplifying that system). As 
noted earlier, however, the existing level of UC program 
complexity would require perhaps a fiftyfold increase in the time 
currently devoted to eligibility verification. Given competing 
claims for society©s scarce resources, it appears to be a virtual 
certainty that such a large increase would not be considered 
acceptable. The more feasible alternatives would be to devise 
acceptable ways of reducing the complexity of the system and to 
develop better techniques for administering whatever level of 
complexity remains. Because these alternatives are both more 
feasible and more desirable in terms of both equity and efficiency 
considerations, they are the only possibilities discussed in the 
remainder of this chapter. The issue of designing and conducting 
pilot tests of proposals for either reduced complexity or im 
proved administration also is discussed.
Reducing Program Complexity
The previous discussion of the system©s existing complexity 
and its adverse consequences is intended to encourage consider 
ation of acceptable methods of reducing that complexity. Al 
though many policymakers and program administrators are at 
least partially aware of the program©s complexity and its effects, 
it may prove to be extremely difficult to reduce that complexity.
Even with the goal of reducing system complexity, a number 
of difficult questions would remain about which program fea 
tures should be changed. Certainly, simplicity per se should not 
be accepted as a necessarily desirable end result, independent of 
the benefits and costs of particular changes. For example, one of
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the costs of reducing the complexity of UC eligibility criteria is 
that some of the subtle distinctions in the current system would 
have to be removed; it is possible that policymakers may not be 
willing to incur the costs associated with the elimination of these 
distinctions. Such practical realities have caused several UC 
system experts to suggest that advocating program simplification 
may represent a naive, impossible dream. 41 Moreover, as one of 
them recently pointed out, merely recommending program sim 
plification will not remove the public pressures particularly by 
legislators and the courts that have contributed to current 
system complexity. 42
Reducing program complexity could either decrease or in 
crease UC benefit outlays. Such cost considerations would be 
relevant in evaluating proposals for specific changes. Further 
more, changes implemented in some UC jurisdictions may not be 
appropriate for all others. Hence, the judgments required to 
evaluate the desirability of certain changes must be made by 
policymakers and others familiar with the state-specific circum 
stances in particular UC jurisdictions.
Contributions to reducing program complexity by both legis 
lators and UC program administrators are briefly discussed 
below. However, a full benefit/cost evaluation has not been 
undertaken to assess the equity, claims filing or other impacts of 
such changes. Consequently, no judgments about the relative 
merits of these approaches are offered. The examples simply 
illustrate a few of the reductions in UC program complexity that 
could be considered.
Legislative Contributions. Contributions to a less complex 
system could be made by both federal and state legislative 
bodies. It would be helpful for both the Congress and state 
legislatures to carefully evaluate proposed programs and initia 
tives for their impacts on UC system complexity and adminis 
trative feasibility, particularly given the relatively limited admin 
istrative funding provided to state programs. Obviously, more
41. The difficulty of UC program simplification has been emphasized by a number of UC 
system experts, including Saul Blaustein and H. Allan Hunt of the W.E. Upjohn Institute, 
Carolyn Golding of USDOL, and Sally Ward of the Illinois Department of Employment Security.
42. Ward (1985).
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complex programs are more expensive to administer effectively 
than less complex ones, other things equal. Hence, although 
legislated program complexity may not be inappropriate in the 
context of overall policy decisions,43 administrative funding and 
the feasibility of proposed initiatives should be at least important 
considerations. For example, the guidelines for implementing 
congressionally-mandated EB worksearch requirements dis 
cussed earlier in this chapter suggest that program complexity 
and administrative feasibility/costs were accorded little or no 
weight in the decisions that led to the legislation. At the state 
level, reductions in the complexities of legal provisions, such as 
the elimination of the difference between wages reported by 
employers for tax purposes and the wages used for claimant 
benefit determinations, would be important in many instances. 
Elimination of dependents© allowances that require verification 
of family circumstances not otherwise related to the UC eligi 
bility process also merits consideration by state legislators. 
Serious consideration also could be given to reducing the 
complexity of separation provisions and other features of UC 
eligibility criteria.
Administrative Contributions. Both USDOL and state program 
administrators also could make some contributions to reduced 
program complexity. At the federal level, the administrative 
funding process utilized by USDOL could be simplified substan 
tially, as is discussed in detail in chapter 4. Also, USDOL could 
reduce the complexity of some of the guidelines issued to 
implement the legislative intent of the Congress.
State program administrators also have considerable adminis 
trative flexibility to reduce the complexity of policies and 
procedures they devise to implement state laws. Some states 
have found that complex reporting forms result in payment errors 
that could be reduced by appropriate state actions. Also, state 
administrative actions could lead to revisions of the benefit 
policy rules related to reasons for job separations. For example, 
the complexity of provisions for "compelling personal reasons"
43. For example, Golding (1985) has suggested that existing complexity created at the federal 
level may well be justified in terms of the judgments made by presidential and congressional 
decisions through the years.
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and perhaps other voluntary quit disqualification exceptions 
could be considered. As another example, administrative actions 
could be taken in some states to eliminate or otherwise modify 
the active search provisions devised to test claimant availability 
for work. This is discussed in much more detail in chapter I. 44
Improving Program Administration
Some degree of complexity is inevitable in any social payment 
system that does not simply provide benefits to any who apply as 
a matter of right. Even a UC system that reflected substantial 
reductions in current complexity probably could be significantly 
improved by developing more effective techniques for consis 
tently applying law/policy within a given state.
Accordingly, it may be more important, in terms of improving 
the existing system, to consider how any given level of com 
plexity could be more effectively administered than to focus just 
on reducing system complexity. Undoubtedly, many states could 
implement a variety of relatively minor operational improve 
ments, but the focus in this section is on more general ap 
proaches. The general approach most strongly emphasized in this 
study is the provision of appropriate incentives for all UC system 
participants, but that issue is dealt with in detail in chapters 4 
through 7. The approaches discussed in this chapter are: (1) 
clearly specifying legislative intent at the state level; (2) provid 
ing detailed, written guidelines to agency personnel for applying 
law/policy; (3) computerization of eligibility determinations; and 
(4) computerized profiles for targeting administrative resources 
on "high-risk" claimants.
Clarifying Legislative Intent. More clearly specifying the 
legislative intent of particular laws could facilitate improved 
administration in at least some states. In the absence of clear 
legislative intent, state UC program administrators are forced to 
determine what they believe the intent to be and to develop (often
44. In many states, active search requirements are administratively required as a test of 
availability provisions included in state laws. Accordingly, modification or elimination of the 
search requirement is mentioned in the text as an administrative change. However, in some states 
an active worksearch is specified in state laws.
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complex) procedures for implementing it. This problem may be 
partially attributed to the fact that legislative intent at the state 
level often is not as clearly developed through extensive and 
documented hearings as is typical at the federal level. For 
example, one legal scholar contends:
In applying disqualifications for voluntary leaving and miscon 
duct, an effort is being made to find objective standards and proof 
in place of the apparent ambiguity and subjective tests of present 
statutes. In the process, courts and administrative agencies 
sometimes invent doctrines, presumptions and rules which ignore 
or exceed the legislative intent. The necessity for such inventive 
ness flows from the practical difficulty of processing and deciding 
numerous claims promptly, and from the dual role of the various 
administrative agencies to assist the unemployed in a time of 
need, yet to protect a limited fund from ineligible claimants so 
that an employer©s reserve account is not unfairly charged. While 
the difficulty may not be desirable, it is one commonly found in 
the area of administrative law. The solution lies not in greater 
procedural formality, but rather in a return to the legislative intent 
and in demanding a minimum quantum of competent evidence 
before disallowing a claim. The main purpose of the legislative 
scheme, the integrity of the system itself and fairness to the 
unsophisticated claimant will thus be better served. 45
Written Guidelines for Administering Law/Policy. A general 
suggestion that follows from the previous analysis of complexity 
would be for those states that do not currently have detailed, 
written instructions for administering UC law/policy to develop 
them. In order to facilitate the development of such guidelines, 
it also would be helpful to develop either a more detailed 
flowchart of UC law/policy than that provided in figure 3-1 or 
some similar device for summarizing law/policy in a particular 
state. A recent six-state study of eligibility decisions also has 
strongly emphasized the importance of providing written guide 
lines to increase the consistency of eligibility decisions. Corson, 
Hershey and Kerachsky state:
45. Packard (1972: 653-654).
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The states we visited varied dramatically in the extent to which 
they made UI policies and procedures available in a clear, 
organized form, or even consistently recognized in more informal 
ways. . . . Not surprisingly, we found that in states that had more 
comprehensive and detailed written policy and procedures, the 
staff©s understanding of state policy was more accurate and more 
consistent.
Detailed and specific policies tend to restrict the amount of 
discretion that can be exercised by claims staff in considering 
each claimant©s case ....
However, detailed and specific program guidelines need not 
prompt claims staff to undertake unreasonable enforcement activ 
ities, and probably provide greater protection for claimants than 
do nebulous and unwritten rules .... In contrast, the lack of 
clearly written rules makes it more difficult for adjudicators to 
justify their decisions, and more difficult for claimants to under 
stand the standards they must meet and to prepare arguments in 
their defense. Agency adjudicators then apply unwritten stan 
dards which may be understood and interpreted quite differently 
by different adjudicators, and leave claimants with no reasonable 
basis for predicting the relationship between their behavior and 
the adjudication outcome. In such circumstances, high standards 
of due process may be difficult to achieve.*6 (emphasis added)
The availability of detailed, written guidelines should also facilitate the 
benefit/cost analyses that would be appropriate for making decisions 
about which aspects of UC law or policy could be eliminated or 
simplified.
Computerizing Benefit Eligibility Determinations. Another 
way to increase consistency in applying UC law/policy and to 
reduce associated administrative costs would be for the states to 
increase the use of computers in making benefit eligibility 
determinations. Computerized monetary determinations already 
are a common feature of many state programs, but recent 
developments in computer software suggest that computer- 
assisted decisions could be made for other eligibility criteria as
46. Corson et al. (1986: 133-34).
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well. This approach would involve the use of "expert systems" 
that have evolved from many years of research in the artificial 
intelligence area of computer science. Although no state UC 
agency has yet implemented such an approach, Nagy, DiSciullo 
and Crosslin completed an experimental study during 1983 that 
was funded by USDOL to explore the potential of such an 
approach for one "relatively simple" eligibility issue labor 
disputes. 47 Even though their expert system for labor disputes 
has never been operationally implemented by any state agency, 
the results of their study and the use of expert systems for 
handling other, relatively complicated issues in other applica 
tions48 show that such an approach holds considerable potential 
for the operational UC system. Because existing computer 
software programs clearly could be adapted for utilization in the 
UC system and because of the potential benefits of expert 
systems as a method of inexpensively improving UC program 
administration, some important implications of that study are 
discussed in considerable detail below.
In evaluating the expert system approach for UC eligibility 
decisions, Nagy, DiSciullo and Crosslin conclude that important 
advantages include: (1) the need for little or no retraining to 
account for policy changes implemented through changes in an 
expert system©s program; (2) the ease of implementing policy 
changes; (3) the "common sense" of expert systems to ask only 
necessary questions and to follow efficient lines of questioning; 
(4) a reduction in the time required for making determinations 
(and a consequent increase in the timeliness with which they are 
made); (5) an increase in the consistency of determinations and 
a corresponding reduction in erroneous determinations (because
47. Nagy et al. (1983) provide an excellent discussion of the use of expert systems in the UC 
program, including how such systems have evolved from research on artificial intelligence. The 
discussion of expert systems in this section is based primarily on their study.
48. For example, expert systems are becoming fairly common in the private sector for handling 
complicated underwriting decisions that are required to assign risks and determine rates for 
various types of insurance coverage, as illustrated by the work of Decisions & Designs, Inc. of 
McClean, Virginia. As other examples, work has been undertaken on profiling both health cost 
containment and worker compensation risks. The interested reader may obtain additional 
information on this latter work by contacting the International Association of Accident Boards 
and Councils in Jackson, Mississippi; the National Council on Compensation Insurance in New 
York City; and Medstat Systems, Inc. in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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all determinations would be based on "the same knowledge base 
and inference mechanism"); (6) the possibility that existing 
technology is sufficient for expert systems to "reliably handle" 
between one-half and four-fifths of nonmonetary adjudications; 
(7) largely as a reflection of the above advantages, reduced costs 
of making nonmonetary determinations; and (8) an overall 
improvement in the service claimants receive. 49
The essence of utilizing (computerized) expert systems can be 
easily understood in terms of how human experts currently make 
decisions on whether particular claimants are eligible for UC 
support. Under ideal circumstances, highly trained individuals 
gather facts about particular cases, sift through the evidence, and 
then draw upon their knowledge of UC law/policy to determine 
whether claimants are eligible for benefits. Unfortunately, the 
staff with the training and experience required to make such 
decisions often is so small, relative to the number of decisions 
that must be made, that many decisions actually are made by 
persons with less training and experience than that necessary to 
obtain accurate decisions. If equipped with expert system tech 
nology, however, relatively inexperienced staff should be able to 
make better decisions than are often made under the present 
system about whether claims should be paid, denied or referred 
for further evaluation by human experts.
In order to develop the computer-assisted approach outlined 
above, it would be necessary to develop a sequence of questions 
to cover most (ideally, all) possible situations relevant to each 
eligibility criterion. The detailed written guidelines suggested in 
the prior section probably would be a necessary input into the 
process of developing the required questions. Also, it should be 
noted that the less complex the eligibility criteria, the easier it 
would be to develop the required questions.
Eligibility determinations from an expert system would be 
based on responses to questions input (by trained clerks, rather 
than eligibility adjudicators) through a computerized, interactive 
question-answer process. The inference mechanism of the expert 
system would be able to sort cases into three categories: (1) those
49. Nagy et al. (1983: 75, 78, 80, 82, 91, 92 and 93).
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in which the issues involved exceed the capabilities of the 
(computer) expert system and should be referred to human 
experts for adjudication; (2) those in which the claimant is 
eligible to receive benefits for the week in question; or (3) those 
in which the claimant is not eligible for benefits. For those 
eligible for benefits, the preparation of a check could be 
triggered by the expert system. In contrast, claimants identified 
as ineligible for benefits would receive a computer-generated 
eligibility determination that would provide the facts, reasoning, 
conclusions and documentation involved in the determination. If 
UC eligibility criteria were sufficiently simplified, then the 
number of cases in category 1 probably would be relatively 
small, given the current state of expert-system technology.
The above discussion indicates the potential benefits of apply 
ing expert systems for at least some UC eligibility criteria in 
experimental, if not operational, settings. Assuming further 
experience with this approach proved to be at least as positive as 
the conclusions reached by Nagy, DiSciullo and Crosslin, expert 
systems could represent an important source of improvement for 
the existing UC system. The initial explorations of implementing 
expert systems in an operational setting reported by the states of 
Nevada and Utah are encouraging. 50
Computerized Profiles for Targeting Administrative Re 
sources. Another application of computerized technology to 
facilitate administration of eligibility determinations would be to 
develop claimant screening profiles for use in targeting compli 
ance verification. Such an approach might distinguish between 
"high-risk" and "low-risk" claimants, so that administrative 
resources could be focused on the high-risk group exclusively. 
The low-risk group might be processed and paid almost solely on 
the basis of claimant certifications. Screening profiles also might 
be used for determining which claimants to routinely process 
through the computerized expert system and which claimants to 
review more frequently by other methods. In any case, the thrust
50. Hanna (1985) reports that the Region IX Office of USDOL and the state of Nevada are 
continuing their attempts to obtain funding for an operational feasibility study of the expert- 
system approach. Also, the state of Utah has explored the possibility of implementing an 
expert-system approach for some eligibility determinations.
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of implementing computerized profiling would be to more 
effectively use administrative resources both to prevent and 
detect overpayments.
A number of issues arise in considering the technical and 
administrative potential of computerized profiling. Most of these 
are dealt with extensively in chapters 6 and 7 and elsewhere. 51 
However, it may be noted that the critical technical issue in this 
regard is whether high-risk and low-risk claimants can be 
effectively identified by analyzing differences in characteristics 
between claimants with and without overpayments from histor 
ical data taken from the intensive eligibility verifications con 
ducted in the Random Audit or Quality Control programs. 52 If 
the overpaid and properly paid groups of claimants within a 
particular state differ substantially with respect to certain labor 
market or demographic characteristics, it then would be possible 
to develop a screening profile (on the basis of historical data) to 
identify claimants with relatively high overpayment likelihoods 
in that state. In this regard, Kingston and Burgess noted recently 
that experimental results for five states indicate that:
The development and use of statistical profiles, on the other hand, 
appears to be a technically feasible approach that could signifi 
cantly improve the allocation of UC program administrative 
resources. This approach would require no increase in the (real) 
level of resources devoted to UC program administration and 
could be implemented with existing or revised eligibility criteria. 
Furthermore, increased claimant self-compliance with UC eligi 
bility criteria would be induced. Also, the technical feasibility of 
utilizing such profiles on an operational basis has been greatly 
enhanced by the availability of Random Audit program data in 
most states, and by the availability of Quality Control program 
data in all states, starting in April 1986.
51. In addition to the discussion in chapters 6 and 7, see Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and 
DePippo (1983); Kingston and Burgess (1986); Porterfield, St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston 
(1980); and St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986).
52. The development of such profiles should not be based on routine operational data because 
such data (incorrectly) include many claimants who actually receive overpayments in the group 
considered to be properly paid. Thus, accurate screening profiles cannot be developed from such 
data. See Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and DePippo (1983) for a discussion of this issue.
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Notwithstanding these considerations, statistical profiling has 
received very little consideration to date. The rather limited 
profiling efforts analyzed in this paper, however, illustrate the 
potential contributions of such an approach.
It seems quite certain that futher estimation efforts, based on 
either Random Audit or Quality Control program data, would 
result in more powerful statistical profiles than those discussed in 
this paper. Hence, further investigation of this approach appears 
warranted. 53
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that most of the work in this area 
to date relates to availability/worksearch issues or to unreported 
earnings. It remains an open question whether statistical profiles also 
might be effective for other eligibility issues.
Pilot Tests
A systems approach is important in devising and evaluating 
responses to the problems analyzed throughout this study, 
including the adverse effects of complexity addressed in this 
chapter. The importance of such an approach arises from the 
interactive nature of the various components and relationships 
that comprise the existing UC system. The interrelationships 
within the system mean that even apparently plausible responses 
to particular problems, such as complex eligibility criteria, may 
result in unintended and undesirable side effects. As a result, it 
is difficult to overemphasize the importance of further research 
and experimental pilot studies for assessing the overall costs and 
benefits of particular responses to system problems.
Given existing federal-state relationships, administrative fund 
ing arrangements, and the lack of well trained research personnel 
in some state agencies, there obviously is an important leader 
ship role for USDOL in supporting and encouraging pilot studies 
to assess approaches for reducing program complexity and 
improving program administration. USDOL-supported pilot tests 
appear to be particularly appropriate because many of the 
approaches that might be considered in a particular state could be
53. Kingston and Burgess (1986: 40).
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relevant for many other state programs as well. Conducting pilot 
programs for small sets of states could avoid the expensive 
duplication of pitfalls that are almost inevitable in applying new 
procedures and would provide valuable insights and refinements 
for all states.
Although USDOL leadership in promoting pilot studies is 
vital, states must also take lead roles in identifying and 
operating appropriate pilot studies, since most changes would 
have to be implemented by the states themselves. Also, 
individual states or groups of states probably will want to 
explore some possible changes not included in whatever 
research effort may be initiated by USDOL for the UC system as 
a whole. Individual state analyses of data available from the 
Random Audit and Quality Control programs, as well as from 
other sources, undoubtedly would provide valuable guidance in 
determining: the further research and pilot tests that might be 
useful; the desirability of possible reductions in the complexity 
of UC provisions and administrative procedures; and the 
desirability of suggestions for improved administration. In 
short, the individual states necessarily will play a critical role in 
designing and evaluating most of the important changes that 
might be made in the existing UC system. Moreover, interstate 
cooperation in such efforts through the Interstate Conference 
of Employment Security Agencies, other organizations or 
smaller groups of states with similar problems or interested in 
similar issues would greatly facilitate responses to the issues 
discussed in this chapter.
Although efforts to analyze, test, and evaluate the various 
kinds of responses to the adverse effects of program complexity 
might seem very difficult, some extremely encouraging progress 
has been made in these areas, including the following three 
developments: (1) USDOL provision of specific guidelines, as 
part of the recently implemented Quality Control program, for 
evaluating and funding special studies that state agencies may 
wish to conduct; (2) the start of a study entitled the "Quality 
Improvement Project" undertaken in a number of western states; 
and (3) the initiation of the "Quality Unemployment Insurance 
Project" by a consortium of state agencies and the authors.
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Although some of these projects have other objectives, they also 
represent attempts to reduce program complexity or to improve 
administrative effectiveness. A very brief overview is provided 
below of some major features of each of these developments, 
with no attempt to summarize their entire scope.
USDOL Guidelines for Special Studies. USDOL issued formal 
guidelines to the states in April 1986 for the preparation of 
funding proposals for special studies within the context of the 
Quality Control program. 54 Funding for special studies under 
these guidelines is a potentially important step towards a broader 
pilot test effort that could contribute to a significantly improved 
program. It also appears, however, that these guidelines are 
somewhat restrictive in scope in that the emphasis clearly is on 
various approaches to conducting the Quality Control program, 
rather than on encouraging studies designed to improve the UC 
system itself. Obviously, fundamental UC system improvement 
is more likely to result from the latter types of studies. In 
addition, there is room for less rigorous studies designed for the 
diagnosis and correction of selected problems in particular states. 
It is hoped that USDOL will expand its guidelines in light of 
these considerations in order to encourage pilot studies related to 
a broad range of possible program improvements. Such an 
expansion could represent a very important addition to the 
initiative already taken by USDOL.
Quality Improvement Project. The Quality Improvement 
Project was initiated in 1985 by USDOL©s regional office in 
Seattle and the States of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington. 
Its purposes include identifying benefit payment error sources, 
why errors occur and whether such errors can be corrected at a 
reasonable cost. 55 The project emphasizes various agency data 
sources including Random Audit (and Quality Control) data, 
routine benefit payment control information and the results of 
local office quality reviews for identifying potential payment 
errors. The project seeks specifically to determine whether 
particular errors are symptomatic of general system weaknesses,
54. U.S. Department of Labor (19865).
55. Johnson (1985).
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and to carefully evaluate the costs of corrective actions against 
the anticipated benefits of those actions. Based on this analysis, 
priorities can be suggested to rank the importance of various 
changes that might be considered.
Quality Unemployment Insurance Project. The Quality Unem 
ployment Insurance Project (QUIP) was initiated in August 1985 
by the authors and the following 10 state employment securities 
agencies Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Utah. 
Alaska joined the QUIP consortium in August 1986. Except for 
Arizona and Louisiana, these QUIP states have continued to work 
as a group on UC program improvements during 1987. The 
project was designed to provide a forum for analyzing system 
problems and exchanging ideas on how each state might improve 
its UC system, particularly given severe funding constraints in 
recent years. The importance of the project relates to the efforts 
of these states to either reduce program complexity or to improve 
law, policy and administrative procedures. Most of the partici 
pating states have formed task forces or work groups of key 
agency personnel to assess possible system weaknesses and to 
evaluate various possibilities for law/policy changes or improved 
administrative procedures. As part of this process, each state has 
conducted case-by-case analyses of the Random Audit or Quality 
Control cases it has processed to identify any general patterns or 
system weaknesses that may suggest the need for corrective ac 
tions. No attempt is made to catalog the large number of specific 
findings and actions taken by the QUIP states, but some are 
particularly consistent with the types of complexity responses 
suggested earlier in this chapter. The following few examples will 
serve to illustrate some findings and responses of these QUIP 
states:
Reducing program complexity or improving administration re 
quires detailed analyses of existing procedures, policies and 
problems. Although all states have undertaken some analyses, the 
flowcharting of law/policy by New York and the detailed, 
computerized analysis of Random Audit cases by Pennsylvania
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illustrate the suggestions in this chapter for pinpointing potential 
problems.
2. Several states have addressed the worksearch issue during the 
QUIP project. Missouri©s special study of claimants, employers 
and local office personnel found considerable confusion about the 
precise nature of this requirement. Missouri found that employers 
strongly favored verifiable search efforts by claimants, but the 
employers also conceded that it was difficult to suggest concrete 
guidelines that were administratively feasible, and they generally 
did not favor the employer recordkeeping that would be necessary 
for comprehensive verification. Illinois found that telephone ver 
ification of job contacts may be as effective and much less costly 
than in-person verification by agency personnel. Perhaps surpris 
ingly, Illinois also concluded that in-person eligibility reviews with 
claimants did not seem to improve their worksearch efforts. Okla 
homa is experimenting with sorting claimants into various cate 
gories in terms of required search activities. New Jersey has in 
structed claimants that they must contact© ©hiring officers,©© not just 
any employee of the firms they contact. Missouri, New Jersey and 
Oklahoma have implemented law/policy changes designed to im 
prove claimant worksearch and job finding activities.
3. Difficulties with coordinating Job Service and unemployment 
insurance efforts to return claimants to work have been high 
lighted in studies undertaken in both Oklahoma and New Jersey, 
with a special pilot test to improve such efforts implemented in 
New Jersey during 1986.
4. Utah has implemented an experimental claimant screening profile 
to improve the targeting of administrative resources on "high- 
risk" claimants. Alaska, Illinois and New Jersey are in the process 
of conducting the research needed to evaluate whether such an 
approach might be feasible in their states.
5. Alaska and New Jersey are conducting special studies to deter 
mine whether claimants who collect UC benefits while working 
can be inexpensively identified by using computerized screening 
profiles.
6. Utah is attempting to determine whether an expert system ap 
proach would be cost effective for administering some portions of 
its eligibility criteria.
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7. Both Louisiana and Missouri found that partial claims appear to be 
a particular problem in terms of overpayments. Their detailed 
analysis of this problem has resulted in new forms, procedures and 
policies for dealing with partial claims in both states.
8. Programs for improving reviews designed to assist local offices 
have been conducted by Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. For exam 
ple, Oklahoma has initiated a new procedure that requires local 
offices to routinely utilize a "quality checklist" in order to 
identify error sources and initiate immediate corrective actions.
9. Oklahoma also has conducted a special study of employer tax 
audits and has found some employer wage reporting errors and 
also some independent contractors that were not paying UC taxes 
they owed.
10. Alaska and Illinois are conducting special studies to determine 
whether employers who misreport claimant earnings can be 
effectively targeted for tax audits by using computerized screening 
profiles.
11. Louisiana found that its system for auditing claimants for unre- 
ported earnings could be improved through a revision of its 
employer wage-reporting forms.
12. Overall oversight and quality evaluation functions have been 
improved by better integrating and coordinating a variety of 
functions designed to enhance program quality by Arizona, New 
York and Pennsylvania. 56
Conclusions
The evidence presented in this chapter does not necessarily 
prove that the UC program is excessively complex. All social 
payment systems must have eligibility criteria to regulate the 
volume of payments and to determine those who will or will not
56. These findings and activities have been reported on at four meetings held by the QUIP 
states during 1985 and 1986. The summary in the text is based on the authors© meeting notes and 
the sources referenced below, since no comprehensive report or summary of QUIP state activities 
has yet been developed. For details on any of these projects, contact the relevant state agencies. 
Also see Missouri Division of Employment Security (1986) for the worksearch survey; Murrie 
(1986) for the Oklahoma "quality checklist" and revised worksearch requirements; and Utah 
Department of Employment Security (1986) for the worksearch profile.
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be paid. The extent of program complexity required to accom 
plish this goal obviously is an issue about which informed 
individuals may disagree. On the basis of equity/efficiency 
criteria and the maximum level of real resources likely to be 
allocated to UC program administration, however, our judgment 
is that the present system is unduly complex that the costs 
implied for the adverse effects of current complexity, as detailed 
in this chapter, exceed any realistic expectation of what the 
benefits of that complexity might be.
Responses to the negative impacts of program complexity 
could include a substantial increase in administrative funding, a 
reduction in program complexity or improved methods of ad 
ministering any given level of program complexity. Because a 
substantial increase in administrative funding seems neither 
likely nor even desirable, particularly in the absence of other 
changes discussed in this study, this chapter focused on reducing 
program complexity or improving administration.
Reducing program complexity would require policymakers 
and UC program administrators to confront the issue of which 
subtle distinctions (with regard to eligibility criteria, for exam 
ple) they are willing to eliminate. Considerable controversy is 
likely to occur. Such controversy should be evaluated, however, 
in light of the costs and difficulties involved in attempting to 
administer relatively complex eligibility distinctions.
Even though the benefits of a less complex UC system might 
be substantial, political realities are likely to constrain overall 
system simplification. Accordingly, implementing better poli 
cies and procedures for administering any given level of program 
complexity could represent an important contribution to an 
improved UC system. Three such approaches were emphasized 
in this chapter. First, the development of detailed, written 
guidelines for administering state law/policy could be helpful in 
states that do not currently have such guidelines. Second, 
computerized expert systems might improve the administration 
of UC eligibility criteria. Third, computerized screening profiles 
may represent an effective technique for identifying high-risk 
claimants, so that claimant compliance can be increased by 
targeting administrative resources more heavily on this group.
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Finally, it should be emphasized that further research and pilot 
tests of the potential responses to the adverse effects of program 
complexity would be very important in evaluating their overall 
costs and benefits, particularly because of the likelihood that 
many proposals could result in unintended side effects. The 
recent leadership shown by several state agencies and USDOL in 
initiating research and experimental studies is particularly en 
couraging.
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APPENDIX 3A
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR CHANGES IN 
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS
Source: Reprinted from National Foundation for Unemployment 
Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985c: 76-78).
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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR CHANGES
IN FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAWS
August 1935 (P.L. 74-271, App. 8/14/35) Enactment of Social Security Act. Declared constitutional May 24,1937. 
Creation of Federal unemployment tax; credit for employers against Federal tax for taxes paid 
under a State law that meets Federal law requirements; Federal financing of administrative costs; 
State autonomy over substantive elements of State UC programs.
June 1938 (P.L. 75-722, App. 6-25-38) Enactment of Railroad Retirement Act (Federal system of unemploy 
ment insurance for railroad industry).
February 1939 (P.L. 76-1, App. 2/10/39) Taxing provisions in Title IX of Social Security Act transferred to Internal 
Revenue Code Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).
August 1939 (P.L. 76-379, App. 8/10/39) FUTA taxable wage base limited to first $3,000 of a worker©s earnings; 
States required to establish merit systems for personnel who administer UC programs; coverage 
extended to certain Federal instrumentalities.
September 1944 (P.L. 78-346) Servicemen©s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill). Readjustment allowances of $20 a 
week for a maximum of 52 weeks.
October 1944 (P.L. 78-458, App. 10/3/44) established the George Loan Fund for Federal loans to States in anticipa 
tion of heavy reconversion costs.
August 1946 (P.L. 79-719, App. 8/10/46) Extended coverage to maritime service; permitted States to withdraw 
employee contributions from fund for payment of benefits under a temporary disability insurance 
program; provided reconversion unemployment benefits for seamen employed by the War Shipping 
Administration.
July 1947 (P.L. 80-226, App. 7/24/471 Voluntary contributions permitted in employer rate computations.
June 1948 (P.L. 80-642, App. 6/14/48-1 Supreme Court decision resulted in the term "employee" in the FUTA 
being limited to employees under the common law rule of "master-servant" retroactive to 1939. 
Federal coverage withdrawn from 500,000, including outside salesmen.
October 1952 (P.L. 82-550) Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952 (UCV program > provided up to 26 weeks of benefits 
at $26 a week ($676) to unemployed veterans of the Korean conflict.
August 1954 (P.L. 83-567, App. 8/5/54) The Employment Security Administrative Financing Act of 1954 (Reed 
Act) earmarked all proceeds of the unemployment tax to UC purposes by appropriating to the 
Federal Unemployment Trust Fund any annual excess of Federal tax receipts over employment 
security expenditures approved by Congress. Bill created loan fund; provided for return to the States 
of any excess over a $200 million reserve in the loan fund to be used for benefits and State adminis 
trative expenses, including buildings.
September 1954 (P.L. 83-767, App. 9/1/54) Coverage: established Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employ 
ees (UCFEl program; extended coverage (efT. 1/1/56) to employers of 4 (instead of 8) or more 
workers in 20 weeks in a calendar year. Tax: States permitted to allow reduced rates to employers 
with 1 (instead of 3) years© experience.
June 1958 (P.L. 85-441, App. 6/4/58) Established Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 (TUC). 
Provided up to 13 weeks of extended benefits to individuals who had exhausted regular entitlement 
after June 30, 1957 and before April 1, 1959. Financed by Federal loans to States. State participation 
optional.
October 1958 (P.L. 85-848, App. 8/28/58) Permanent program providing benefits to veterans under law of State in 
which claim was filed. Ex-servicemen©s Unemployment Act of 1958 (UCX).
September 1960 (P.L. 86-778, App. 9/13/60) Federal tax increased from 3 to 3.1 7, without a change in the 2.77, offset 
credit, thus increasing Federal share from 0.3©/f to 0.4©/; permitted advances from loan fund only to 
States unable to meet benefit costs in current or following month; extended coverage to Federal 
Reserve Banks, land banks, and credit unions. Puerto Rico brought into system. Effective 1/1/62, 
coverage extended to employees on American aircraft working outside U.S.; nonprofit organizations 
not exempt from income tax, feeder organizations of nonprofit organizations.
March 1961 (P.L. 87-6, App. 3/24/61) Established Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1961 (TEUC). Provided up to 13 weeks of extended benefits to workers who exhausted benefits after 
June 30, 1960 and before April 1, 1962. Financed by a temporary additional Federal unemployment 
tax of 0.4^ for 1962 and 0.259f for 1963. Mandatory for all states.
August 1970 (P.L. 91-373, App. 8/10/70) Tax: wage base increased from $3,000 to $4,200, eff. 1/1/72; Federal tax 
rate increased from 3.1 r/< to 3.2©7r; new employers permitted reduced rate on basis other than 
experience. Created Extended Unemployment Compensation Program providing up to 13 weeks of 
extended benefits financed 50-50 Federal-State to claimants who exhausted regular entitlement 
during periods of high unemployment nationwide or in their State: nationwide, whenever seasonal 
ly adjusted insured unemployment rate is 4.5r/i or more for 3 consecutive months; State; whenever 
State©s insured unemployment rate averaged 4r/t or more for 13 consecutive weeks and was at least 
207r higher than the average of such rates for the corresponding 13-week periods in the preceding 2 
years. Extended benefit period ends when conditions no longer exist, but must remain in effect at 
least 13 weeks. Coverage extended, eff. 1/1/72, to employers with 1 or more employees in 20 weeks or 
a quarterly payroll of $1,500; nonprofit organizations of 4 or more employees; State hospitals and
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institutions of higher education; outside salesmen, agents and commission drivers; certain agricul 
tural processing workers; U.S. citizens employed by American firms outside the U.S. New State 
requirements added; nonprofits must be given right to finance benefit costs by straight reimburse 
ment instead of tax; certain professional employees of colleges must be denied benefits between 
school terms if they have a contract to work both terms; benefits may not be paid any claimant for a 
second successive benefit year unless he has worked since beginning of the preceding benefit year; 
benefits may not be denied claimants in approved training; benefits may not be denied because a 
person files a claim in another State or Canada; required participation in interstate plan for 
combining a claimant©s wage credits when his earnings are in more than one State; prohibits 
cancelling wage credits or totally reducing benefit rights except for misconduct in connection with 
the work, fraud in connection with a claim, receipt of disqualifying income.
December 1971 (P.L. 92-224, App. 12/29/71) Enacted the Emergency Compensation Act of 1971, providing addition 
al extended benefits of up to 13 weeks to claimants in States with an insured unemployment rate 
plus an adjustment rate for exhaustees of 6.5$, provided extended benefits had already triggered on 
in the State. Act was effective between January 30, 1972 and September 30, 1972.
June 1972 (P.L. 92-329, App. 6/30/72) Extended Emergency Compensation Act of 1971 to March 31, 1973. 
Financed by increase in Federal tax rate for 1973 from 3.2ft to 3.28ft.
October 1972- Several bills enacted temporarily suspending the requirement that a State must have both an
October 1976 insured unemployment rate of at least 4ft and the rate must be 120ft higher than the average of the 
rates for the corresponding period in the 2 preceding years. Most such bills permitted States to waive 
the 120ft requirement.
December 1974 (P.L. 93-567, App. 12/31/74) The Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act provided a 
temporary program of Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) to individuals with work experi 
ence but no benefit rights under regular unemployment compensation programs because their jobs 
were not covered.
December 1974 (P.L. 93-572, App. 12/31/74) Created emergency benefits program providing up to 13 weeks of 
Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) to individuals who had exhausted all regular and extended 
benefit entitlement. Payable between January 1, 1975 and December 31, 1976 on the basis of same 
triggers as in the extended benefits program.
March 1975 (P.L. 94-12, App. 3/29/75) Increased maximum number of weeks payable under FSB from 13 to 26 
until January 1, 1976.
June 1975 (P.L. 94-45, App. 6/30/75) Changed FSB trigger to require insured unemployment rate of at least 5ft; 
limited FSB benefits to 13 weeks duration; extended the program until March 31, 1977; provided for 
a 3-year deferral of the tax credit reduction provisions applicable to borrowing States, provided they 
met conditions prescribed by Secretary of Labor.
October 1976 (P.L. 94-444, App. 10/1/76) Provides for Federal reimbursement to the States for unemployment 
compensation paid to individuals separated from CETA public service jobs.
October 1976 (P.L. 94-566, App. 10/20/76)
Financing: increased tax base from $4,.200 to $6,000, effective 1/1/78; increased net Federal tax rate 
from 0.5ft to 0.7ft to return to 0.5ft after all advances for the Federal share of extended benefits have 
been repaid.
Coverage: extended to State and local government employees; household workers who are paid 
$1,000 or more in any calendar quarter for such services; agricultural labor for employers having 10 
or more workers in 20 weeks of paying $20,000 or more in wages in any calendar quarter; employees 
of nonprofit elementary and secondary schools; Virgin Islands admitted to the system. 
Extended benefits: change in triggers National, seasonally adjusted insured unemployment rate 
of 4.5ft during a 13-week period; State, the 4ft unadjusted rate and the 120ft requirement retained, 
but the latter may be waived by the State whenever the unadjusted rate is 5ft or more. 
Standards: disqualification on basis of pregnancy is prohibited; payment prohibited to professional 
athletes between successive seasons and to aliens not legally admitted to U.S. for permanent 
residence; to individuals receiving a pension. Payment based on service for a school by a professional 
must be denied between school terms if individual has reasonable assurance of reemployment. 
States permitted to apply same denial to nonprofessionals employed by schools. Establishes a 
National Study Commission to study and report on the unemployment compensation program.
April 1977 (P.L. 95-19, App. 4/12/77) Reduced length of FSB emergency benefit period from 26 to 13 weeks; 
extended FSB program to November 1977 for new claims; added special disqualifications for refusal 
of suitable work and defined suitable work for FSB claimants; provided general revenue financing of 
FSB beginning April 1, 1977; extended the deferral period for borrowing States for 2 years; clarified 
the required denial of benefits to undocumented aliens; permitted States to extend the required 
denial of benefits to school employees to vacation periods and holiday recesses in addition to the 
period occurring between school terms.
December 1977 (P.L. 95-216, App. 12/20/77) Required State UC agencies to provide wage information to welfare 
agencies on request; for annual rather than quarterly reporting of F1CA wages.
November 1978 (P.L. 95-600, App. 11/6/78) The Revenue Act of 1978 subjected unemployment benefits to taxation 
for those whose total income exceeds certain amounts.
October 1979 (P.L. 96-84, App. 10/10/79) Extended exclusion from the FUTA of certain alien farmworkers for 2 
years but provided that these workers shall be counted for determining if a farm operator has 
enough workers or payroll to be subject to FUTA coverage.
September 1980 (P.L. 96-364, App. 9/26/80) Amended pension standard to require deduction of pension payments 
only in specified circumstances and to allow States to consider an individual©s contribution to the 
pension in determining the amount to be deducted from unemployment benefits; required States to 
prohibit payment of extended benefits beyond 2 weeks to an interstate claimant if the claim was
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filed in an agent State where an extended benefit period was not in effect; required exservice- 
members to have one year instead of 90 days of active service before they can be eligible for benefits.
December 1980 (P.L. 96-499, App. 12/5/80) Terminated Federal funding of unemployment benefits paid to CETA/ 
PSE workers; eliminated Federal share of the first week of extended benefits in any State that does 
not have a noncompensable waiting week requirement for regular benefits; required denial of 
extended benefits to individuals who fail to meet certain specified requirements concerning applica 
tion for suitable work, or who fail to actively engage in seeking work; prohibited States from paying 
extended benefits unless State law provided duration of unemployment disqualifications for the 3 
major causes for EB claimants.
August 1981 (P.L. 97-35, App. 8/13/81) Eliminated natinal EB trigger; increased from 47( to 5% the State EB 
trigger (and from 5% to 6% the optional trigger if a State waives the 120% requirement); disqualified 
ex-servicemembers who separate from the service when they had an opportunity to re-enlist; re 
quired offsetting of unemployment benefits by amount of child support owed by a claimant; prohibit 
ed States from granting extended benefits to any claimant who qualified for regular benefits with 
fewer than 20 weeks of work (or the equivalent) in his base period.
August 1982 (P.L. 97-248, App. 9/2/82) Increased FUTA taxable wage base from $6,000 to $7,000 and net Federal 
tax rate from 0.7% to 0.8% (eff. 1/1/83); increased the gross Federal tax rate from 3.4% to 6.2% (eff. I/ 
1/85) including 0.2% temporary tax until EUCA debt is repaid. 90% offset credit applies to 6.0% 
yielding net Federal tax of 0.8%. Allocation of Federal taxes was revised with 60% to ESSA account 
and 40% to EUCA account until debt is repaid. Fifth year added tax credit reduction for debtor states 
was amended to eliminate cost rate/tax rate comparison in qualifying states. Lowered the earnings 
level at which the U.C. benefits are taxable from $20,000 to $12,000 for singles and from $25,000 to 
$18,000 for married individuals. Debtor states were permitted to make repayments from experience 
rated trust fund moneys. States with very high insured unemployment rate allowed to defer a 
portion of their interest payments. Wages paid certain student interns were exempted from FUTA. 
Initiated a temporary program of Federal Supplemental Compensation providing for 6-10 weeks of 
benefits with program terminating 3/31/83. Extended for 1982-83, the FUTA exemption on wages 
paid certain alien farmworkers. Directed USDL to assist states desiring to adopt short-time compen 
sation. Extended the Reed Act for 10 years permitting states to restore depleted Reed funds if state 
has solvent trust fund.
October 1982 (P.L. 97-362, Miscellaneous Tax Act of 1982, App. 10/1/82) Extended for two years FUTA exclusion 
of services performed on fishing vessels with crews of fewer than 10; amended UCX program to 
provide that ex-servicepersons may qualify if they leave the service after a full term of enlistment; 
imposed a 4-week waiting period on UCX benefits; limited UCX duration (including extended 
benefits) to a maximum of 13 weeks; required UCX payments to be charged to Department of 
Defense after 10/1/83.
December 1982 (P.L. 97-424, App. 1/6/83) Provided for an additional 2-6 weeks of Federal Supplemental Compensa 
tion for each state, according to insured unemployment levels.
January 1983 (P.L. 97-424, Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, App. 1/6/83) Revised triggers and 
duration of benefits under Federal Supplemental Unemployment Compensation Act of 1982.
April 1983 (P.L. 98-21, Social Security Amendments of 1983, App. 4/20/83) Extended FSC program 6 months to 
9/30/83. Modified conditions debtor States must meet to avoid FUTA tax increase. Established new 
conditions under which interest may be deferred. Required States to provide that nonprofessional 
employees of schools and colleges be denied benefits between terms and during holidays and vaca 
tion periods. Gave States option to extend denial to individuals performing services for or on behalf 
of schools, even though not employees of those schools. Permitted States to deduct from an individ 
ual©s unemployment check amounts for health insurance if individual agrees. Allowed States to 
modify availability requirements for EB claimants to take account of jury duty or hospitalization if 
such exemptions also apply to regular claimants. Removed from FUTA "wage" exclusions, begin 
ning January 1985, certain employer payments relating to employee retirement benefits and sick 
pay.
October 1983 (P.L. 98-135, Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of 1983, App. 10/24/83) Extended 
provisions of Act to 3/31/85. Revised triggers and duration of FSC; added exclusion from taxable 
wages of any payment made by an employer to a survivor or estate of a former employee after the 
calendar year in which the employee dies; extended for two years, to 12/31/85, exclusion from 
coverage of wages paid certain alien farmworkers under contract for fixed periods; directs Secretary 
of Labor to make special reports on feasibility of area triggers for extended benefits, structural 
unemployment among claimants, eligibility of federal retirees and federal prisoners for benefits.
July 1984 (P.L. 98-369, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, App. 7/18/84) Extended definition of "wages" to all tips 
reported by employee to employer, including tips made by credit cards as well as cash; extended for 2 
years (to December 31, 1984) the exclusion of services performed on fishing vessels with crews of 
fewer than 10 whose remuneration involves a share in the catch; required that State UI agencies 
provide for exchange of information with agencies administering other programs for purposes of 
income and eligibility verification; required all States to require employers to make quarterly 
reports of wages to a State agency.
October 1984 (P.L. 98-601, Small Business Unemployment Tax Act, App. 10/30/84) Permitted State UI laws to 
provide certain small businesses (quarterly total wages of under $50,000) opportunity for phasing in 
to a maximum tax rate of 5.4%, from 1985 to 1989. (Parallels a similar phase-in provision in P.L. 97- 
248 applicable to certain industries subject to a uniform State rate above 2.7%.)
October 1984 (P.L. 98-611, App. 10/31/84) Provided a 2-year (1984 and 1985) extension of an employer credit 
against FUTA and FICA taxes for employer-paid costs of education assistance for employees.
October 1984 (P.L. 98-612, App. 10/31/84) Provided a 1-year (1985) extension of an employer credit against FUTA 
and FICA taxes for employer-paid costs of group legal services for employees.
Adverse Impacts of Federal 
Administrative Funding Procedures
Each state is responsible for determining its eligibility criteria 
and benefit levels, and also for raising the tax revenue neces 
sary to fund its benefit payments. However, state administra 
tive costs are financed by Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
(FUTA) receipts collected from taxpaying employers in all 
states. 1
This federal funding process is one of the major features of the 
federal-state partnership in the UC system. USDOL applies 
administrative funding allocation procedures that affect state 
programs by creating various incentives and disincentives to 
which states respond. After providing a brief overview of the 
USDOL administrative funding process, this chapter analyzes 
the adverse incentives and impacts of that process on payment 
accuracy and overall UC program quality. Then, some possible 
improvements in the administrative funding process are dis 
cussed.
1. As of 1985, the FUTA tax rate on employers was 6.2 percent of the first $7,000 paid to 
each covered employee, but employers may receive a credit of 5.4 percent of this tax for taxes 
paid under state UC laws (to fund benefit payments). Thus, the net federal tax on employers is 
0.8 percent. Both federal and state UC program administrative costs are paid from appropriations 
made annually by Congress out of funds accumulated from net FUTA tax receipts. In addition to 
funding federal and state administrative costs, the net federal tax is used to finance the federal 
share (50 percent) of federal-state extended benefits and to provide a loan fund for states that 
deplete the reserves available for benefit payments. For details on the federal tax (including 
details on the "flow of funds" from the 0.8 percent net federal tax), see the excellent summary 
provided in National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation 
(1986a).
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Background
Control of administrative funding represents a substantial 
source of federal authority over state UC programs. In fact, 
Rubin contends that:
The source of this authority is the federal control over the 
distribution of administrative grants and the power to establish 
standards "designed to insure competence and probity."
Under the Social Security Act, administrative grants are 
permitted only if the state law provides "such methods of 
administration as are found by the Secretary (of Labor) to be 
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of compensation 
when due." A second provision permits expenditure of adminis 
trative grants by a state only in the amounts and for the purposes 
found necessary by the Secretary for proper and efficient admin 
istration.
The virtually unqualified authority of DOL to allocate admin 
istrative grants regularly collides with the states© responsibilities 
to administer their own laws. Control over allocation has trans 
lated into federal dictation of priorities, limitations on state 
flexibility, friction, and cooperation. The conflicts have produced 
state recommendations either for some share of the authority over 
allocations or for independent sources of administrative funds 
without federal control. 2
Individual state UC programs receive administrative funding 
from the federal government on the basis of allocations by 
USDOL. 3 Initially, detailed line item budgeting was utilized for 
all budgetary items, but in 1941 this approach was replaced by a 
system of "functional" budgeting, under which administrative 
financing was provided for the specific costs of performing 
various UC functions (e.g., the maintenance of employer wage
2. Rubin (1983: 27-28).
3. For a recent and excellent discussion of the administrative funding process, see House 
Committee on Appropriations (1985). This chapter draws heavily on this source. For recent 
analyses of financing issues in terms of state trust fund solvency for paying UC benefits to 
claimants, see Vroman (1985 and 1986).
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records). 4 This functional budgeting system eventually evolved 
into one in which funding for direct UC operations, such as 
benefit payment procedures, depended on "standard" times per 
unit of work performed in each state.
Because of difficulties with its functional budgeting system, 
which included an inability to explain or justify cost variations 
among the states, USDOL initiated a major research and devel 
opment project in 1971 that was intended to result in an 
improved administrative funding system. 5 The result of this 
effort was the Cost Model Management System implemented in 
the mid-1970s and used through at least FY 1987, although some 
changes were made for FY 1987 allocations. Because some 
familiarity with this system is essential for understanding exist 
ing, past and probably future administrative funding impacts and 
problems, it is briefly explained below.
At the very outset, it is important to emphasize that USDOL 
already has responded positively to some of the adverse funding 
impacts analyzed in this chapter. In particular, USDOL imple 
mented some potentially significant changes that affected FY 
1987 allocations to the states, as discussed in a subsequent 
section. 6 Nonetheless, because the funding process described 
below is essential to understanding adverse federal impacts on 
state programs from the mid-1970s through at least FY 1987, and 
because many features of that funding process may be retained in 
future years, it is important to provide further background. 7
The Cost Model Management System is based upon work 
measurement and time studies of the various functions involved 
in processing UC claims in each state. Statistical sampling 
techniques are used to analyze sample work stations in order to 
estimate the (statewide average) time required to perform the 
major UC functions in each state. 8 These time factors are
4. National Governors© Association (1983: 9).
5. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 7).
6. See Semerad (1986), Jones (1986) and Balcer (1986).
7. It should be noted that, although such funding procedures are not discussed in the text, 
USDOL also provides separate funding to the states for certain special purpose projects, such as 
the operation of the Cost Model System itself. Nonetheless, most administrative funding for state 
programs has been provided through the funding process discussed in the text.
8. A number of potential issues arise because of the use of "sample" work stations for
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denoted as "minutes per unit" (MPUs) and have been developed 
for a number of major cost model components, including: initial 
claims, weeks claimed, nonmonetary determinations, appeals, 
wage records and tax functions. 9 MPUs for 17 different workload 
activities were used in the administrative funding allocation 
process for FY 1985. 10
On the basis of the MPUs developed from the Cost Model 
System and forecasts of future workloads, the total staff posi 
tions required by each state to process its predicted workload for 
each year are estimated. One of the major problems that led to 
the development of the Cost Model System the inability to 
justify or explain cost differences among the states has contin 
ued as an unresolved problem, however. In fact, as early as FY 
1977, only two years after implementation of the Cost Model, 
the Office of Management and Budget began to cut USDOL©s 
annual budget requests for administrative financing because of 
unexplainable variances in administrative costs among the 
states. 11
A recent summary of the Cost Model System by Dunn and 
Griffin provides a convenient overview of a number of admin 
istrative financing issues frequently raised by the states:
The primary elements in financing the administration of the 
nation©s unemployment insurance program are the estimated 
workloads for the forthcoming fiscal period and the time factors 
established as necessary to maintain a fully effective program for 
the prompt payment of benefits and the prevention of fraud and 
other abuses. As a hedge against inaccurate estimates (which are 
made initially 21 months before the end of the fiscal period) only 
a portion of the estimated workloads (the base) is funded in 
advance the rest (the contingency) will be funded only if and 
when the additional workloads occur.
relatively short periods to estimate the average (statewide) time required to perform particular 
tasks. Obvious issues include the statistical validity of the selection procedures for the sample 
work stations and the extent to which "gaming" strategies may be utilized by states to affect the 
Cost Model estimates. However, these and other potential Cost Model design issues are not 
addressed in this study because the authors have no substantive basis for evaluating such issues.
9. National Governors© Association (1983: 9).
10. See Brown (1984) and House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 24).
11. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 10).
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. . . Base funding presupposes a sufficiency of resources to 
support the minimum number of experienced staff who will 
provide a continuity of operations and stability, regardless of 
workload fluctuations.
In contrast, additional contingency funding presupposes that 
when workloads exceed base entitlements, temporary, part-time 
and transitional staff (usually lower salaried) will be added to 
handle this excess workload on an as-needed basis. The propor 
tion of total expected workload which is funded at "base" is 
critical since the allowances for salary and NFS [Non-Personal 
Services] are lower for the contingency workloads than for those 
in the base. One major difficulty is that for the past several years, 
the base workloads nationwide have been arbitrarily fixed, while 
the actual number of claims processed has varied widely during 
the same period. 12 (emphasis added)
Four issues noted in the above summary of funding procedures require 
further clarification: (1) workload projections, (2) the underfunding of 
state UC program operations, (3) "base" v. "contingency" funding, 
and (4) the funding for nonpersonal services.
Workload Projections
One of the major determinants of the level of administrative 
funding for state programs in any year is the projected (national) 
workload. The accuracy of these projections is essential to the 
overall adequacy of administrative funding because, as discussed 
below, it affects the extent to which funding is provided on a 
base or a contingency basis. 13 Accurately projecting the national 
workloads for particular years would be extremely difficult, even 
if such projections were based solely on objective factors. 
However, political considerations affect the objectivity of these 
forecasts, since USDOL and the Office of Management and 
Budget utilize the administration©s official economic assump-
12. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 7 and 3).
13. Dunn and Griffin (1984 or 1985) and House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 17).
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tions in determining workload projections. 14 Relatively inaccu 
rate workload estimates that consistently understate actual 
workloads have been used by USDOL in its administrative 
funding process in recent years. Actual UC workloads were 
greater than projected workloads for FY 1976 through FY 
1980. 15 More recently, the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies has found that USDOL©s projected annual 
workload estimate was never more than 80 percent of the actual 
workload from FY 1980 through FY 1984, with the exception of 
one year. 16
Underfunding of State Programs
One issue that has aroused strong state objections, especially 
in recent years, has been the practice of underfunding states for 
the number of positions indicated by the Cost Model MPU 
studies. 17 The underfunding issue partly reflects the fact that 
congressional appropriations (which determine the total funds 
from FUTA collections available to USDOL for state programs) 
have not been sufficient to fully fund all positions indicated by 
the Cost Model System, although underfunding actually predates 
the Cost Model System. According to a report prepared by the 
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies and 
Macro Systems, Inc., numerous methods have been used to 
reduce the number of positions implied by the Cost Model and 
workload estimates to the number of base positions that could be 
supported with available resources. 18 As a result, states often 
have received different percentage reductions in allowable MPUs 
for different functions.
14. See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 17-23) and Interstate Conference of 
Employment Security Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1980: 607).
15. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 17).
16. Cited in House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 17-18).
17. UC program personnel also often contend that the Job Service underfunds programs 
related to placing UC claimants in jobs. The issue arises because Job Service operations receive 
specific funding from FUTA collections deposited into the Employment Security Administration 
Account for serving UC claimants. However, UC program personnel often contend they do not 
receive service for their claimants commensurate with the funding provided to the Job Service 
from these FUTA collections.
18. Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1979: 
III-9).
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The states with the highest MPUs for a given function usually 
have the funding for those MPUs reduced by the largest 
percentage amounts; in most instances, these MPU funding 
reductions become progressively smaller for states with lower 
MPUs. Full MPU funding has been unusual in recent years. 
During the FY 1985 allocation process, USDOL fully funded the 
MPUs in each of the workload components for only the five 
states with the lowest MPUs. 19 Overall, USDOL funded only 
about 84 percent of the state needs indicated by the Cost Model 
studies during fiscal years 1984 and 1985, with this percentage 
evidently falling to about 82 percent for FY 1986. 20
The practice of not fully funding state MPUs has aroused 
overwhelming, if not unanimous, opposition by the states. In 
fact, a recent analysis by the House Committee on Appropria 
tions found that nearly all states surveyed supported the Cost 
Model as "a theoretically sound approach to accurately 
determining the time needed to accomplish specific UI 
functions," 21 and most states also believed that USDOL©s 
reductions for the MPUs indicated by the Cost Model studies 
have been arbitrary. 22 These state concerns are summarized well 
by Dunn and Griffin:
The MPUs identified for each state are revised downward by the 
Secretary of Labor to assure that the number of positions allocated 
to states does not exceed the number of positions which have been 
included in the President©s annual budget request. These adjust 
ments seriously affect the funding each state actually receives. 
The program needs have been methodically documented and 
justified through the cost model/workload estimating process. 
These needs nevertheless are modified arbitrarily by ETA to fit 
within a total funding ceiling. 23
19. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 24).
20. See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 24) for the estimates for fiscal years 
1984 and 1985. The estimates for FY 1986 were provided by New York©s former UC 
administrator, Gerald Dunn.
21. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 20).
22. For a summary of state views, see House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 24). Also, 
see Dunn and Griffin (1984 or 1985).
23. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 3).
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USDOL generally believes nationwide funding for the admin 
istration of state programs is adequate, despite the fact that full 
funding for Cost Model MPUs is not provided. 24 This may 
explain why many states maintain that USDOL does not make as 
strong a case to Congress for full funding of Cost Model MPUs 
as the states believe is appropriate. A recent analysis by the 
House Committee on Appropriations concluded that USDOL 
could not support its conclusion or "adequately demonstrate that 
Cost Model results were improperly prepared or were inaccu 
rate."25
Base v. Contingency Funding
Another administrative funding issue is that overall funding 
adequacy partly depends on the proportion of total funding 
provided to a state as "base," rather than "contingency," 
funding. The need for such a distinction in the funding process 
arises because claim loads can fluctuate sharply from quarter to 
quarter in any state. The base allocations are supposed to provide 
funding for a sufficient number of permanent staff to effectively 
operate a state©s program during relatively low volume periods. 
In contrast, contingency funding is supposed to make it possible 
to effectively process claims during higher volume periods by 
allowing states to supplement their permanent (base) staffs with 
temporary/seasonal employees. However, in addition to the 
tendency of USDOL to underestimate base staff needs, there are 
at least three interrelated issues that complicate the apparently 
simple distinction between base and contingency funding: (1) 
differential funding levels for a given number of positions, 
depending on whether they are funded as base or contingency 
positions; (2) the problems states confront because of the 
distinction between positions "earned" and "used" for partic 
ular calendar quarters; and (3) the allocation constraints imposed 
for base staff gains and losses in particular states. Each of these 
issues is briefly discussed below.
24. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 20).
25. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 19).
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An implicit assumption of the Cost Model System is that the 
efficiency of permanent and temporary employees is the same. 
No adjustment is explicitly made in the MPUs for a state on the 
basis of the proportion of its workload processed with permanent 
v. temporary employees. At the same time, however, USDOL 
provides lower funding levels to a state for contingency than for 
base positions to reflect the lower wage and employment costs 
supposedly associated with temporary v. permanent employees. 
Thus, a state would receive a smaller (larger) administrative 
funding allocation if it had fewer (more) of a given number of 
total positions funded as base positions; as explained earlier in 
this chapter, USDOL has consistently underestimated base 
workloads in recent years.
Funding generally has been provided to a state for base 
positions only if it has "used" all of the positions it "earned" 
for a particular calendar quarter; excess positions earned typi 
cally have been recaptured by USDOL at the end of each 
calendar quarter. In contrast, contingency or other extra funding 
generally has not been provided to a state in past years if it has 
used more positions than it has earned for a particular calendar 
quarter. As a result, the adequacy of funding has depended partly 
on how accurately states could forecast the exact staff size 
required to process quarterly workloads, since the states typically 
have been funded for the lower of earned or used staff positions. 
In addition, it can be extremely difficult to vary staffing rapidly 
enough during particular calendar quarters, even given accurate 
annual workload forecasts, to keep actual (or "used") staffing 
exactly matched to "earned" staffing. In apparent recognition of 
these problems, USDOL recently changed its policy to allow 
states to make accounting carry-overs of earned but not used 
positions from the first to the second quarter in a year, and for 
FY 1987 USDOL decided to allow states to continue such 
carry-overs for base positions for the entire fiscal year. 26 
Moreover, at least for FY 1987, the states could be paid for 
earned contingency positions, even if they were not used during
26. For the earlier change, see House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 30). For the more 
recent changes, see Jones (1986).
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the year. 27 However, it still is not clear whether these recent 
changes will be continued in future years, and they certainly do 
not fully address the other base v. contingency funding issues 
discussed above.
Another dimension of the underfunding of base positions is that 
the allocation procedures in recent years appear to penalize states 
that experience extremely sharp increases in claim loads from one 
year to the next. This occurs because USDOL generally has 
modified the allocation of base staff positions for certain func 
tions indicated by MPU/workload estimates to constrain the in 
crease in such positions for any state from one year to the next. 28 
The effect of such constraints obviously is to increase the relative 
underfunding of states that have rapidly growing claim loads, as 
has been emphasized by the Florida UC agency. 29 The relative 
underfunding imposed on such "loser" states by this zero-sum 
reallocation process (that benefits some "gainer" states) would 
be expected to contribute to quality problems in "loser" states.
Funding for Nonpersonal Services30
The funding of nonpersonal services (NFS) is another major 
feature of the existing administrative funding system. The NFS 
category consists of nonstaff items such as supplies, communi 
cations, travel, equipment, premises and various purchased 
services that may include data processing. Prior to 1981, funding 
for such costs was based mainly on historical funding levels, 
adjusted for numerous special factors relevant in particular 
states. Because of historical difficulties encountered in equitably 
funding differential NFS costs among the states, a special model 
intended to account for wide variations in NFS costs among the 
states was developed in 1981. 31 This special model was soon 
discarded in favor of existing NFS funding procedures.
27. Balcer (1986).
28. For example, see Brown (1984).
29. Burnett and Pendleton (1985).
30. For an excellent and extremely detailed analysis of NFS funding issues, see House 
Committee on Appropriations (1985: 36-62). The discussion in this section draws heavily on that 
source.
31. National Governors© Association (1983: 15).
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In recent years, NFS funding has been closely tied to actual 
workloads (and staffing costs), even though many NFS costs 
(e.g., premises) represent fixed or quasi-fixed costs that vary 
little (if at all) with actual workloads, particularly on a quarterly 
basis. 32 A particular problem with this NFS funding process is 
that capital-intensive states, especially those with highly auto 
mated systems, tend to receive less adequate funding than 
labor-intensive states, especially those with relatively high MPUs 
and salary levels. Other difficult issues that must be confronted 
by USDOL in attempting to equitably fund NFS costs among the 
states include: (1) the substantial differences in NFS costs among 
the states in a given year; (2) differences in NFS costs within a 
state from year to year; (3) the fact that state decisions can alter 
both the amount and mix of NFS costs; and (4) the fact that the 
extent and duration of the fixed component of NFS costs varies 
substantially among the states. 33 However, it is quite clear that 
USDOL©s NFS funding procedure34 to fund NFS costs attrib 
uted to contingency staffing at a much lower rate than the rate 
used for NFS costs attributed to base staffing has created 
serious difficulties for state programs. In particular, the consis 
tent underestimates of base workloads result in lower NFS 
funding allocations because less NFS funding is provided for 
contingency than for base positions. 35
It also appears that the difficulties states have in fully covering 
their NFS costs have accelerated in recent years. According to a 
survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies, which obtained responses from 47 state 
agencies, the number of states that reported NFS deficits 
increased from 18 to 40 between 1980 and 1983. 36 USDOL has 
contended that the shortfall in NFS funding alleged by the states
32. For example, see Dunn and Griffin (1984: 4) and House Committee on Appropriations 
(1985: 36-44).
33. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 36-62).
34. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 36 and 50).
35. An additional dimension of the NFS underfunding issue is the shortfall in NFS funds for 
the UC program that resulted from the split in NFS funding for the UC and ES programs 
mandated in the 1982 Wagner-Peyser Act amendments. This issue is not addressed here, but it 
is discussed in House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 46-49).
36. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 55).
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is due to state accounting procedures rather than to inadequate 
funding. 37 Nonetheless, most states and the Interstate Confer 
ence of Employment Security Agencies view the shortfall as 
indeed a real one; this position evidently was accepted by the 
Congress in at least two recent years, as reflected by the fact that 
portions of supplemental appropriations for the UC system for 
FY 1984 and 1985 were earmarked specifically for NFS fund 
ing. 38 In addition, the evidence and substantive analysis pro 
vided by the states, the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies, the House Committee on Appropriations, and 
even USDOL certainly appears to be much more supportive of 
the state position than of USDOL©s position. 39
Funding Impacts on Payment Accuracy and Program Quality
The overview of the funding process in the prior section 
provides a basis for analyzing how the administrative funding 
procedures utilized from the mid-1970s through at least FY 1987 
likely have impacted on both payment accuracy and overall UC 
program quality. Although the effects analyzed obviously are 
interrelated, at least eight somewhat distinct impacts or issues 
can be identified: (1) the inherent complexity of the funding 
process; (2) the overall underfunding of state UC program 
operations; (3) the base v. contingency funding procedures; (4) 
the underfunding of nonpersonal services; (5) the likelihood the 
funding process discourages general innovations in state opera 
tions; (6) disincentives for states to automate their operations; (7) 
the absence of direct incentives to encourage administrative cost 
efficiency, including a lack of incentives for reducing program 
complexity; and (8) the absence of appropriate incentives to 
encourage states to prevent payment errors or to detect/recover 
overpayments.
37. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 47).
38. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 47-62) and International Association of 
Personnel in Employment Security (1985).
39. For a summary of the arguments and evidence for several states, see House Committee 
on Appropriations (1985: 47-62). Also, several individual states have documented their NFS 
shortfalls. For example, see Dunn and Griffin (1984).
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It should be emphasized that USDOL has disputed the 
existence of some of these impacts. Nonetheless, a December 
1984 internal study prepared by USDOL©s own Administrative 
Finance Workgroup severely criticized the funding system and 
explicitly acknowledged most of the adverse impacts listed 
above. 40 Moreover, in evaluating these adverse impacts, it is 
important to emphasize that USDOL already has implemented 
some changes in that system. After obtaining substantial input 
on reforming its administrative funding process, USDOL 
implemented some short-term reforms in May 1986. 41 At the 
same time, USDOL announced that there would be continuing 
public discussion of long-term revisions in its administrative 
funding procedures. 42 Although there continues to be contro 
versy about the importance of the short-term revisions that were 
implemented during FY 1987, it certainly appears to the authors 
that these changes represent an important step towards a much 
better administrative funding process. Probably the most 
important of these short-term changes is that USDOL has 
provided the states much more flexibility in determining how to 
allocate the administrative funding they receive among various 
cost categories. In addition to increasing the flexibility of state 
spending decisions, the FY 1987 changes implemented by 
USDOL include: (1) an emphasis on monitoring state 
performance outcomes, rather than expenditures by detailed cost 
categories; (2) a reduction and simplification of fiscal reporting; 
(3) the replacement of the quarterly recapture of unused funding 
for base positions with only the annual recapture of such funds; 
and (4) evidently for FY 1987 only, contingency funding for 
positions states earn, instead of funding for the lesser of earned 
or used positions. 43 Thus, USDOL already is in the process of 
improving its past administrative funding system. Accordingly, 
although the full impact of these recent changes cannot yet be 
evaluated, their apparent contribution to a better funding system
40. Cited in House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 73-74).
41. Jones (1986).
42. Jones (1986).
43. Jones (1986) and Balcer (1986).
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will be noted in the relevant sections of the subsequent 
discussion of the eight issues identified above.
Funding Process Complexity
The inherent complexity of USDOL©s funding process be 
comes evident from a careful examination of the intricate details 
of the system. In a study prepared in 1980 at the request of the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation, the 
undue complexity of the administrative funding mechanism was 
identified as a major problem:
Congress appropriates Grants-to-States resources to states in three 
categories: UI, Employment Service, and contingency. In recent 
years, however, the allocation of these resources to the States has 
become increasingly complex and restrictive as well as being 
constantly under revision. This complex of mechanisms has 
resulted in increased confusion and frustration in understanding 
funding concepts, incentives, and mechanisms. . . . ^
Although the funding system has been revised since the above study 
was completed, it is very clear that the process subsequently utilized 
still was a complex one. 45
The funding process makes it difficult for states to undertake 
effective long-range planning on the basis of reasonably stable 
funding, even assuming constant workloads. The complexity of 
the funding process also makes it difficult to understand or 
explain either existing funding allocations among the states or 
how changes in a particular state would affect its allocation. In 
fact, a conclusion of an internal ETA study dated December 
1984 is that the administrative funding process was "unneces 
sarily costly," "highly complex," and resulted in "incongru 
ities" between resources and workloads "that are difficult to
44. Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1980: 
606).
45. For an excellent discussion of some complexities involved in allocating administrative 
funds among the states, see Brown (1984).
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understand and explain."46 A recent and detailed comparison of 
various components of the FY 1986 administrative funding 
allocations among the states by the Arizona UC agency also finds 
"that there are radical relative differences between states for 
which logical explanations do not come to mind.© © 47 Fortunately, 
it appears that USDOL now has somewhat reduced the complex 
ity of the administrative funding process, at least for FY 1987 
allocations. 48
Overall Underfunding of State UC Program Operations
State UC program administrators have strongly contended that 
USDOL underfunds the administrative costs that would be 
associated with "quality" programs, since full funding is not 
provided for the MPUs indicated by USDOL©s own Cost Model 
System. 49 For example, Dunn and Griffin contend:
Virtually all states support the use of objectively developed Cost 
Model MPU©s as indicators of the time necessary to accomplish 
program goals.
. . . When the Cost Model-developed MPUs are reduced to fit 
within the funds included in the President©s Annual Budget 
request, the quality of administrative operations in each state, and 
each state©s ability to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse in the 
unemployment insurance program, is eroded. 50
Even more recently, the Quality Control Subcommittee of the Inter 
state Conference of Employment Security Agencies argued that, given 
underfunded state programs, allocating funds for a system to 
detect/measure UC payment errors (in USDOL©s Quality Control 
program) does not make sense because without adequate staffing "the 
same errors will occur despite any amount of statistics collected." 51 It 
also should be noted that concerns about the administrative underfund-
46. Cited in House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 73-74).
47. Arizona Unemployment Insurance Administration (1985: Cover Sheet).
48. Jones (1986).
49. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 13).
50. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 8 and 11).
51. Quality Control Subcommittee (1985: 8).
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ing of state programs are not recent or isolated. The National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation recommended an in 
crease in administrative funding for state programs, including provi 
sions for fully funding state MPUs, on the basis that such an increase 
in funding would allow states to maintain prompt payments with low 
error rates. 52
The underfunding concerns expressed by state program administra 
tors, the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation and others 
evidently have not convinced USDOL that underfunding represents a 
real problem. In fact, a recently completed investigation by the House 
Committee on Appropriations found that USDOL officials "were 
quick to blame the states for the funding problems they were 
experiencing." 53 Although USDOL officials tended to attribute finan 
cial problems to the "inability or reluctance to make prudent mana 
gerial cost-cutting decisions" by state officials, the House study found 
that this conclusion was in "direct conflict with an internal study 
report prepared by ETA©s own Administrative Finance Workgroup." 54
The analysis in chapter 3 of this study suggests that the 
underfunding of state programs could be greatly reduced and 
perhaps eliminated, without any increase in funding, if states 
would reduce the complexity of their programs. However, it 
must be recognized that state legislators have little incentive to 
reduce program complexity because they are not involved in 
funding the administrative costs of the laws they enact. There is 
little doubt that administrative funding is far short of the levels 
required for states to fully and accurately administer their 
existing laws/policies. As discussed subsequently in this chapter, 
however, the large increase in funding that would be required for 
states to fully administer their existing programs does not appear 
to be desirable. Nonetheless, it still must be recognized that 
payment accuracy and overall program quality undoubtedly are 
adversely affected because of inadequate funding to fully admin 
ister the complex state UC programs that currently exist.
52. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 130).
53. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 72).
54. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 72).
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Base v. Contingency Funding Issues
The administrative funding procedures used by USDOL vir 
tually guarantee that states often will be forced to rely on 
temporary or seasonal employees to process substantial propor 
tions of their workloads; such staffing patterns have been 
particularly evident in recent years. At the same time, USDOL 
also has continued to emphasize the importance of timely benefit 
processing and payments, even during peak workload periods. 
These time pressures, in conjunction with the problems caused 
by staffing variability and substantial reliance on temporary 
employees, would be expected to contribute to quality problems 
and high payment error rates, particularly during high volume 
periods. This conclusion was supported by the responses to the 
1980 K-B study, in which highly trained UC personnel in six 
states were asked to express the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement with statements about the prevention and detection 
of overpayments in their states. The respondents were virtually 
unanimous in either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with 
both of the following statements:
1. In your state, adequate training in overpayment prevention is 
provided to local office personnel who are hired as "temporary" 
or "seasonal" employees.
2. In your state, adequate training in overpayment detection is 
provided to local office personnel who are hired as "temporary" 
or "seasonal" employees. 55
The difficulties created by base/contingency funding differ 
ences and the reliance on temporary employees were also 
strongly emphasized in Dunn and Griffin©s recent analysis:
This [base/contingency funding] theory works fairly well when 
the base workload is reasonably close to the total workload . . .
55. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 58). Those surveyed did not represent a cross-section of 
all UC program personnel. For example, UC program administrators were not included in the 
survey. Nevertheless, the results presented in the text represent the judgments of knowledgeable 
and highly trained UC program personnel. Accordingly, we believe these survey results merit 
serious consideration.
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Problems arise, however, when the total workloads experienced 
for the full year greatly exceed the base. With as much as half of 
the claims loads in many states in the above-base category, this 
means that at least half the local office staff responsible for claims 
processing, screening for eligibility issues, and enforcing work- 
search requirements are temporary staff who are recruited quickly 
and who have little training or experience.
. . .Since permanent staffing] is primarily determined by base 
workloads, a low proportion of base workloads to estimated total 
workloads is reflected directly in the quality of claims control. 
This results in a greater number of overpayments than would 
occur if a higher proportion of the state©s total staff were 
permanent. 56
In their recent study of six state UC systems, Corson, Hershey and 
Kerachsky also stress the adverse impacts of relying on poorly trained 
temporary employees. 57 Apparently, an additional problem in manag 
ing variations in workloads is that the states have been "the last to 
know" how much administrative funding will be available for any 
particular fiscal year. 58
In short, it appears that the base/contingency funding process 
utilized by USDOL and its contribution to heavy reliance on 
temporary and seasonal workers is a serious problem. Appar 
ently, the changes implemented by USDOL for FY 1987 
contingency funding somewhat alleviated difficulties by increas 
ing state flexibility in utilizing total administrative funding 
allocations, by simplifying the formula for determining the size 
of contingency allocations and by funding states for earned 
positions, even if they were not used. 59 Nonetheless, the exact 
impact of these changes on state operations cannot be determined 
at this time, and it is not yet known whether they will be 
continued in future years.
A closely related issue to the base/contingency impacts is the 
funding for administrative services, and technical support
56. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 12 and 5).
57. Corson et al. (1986: 93-95).
58. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 23).
59. Jones (1986) and Balcer (1986).
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(AS&T). Because USDOL has utilized a procedure for funding 
AS&T activities similar to the procedure for NFS costs discussed 
below, the adequacy of AS&T funding also has varied, depend 
ing on whether it has been attributed to base or contingency 
staffing. Apparently, USDOL assumes that less administrative/ 
technical support and training are required for a contingency than 
for a base staff position. This assumption has been challenged by 
the states. For example, Dunn and Griffin contend:
The needs for training and supervision clearly are not less for 
temporary staff than they are for a permanent trained cadre.
Any reasonable administrator whether in the public sector or 
the private knows that closer supervision and more training are 
required for overseeing the work of large numbers of people 
unfamiliar with normal operating and procedural requirements. 60
The recent analysis by the House Committee on appropriations 
also emphasizes the serious implications for program quality of 
the heavy reliance of states on temporary employees, who cannot 
be adequately trained or retrained because of the nature of 
USDOL©s contingency funding process. 61 USDOL©s recent 
changes at least partially reduced these problems for FY 1987, 
since the states were given much more flexibility in determining 
how to allocate available funds among various spending catego 
ries (including NFS and AS&T costs).
Underfunding of Nonpersonal Services
The underfunding of nonpersonal services (NFS) also has 
impacted on the ability of states to effectively administer their 
programs. In recent years, various state agencies have attempted 
to cover their shortfalls in NFS funding levels in a number of 
ways, including the following: (1) the use of funding for staff 
positions and staff salary savings (the most common technique); 
(2) the use of penalty/interest funds assessed on delinquent 
employer tax accounts; (3) federal supplemental appropriations;
60. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 5).
61. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 30-31).
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(4) nonpayment for state-provided items (e.g., data processing 
services); and (5) the payment for NFS items with state, rather 
than federal, funds. 62 Although reliance on these methods for 
covering NFS shortfalls would not necessarily impact adversely 
on either payment accuracy or overall UC program quality, some 
of the methods might well have such impacts. In particular, the 
use of administrative funding that otherwise would be used for 
additional UC personnel clearly could reduce program quality 
and payment accuracy. Arizona, Florida and other states have 
contended that the high rates of payment errors found in 
USDOL©s Random Audit program and the suggestions of declin 
ing program quality by USDOL©s Quality Appraisal program 
clearly reflect NFS and staff funding shortages. 63
The potential impacts of the conversion of staff dollars into 
NFS dollars have been summarized by Cheryl Templeman of the 
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, as 
follows:
It has become a standard practice not to fill staff positions in order 
to use the salary and benefit dollars for NFS . . . The unfilled 
positions have to come from areas where the workload can be 
controlled, like tax audits and overpayment detection. Of course, 
this only hurts the program in the long run. 64
Even more recently, the implications of NFS funding shortfalls for 
payment accuracy and overall UC program quality have been empha 
sized by state officials, including Arizona©s UC program administra 
tor. 65 State officials also have made the point that even supplemental 
budget appropriations for NFS shortfalls may not be an effective 
solution for this problem, because such funding is irregular and 
typically is received late in the fiscal year. 66
62. For a summary of how individual states have covered NFS shortfalls, see House 
Committee on Appropriations (1985: 56-61).
63. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 60-61).
64. Templeman (1984).
65. Vaughn (1985: 3).
66. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 60).
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Program Innovation Disincentives
It appears very likely that the funding process used by USDOL 
has encouraged inflexibility in state operations and has discour 
aged innovations. In part, this adverse feature of the funding 
system results from the uncertainty about how program changes 
might impact on future funding. If a state were to implement a 
new set of procedures to improve payment accuracy, for exam 
ple, it would beeither very difficult or impossible to anticipate 
the resulting impact on the future administrative funding for the 
state. Consequently, such programmatic or procedural initiatives 
probably have been discouraged by the administrative funding 
process.
The problem of funding disincentives for program innovations 
also has been pointed out in other studies. For example, the 
National Governors© Association concluded, with respect to the 
funding procedures utilized prior to the most recent years, that:
The current AS&T/NPS allocation methodology contains strong 
disincentives to reduce costs through reduction of man 
power. ... An individual state is better off to do nothing to 
reduce manpower requirements . . . than to actively pursue a 
program to cut costs while maintaining service delivery. Under 
certain circumstances, cost reductions will result in a greater 
proportionate reduction of resources allocated to the state. Simply 
stated, the SESA will be worse off financially for saving 
money. 67
More recently, Corson, Hershey and Kerachky found, in a study of six 
states, that the funding process may well discourage particular types of 
innovations because:
In the longer term, investing administrative resources in a tighter 
detection effort and a greater volume of determinations may raise 
a state©s MPU and thus increase the rate at which the state©s 
determinations are reimbursed. However, the increase in federal 
reimbursement might not match the increase in the resources
67. National Governors© Association (1983: 20).
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devoted to tighter detection efforts by the state, since no assurance 
exists that state requests based on MPU studies will be accepted 
as submitted in the funding-decision process. 68
An even more recent example of disincentives for states to 
seek innovative ways to improve their programs is provided by a 
bill considered by the State of Texas during 1985. The bill would 
have obtained outside funds for UC administrative purposes to 
supplement the administrative funds regularly provided by 
USDOL. Under the bill, "reimbursable" employers those who 
currently do not pay for administrative costs of the UC pro 
gram would be required to contribute to cover UC administra 
tive costs. 69 An unofficial opinion received from USDOL in 
April 1985 regarding the proposed bill and its likely effects was 
that its implementation (if in conformity with federal law) likely 
would: (1) not reduce the UC tax burden of other private 
taxpaying employers in Texas; (2) not increase the administrative 
funding for the UC program in Texas because USDOL probably 
would reduce its administrative funding allocation by an amount 
equal to any outside administrative funds provided by Texas 
itself; and (3) increase county/city/school taxes and hospital 
charges in Texas to pay for the contributions to UC administra 
tive financing by these entities. 70
Automation Disincentives
A specific problem that is closely related to some of those 
already discussed particularly the underfunding of NFS costs 
and innovation disincentives is that USDOL©s funding process 
apparently creates quite strong disincentives for the automation 
of state UC program operations. The historical concerns of states
68. Corson et al. (1986: 124).
69. Reimbursable employers include nonprofit organizations and state and local government 
units not subject to the FUTA tax. Since a portion of FUTA collections covers administrative 
costs, these entities pay only for the UC benefits paid to their former employees but not for the 
administrative costs associated with those benefits.
70. An official USDOL opinion on conformance with federal law would require an official 
request by a state agency. The unofficial opinion and the likely effects of implementing the 
proposed legislation were obtained by R.E. Harrington, Inc., a firm that specializes in handling 
UC related matters for private firms and public agencies.
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about the effects of automation have been summarized by the 
National Governors© Association:
Since personal services expenditures represent three quarters of a 
typical SESA©s total expenditures, personal services reductions 
are the logical source of cost savings. Automation, the most 
common means of producing cost savings, usually reduces costs 
by reducing staff requirements. The number of positions required 
will have, through the action of the AS&T/NPS formula, a serious 
adverse effect upon the future financial well-being of the Agency. 
A prudent state administrator will not pursue a major cost 
reduction program of this type. 71
State officials have provided a number of specific examples of 
automation disincentives, including the following: (1) USDOL 
has not developed comprehensive automation plans within which 
states could be assured of adequate funding if they were to 
automate their procedures; (2) states may not be able to meet 
USDOL©s "payback" provisions in the form of reduced staffing 
allocations after automation, especially with the relatively short 
period allowed for such "paybacks;" (3) future NFS funding 
may not be adequate to cover the increased maintenance, 
equipment rental, communication, supply, software and eventual 
replacement costs associated with automation; (4) automation 
could result in unfair reductions in already inadequate MPU 
funding; (5) USDOL funding procedures may be arbitrarily 
altered in future years, with the result that automated states will 
be funding "losers;" (6) NFS allocations (which include com 
puter allocations) are directly related to total staffing costs, 
which would be reduced by effective automation programs; (7) 
complex guidelines and excessive red tape are associated with 
obtaining special automation funding; and (8) too little funding is 
available for automation to justify the risk of losing staff funding 
as a result of automation. 72
Available evidence does suggest that the disincentives for 
states to automate their programs apparently have been powerful.
71. National Governors© Association (1983: 21). For a discussion of the same issue, also see 
House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 33).
72. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 66-71).
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An April 1984 report prepared by the Interstate Conference of 
Employment Security Agencies concluded that state systems are 
"supported primarily with obsolete and inadequate computer 
equipment and programs." 73 According to the findings of a 
survey conducted by USDOL and released in July 1984: only 9 
states were highly automated; 17 states were moderately auto 
mated; 17 states were partly automated; and 8 states were 
automated only to a low degree. 74 It should be noted, however, 
that USDOL has stated, in the process of determining FY 1985 
appropriations, that it "believes that disincentives to automation 
have been effectively removed." 75 Although USDOL in fact 
changed its funding procedures (through a September 1983 Field 
Memorandum) in recognition of the automation disincentives 
that resulted from its previous procedures, state officials and the 
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies dis 
agree with the USDOL belief that funding automation disincen 
tives have been removed. 76
Efficiency Disincentives
The lack of incentives for cost efficiency in state programs 
obviously encompasses several of the funding impacts discussed 
above. For example, base/contingency funding problems make it 
difficult for states to effectively plan and implement changes that 
could produce long-run savings. As another example, NFS 
funding procedures and disincentives for both general innova 
tions and automation contribute to cost inefficiencies. The 
possibility that cost-saving changes in administrative procedures 
could result in the full recapture of such savings by USDOL in 
future years also could discourage states from emphasizing 
efficient operations as strongly as they otherwise might.
The extent of these problems is further indicated by studies 
prepared by the General Accounting Office (1984) and the House
73. Cited by House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 65).
74. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 64-65).
75. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 65).
76. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 66-71).
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Committee on Appropriations (1985). 77 Disincentives in the 
USDOL funding process documented by these studies and also 
by others include: (1) rewarding "inefficient" states and penal 
izing "efficient" states because efficiency savings in the form of 
reduced staff MPUs lead to future cuts not just in staff funding, 
but also in NFS and AS&T funding levels (which are driven by 
MPU-based staff funding); (2) rewarding higher state salary rates 
in the funding process by higher funding allocations for both 
staff and related support services; (3) a focus on just costs, rather 
than a dual emphasis on costs and productivity (apart from 
arbitrary reductions in full funding for states with high MPUs), 
which does not appropriately encourage efficiency improve 
ments; (4) discouraging efficient substitutions of automated 
operations for staff operations by relating total funding to staff 
costs; (5) providing no incentives to reduce costs below the level 
fully funded by USDOL; (6) an emphasis on short-run cost 
reductions at the possible expense of long-run productivity 
improvements; (7) a weak management-information system that 
does not allow USDOL to analyze or explain productivity 
differentials among the states (and thereby encourage improve 
ments by less efficient states); (8) the absence of any efficiency 
or cost standards that could be utilized to encourage improve 
ments in state operations or to assess state funding requests; and 
(9) a weak financial accounting system. 78
Another aspect of USDOL©s funding system is that it provides 
no positive incentives for reducing UC program complexity. In 
fact, a reasonable argument can be made that the procedures may 
well have induced at least some states to add to the complexity 
of their systems in attempting to increase their share of the total 
administrative funds available each year. Presumably, a state 
could increase its share of available funds by increasing the 
(measured) MPUs and salary levels for performing the tasks
77. See General Accounting Office (1984) and House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 
31-33).
78. See General Accounting Office (1984); House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 
31-35, 45-46, 52, 54 and 65); Dunn and Griffin (1984 and 1985); Interstate Conference of 
Employment Security Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1979 and 1980); National Governors© 
Association (1983); Quality Control Subcommittee, Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies (1985); Templeman (1984); Thorne (1985a and 1985b); and Vaughn (1985).
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required to operate its UC system. Such increases could be 
accomplished by increasing the complexities of the tasks re 
quired to process claims.
Although there is no proof that states may increase program 
complexity to obtain higher funding allocations, the wide vari 
ations among the states in both the MPUs required to perform 
essentially similar tasks and in average personnel costs certainly 
are consistent with this possibility. 79 This would be a tendency 
for those seeking to maximize either their budget levels or 
bureaucracy sizes (both of which have been suggested as motives 
for some public sector managers). 80 Since less than full funding 
typically is provided for those states with the highest MPUs (but 
evidently not for those with the highest salary levels) for a given 
claim processing function, it is not precisely clear what the final 
effects of such strategies on funding levels would be. However, 
a recent internal USDOL study concluded that:
States with more complex (although not necessarily more effi 
cient) laws and procedures may thereby receive a larger allocation 
of funds than a more efficient state. Again, this results in 
situations where State managerial decisions are made without 
regard to overall efficiency . . . . 81
In short, although definitive evidence may not be available (or perhaps 
even obtainable) to prove that USDOL©s funding procedures have 
tended to increase program complexity, it is clear that funding 
incentives neither directly encourage simplicity nor directly discourage 
complexity.
The view that USDOL©s funding procedures have not encour 
aged administrative cost efficiency in state programs is not 
unanimously held. USDOL, for example, tends to attribute 
funding problems more to inefficient state management practices 
and operational procedures than to difficulties associated with
79. For evidence on differential state costs, see Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1979: HI-9); National Governors© Association 
(1983: 6); House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 10-11); and Arizona Unemployment 
Insurance Administration (1985).
80. Niskanen(1971).
81. Cited in House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 74).
Funding Impacts on Payment Accuracy and Program Quality 111
the funding process itself. They argue that not providing full 
funding for state MPUs (and particularly for the states with the 
highest MPUs) forces states to become more efficient. 82 Never 
theless, USDOL has not developed an objective basis for 
evaluating the causes of MPU differences among the states, and 
some differences clearly are due to factors outside of state 
management control (e.g., workload mix and the requirements 
contained in state law). 83
Even without changes in USDOL©s funding procedures and 
incentives, state operational efficiencies could probably be 
improved to some extent. For example, at least some states could 
improve their programs by: (1) developing more effective 
management control and financial accounting systems; (2) plac 
ing greater emphasis on efficiency and quality work in their 
employee reward systems; and (3) adopting the procedures for 
performing the same or similar tasks that are utilized in relatively 
efficient states. 84
Lack of Payment Accuracy and Overpayment 
Detection/Recovery Incentives
The funding process utilized by USDOL also has failed to 
provide direct incentives for states to increase overpayment 
detection/recovery efforts. In fact, this deficiency and others in 
the administrative funding process have been noted in a recent 
position paper prepared by New York©s former UC administra 
tor, who explains that funding levels for benefit payment control 
activities are not related to the actual efforts or results of states in 
detecting and recovering overpayments. 85 Instead, such (gen 
eral) funding levels depend on the total workloads processed in 
a state, regardless of its specific effort/result levels in benefit 
payment control activities. It appears that it would be appropriate 
for USDOL to consider including overpayment detection/ 
recovery incentives in the administrative funding process.
82. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 24-26).
83. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 25-26).
84. See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 11); Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis 
(1983: 49); and Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 54-58).
85. Dunn (1985).
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There are, in fact, strong indications that USDOL has in 
creased its emphasis on payment integrity, overpayment detec 
tion and recovery procedures, and other benefit payment control 
activities. As early as FY 1983, USDOL began to integrate such 
an emphasis into its "Program and Budget Planning" (PBP) 
process, perhaps partly in response to the K-B and B-K-S study 
findings discussed in chapter 2. More recently, USDOL has 
taken the additional step of adding "Measures of Achievement" 
to its PBP process to encourage the states to set explicit goals for 
enhancing efforts to prevent, detect and recover overpayments. 86 
Furthermore, starting in FY 1985, states with problems indicated 
by Random Audit program findings were instructed to include 
corrective action plans in their PBP documents, with target dates 
for accomplishing certain goals. 87 Although these corrective 
action plans were suspended for FY 1986 (in anticipation of the 
implementation of the Quality Control program), some states 
continued to formulate and submit them. Hence, even though 
USDOL has not yet taken the additional step of backing its new 
emphasis on payment accuracy with substantive administrative 
funding incentives, it is clear that a much greater emphasis has 
been placed on prevention, detection and recovery of overpay 
ments in recent years.
Possible Funding System Improvements
The above analysis clearly establishes the existence of some 
serious deficiencies in the USDOL system to fund the adminis 
trative operations of state UC programs. Unfortunately, identi 
fying the adverse incentives is much simpler than it would be to 
eliminate them without creating other undesirable/unintended 
side effects. A number of possible reform approaches might be 
taken, but only some of the major possibilities are discussed in 
this section. Perhaps the most obvious approach would be to 
improve but maintain the essential features of the funding system
86. For the fiscal year 1985 and 1986 "Measures of Achievement," see U.S. Department of 
Labor(1984a and 1985b).
87. U.S. Department of Labor (1985b: Cover Memorandum).
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by eliminating or at least substantially reducing many of its 
adverse features. Many other approaches also could be taken, 
however, including: (1) federal funding for "model" state UC 
systems, which would include cost standards; (2) a system of 
federal block grants to the states; and (3) "devolution" of 
administrative funding from the federal government to the 
states. 88
In evaluating ways to improve the administrative funding 
process, it is extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to fully 
determine the benefits and costs of many specific proposals 
without substantial research and pilot testing. Administrative 
funding solutions that seem appealing should be carefully ana 
lyzed and evaluated prior to adoption for the UC system as a 
whole. Moreover, any attempt to substantively improve the 
administrative funding process also would benefit from a careful 
review of the findings of past attempts to improve the process. 89
Pessimism about the likelihood that USDOL could rapidly 
respond to the problems analyzed in this chapter could be easily 
supported, based on the numerous other responsibilities already 
assigned to USDOL©s relatively small Unemployment Insurance 
Service staff. Prior to the increase in staff for the recently 
implemented Quality Control program, the Unemployment In 
surance Service staff had fallen to less than half of its peak of 
about 225 positions during the early 1970s. During the last few 
years, both Rubin and the National Commission on Unemploy 
ment Compensation have questioned whether the extremely 
small staff can "perform even essential responsibilities compe 
tently." 90 However, as noted above, USDOL already is in the 
process of addressing some of the adverse impacts analyzed in 
this chapter. Accordingly, the prospects of an improved admin 
istrative funding process appear to have increased considerably.
88. Another obvious possibility would be complete federalization of the UC system, but that 
approach is not considered because of the assumption made in this study that a federal-state UC 
system will continue to operate in the United States.
89. Ron Nairn, who is an administrative financing expert with the Oregon UC agency, has 
stressed that previous attempts to improve the administrative funding process provide a number 
of lessons for any future attempts in this area.
90. Rubin (1983: 30) and National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 
129).
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Maintaining But Improving the Funding System
The analysis in this chapter indicates that attempting to 
maintain but improve USDOL©s administrative funding process 
would be a major undertaking because of the large number of 
adverse and interrelated impacts. The following issues would be 
relevant in determining how to improve that funding process: (1) 
the overall underfunding of state programs and the related issue 
of UC program complexity; (2) specific underfunding of NFS 
costs (including automation costs) and the need for more 
flexibility in allowing states to determine how to spend whatever 
total administrative funds they receive; (3) improved incentives 
for state innovations and automation; (4) incentives for states to 
minimize administrative costs, other things equal; (5) incentives 
for the detection/recovery of benefit overpayments; (6) incen 
tives for states to achieve payment accuracy and other program 
quality criteria;91 and (7) incentives for states to conduct the 
research and pilot tests necessary to evaluate various proposals 
for improving the existing UC system. The changes already 
implemented by USDOL for FY 1987 were noted above, and the 
apparent contribution of these changes to an improved system 
will be referenced in the following discussion of these seven 
issues.
Increase in Funding v. Program Simplification. The under- 
funding of state UC program operations is an issue that has been 
of great concern to state UC program administrators in recent 
years. The evidence offered to support this contention is that 
USDOL does not fully fund the MPUs resulting from its own 
Cost Model process. Certainly, recent federal budget decisions 
have forced USDOL to underfund state programs in the sense 
charged by state UC program administrators. In addition, the 
analysis offered earlier in this chapter suggests that an increase in 
administrative funding levels, given existing UC program com 
plexity, likely would reduce payment errors (by an unknown 
amount). Increased (overall) administrative funding levels also
91. The importance of relating administrative funding to the quality of state UC program 
operations also was noted in a study by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security 
Agencies and Macro Systems, Inc. (1980: 607).
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have been advocated by others, including the National Commis 
sion on Unemployment Compensation and Rubin. 92 Although 
not directly related to the issue of payment accuracy per se, the 
findings of Holen and Horwitz suggest that increased adminis 
trative funding may increase the rate of nonmonetary denials to 
(implicitly) ineligible claimants who would stop filing for 
benefits because of increased administrative scrutiny. 93 Corson, 
Hershey and Kerachsky also conclude that increased staff re 
sources may be required to increase nonmonetary denial rates for 
ineligible claimants. 94 In short, a broad spectrum of informed 
opinion is available to support the contention that an overall 
increase in administrative funding might serve to improve the 
operation of the UC system.
There also is a strong basis for challenging the cost effective 
ness of an increase in overall administrative funding as the major 
technique for correcting existing UC system deficiencies. The 
B-K-S study findings mentioned in chapter 2 (and discussed in 
further detail in chapter 7), for example, question the assumption 
that increased administrative funding actually would result in 
significantly improved administration of certain important as 
pects of the UC program. The investigators in that study required 
at least 50 times as much time as typically would be available in 
the operational UC system in attempting to fully verify the 
benefit eligibility of each claim. Clearly, neither legislators nor 
administrators would support such a large increase in funding for 
this purpose. Moreover, even with the extremely large resource 
commitment of the B-K-S study, it was found that nearly half or 
more of all reported worksearch contacts could not be verified as 
either acceptable or unacceptable in three of the five study 
states. 95 These findings suggest that marginal or even very large 
increases in administrative funding for enforcement of existing 
weekly UC eligibility criteria especially in the absence of
92. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 129-130) and Rubin 
(1983: 254-255).
93. Holen and Horwitz (1976: 426 and 428).
94. Corson et al. (1986: 124).
95. See chapter 7 and Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986) for detailed analyses of 
worksearch verification and worksearch noncompliance problems.
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many other changes advocated in this study probably would be 
difficult to justify. The recent analysis of administrative funding 
by the House Committee on Appropriations also questions 
whether an overall increase in administrative funding would 
significantly improve the performance and quality of state 
programs. 96
These considerations indicate that the underfunding issue 
raised by state administrators is just one aspect of a more basic 
social decision about how much UC program complexity is 
justified and should be funded. The current underfunding debate 
between USDOL and the states mainly misses this more funda 
mental point. Complexity issues need to be considered in the 
underfunding context. For example, should a federal-state fund 
ing system allow unlimited complexity in state programs that 
would be supported by administrative funds pooled from all UC 
jurisdictions? Suppose, for example, that some consensus could 
be reached on how much state program complexity would be 
accepted for federal-state administrative funding purposes. Once 
this decision was made, presumably no federal funding would be 
provided for complexity above that level. The requirement that 
states pay the administrative costs for any additional complexity 
probably would represent a strong incentive for simplification of 
state programs.
USDOL has persistently argued that achieving greater admin 
istrative and operational efficiencies would largely eliminate the 
"underfunding" that states perceive. 97 The analysis in this study 
certainly suggests that there is some validity to this contention. 
State UC program administrators including several who sup 
port many other proposals included in this study appear to be 
virtually unanimous in their opinion that their overall adminis 
trative funding levels are inadequate. 98 Nonetheless, the state 
position still does not appear to us to be a convincing one. Unless 
other very major changes were made in the UC system, it seems
96. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 33).
97. For example, see House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 25).
98. For example, see Dunn and Griffin (1984 or 1985); House Committee on Appropriations 
(1985: 13-14, and 17-31); Quality Control Subcommittee (1985); Thorne (1985a); and Vaughn 
(1985).
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doubtful that even a fairly substantial increase in (real) admin 
istrative funding levels alone would substantially improve the 
overall quality of the UC system." In our view, it would be 
preferable to reduce complexity and improve efficiency in state 
operations rather than to increase administrative resources for the 
system as it currently operates. 100 However, a strong case can be 
made for correcting the underfunding of certain types of UC 
administrative costs, particularly the costs of automating state 
operations.
Increased Spending Flexibility and NFS Funding Levels. 
USDOL has made administrative funding allocations for specific 
workload items (e.g., initial claims and employer tax collec 
tions) and for specific types of costs (e.g., staff v. support 
services). The overall funding allocation for a state also has 
depended on the extent to which its workload has been funded 
with base or contingency positions. Besides adding to the overall 
complexity of the funding process, these distinctions and many 
others have resulted in a compartmentalized funding system. 101 
Moreover, once such compartments were created, considerable 
restrictions limited the flexibility of states in reallocating their 
total funding among various cost categories.
Another issue that merits careful evaluation is whether basing 
NFS funding levels on historical cost data has perpetuated both 
interstate inequities and selected state inefficiencies through 
time. 102 It clearly is the case that the substantial interstate 
differences in NFS costs are difficult to explain, even accounting 
for "explainable differences" among the states in the costs of 
obtaining services. 103
A much better general approach would be to give states more
99. The federal spending obligations for UC administrative purposes for fiscal years 
1982-1984 ranged from $1.4-$1.7 billion. See National Foundation for Unemployment Com 
pensation & Workers© Compensation (1985b).
100. Golding (1985: 3-4) also has stressed that the UC system would be better served by an 
analysis of how to more efficiently distribute existing resources than by an analysis of why the 
existing system is underfunded.
101. Some states even strongly contend that USDOL favoritism enters the funding process. 
See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 14).
102. This possibility is suggested by Templeman (1984).
103. See Templeman (1984) for a brief discussion of these issues; see House Committee on 
Appropriations (1985: 36-62) for an extensive analysis of them.
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flexibility in determining how to make detailed spending deci 
sions (e.g., staff v. computers) to best utilize whatever level of 
administrative funding may be provided by USDOL. It is our 
view that each state can better determine the optimal allocation 
of resources for itself than can a (relatively small) federal 
bureaucracy with responsibility for that state and for 52 other UC 
jurisdictions. The recent changes implemented by USDOL for 
FY 1987 allocations appear to represent a major change in giving 
states just such flexibility. 104 This increased flexibility, which 
includes an increase in the period over which states are allowed 
to offset differences in "earned" v. "used" positions, also 
should contribute to easing the base v. contingency funding 
problems resulting from how USDOL has funded quarterly 
variations in workloads. 105
Improving the current funding process by increasing its 
flexibility is supported by the following findings of a recent 
analysis of the House Committee on Appropriations:
Some State officials indicated that NFS costs could be more 
effectively controlled with a better and more efficient allocation 
system and by removing certain Federal restrictions. For exam 
ple, they stated that current Federal restrictions on the payment of 
interest on large capital acquisitions preclude States from using 
various long term financing options which could turn out to be 
more cost effective in the long run. They also cited restrictions on 
the funding of depreciation which preclude States from accumu 
lating capital replacement funds to replace worn capital equip 
ment. Moreover, they indicated that delays were often experi 
enced in obtaining Federal approval for equipment acquisitions. 
They stated that such delays forced emergency upgrading of 
equipment needs, usually at a much greater cost. 106
The recent emphasis of USDOL on increasing spending 
flexibility seems particularly important in the context of short-
104. Jones (1986).
105. For one proposal for revising existing base/contingency funding procedures, see Dunn 
and Griffin (1984: 3-4 and 9).
106. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 55).
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run reforms because such a change may well be the quickest and 
most effective way of eliminating or at least reducing several of 
the adverse features incorporated into the funding system through 
the years. Consistent with the overall approach advocated in this 
section, USDOL also indicates that it will focus its monitoring 
on State performance outcomes rather than on expenditure by 
cost category. 107
The increased state flexibility indicated by these changes may 
reduce the adverse impacts of USDOL©s past funding process 
and may be particularly important in reducing state concerns 
about underfunded NFS/ automation costs. However, it still is 
our view that past state concerns about underfunding for 
NFS/automation costs have been very legitimate ones, and that 
some increase in funding for such costs very likely could be 
justified on an overall cost/benefit basis. Certainly, the analysis 
provided earlier in this chapter supports the need for improved 
automation of the UC system, even as it presently operates. In 
addition, the analysis in chapter 3 strongly supports increased 
automation as a major feature of state efforts to reduce the 
complexity of their programs and to improve overall administra 
tive efficiency. Subsequent analyses in chapters 6 and 7 suggest 
that states should increase the use of computers in routinely 
processing benefit claims in order to more effectively monitor 
claimant compliance with eligibility criteria. In sum, there is a 
strong basis for supporting increased UC system automation.
Innovation!Automation Incentives. Past funding procedures 
have contained fairly strong disincentives for general innovations 
and, particularly, for substituting automated operations for 
staff-based procedures. Our analysis suggests that these past 
funding procedures could be revised to: (1) provide positive 
incentives, rather than disincentives, for states to aggressively 
experiment with administrative, operational, or procedural 
changes that might contribute to reduced payment errors and 
increased program quality; (2) provide definitive guidelines to 
allow states to estimate in advance how potential changes 
(including automation) would affect future funding levels, other
107. Jones(1986).
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things equal; (3) allow states to supplement administrative 
funding allotments with "outside" funding, without reducing 
federal funding to offset any such increases; (4) eliminate the 
adverse NFS/automation funding impacts contained in the Cost 
Model System because such funding is directly tied to overall 
staff levels (including the specific disincentives for substituting 
automated operations for staff-based procedures that result from 
this practice); and (5) reduce the complexity, uncertainty and 
severity of the payback provisions that relate to the relatively 
small amount of special funding available for automation. 
Implementing even some of the above suggestions could repre 
sent an important improvement over past procedures.
Incentives for Administrative Cost Minimization. Providing 
incentives for states to emphasize administrative efficiency (for a 
given level of program quality) would be another desirable 
feature of a revised USDOL administrative funding system. This 
goal could be partly accomplished by implementing the sug 
gested funding improvements discussed above. In addition, 
explicitly rewarding or penalizing states on the basis of the extent 
to which they minimize administrative costs (other things equal) 
also should be considered. The explicit incentive system could 
be devised in a number of different ways, 108 but the suggestion 
that states should be encouraged to emphasize administrative 
efficiency is hardly a novel proposal. The need for such 
incentives has been emphasized by the states themselves, the 
National Governors© Association, the General Accounting Of 
fice, the House Committee on Appropriations and an internal 
USDOL report. 109
Some specific changes that might be considered in creating 
specific incentives for states to minimize administrative costs
108. A particularly effective although perhaps drastic technique might be to vary the extent 
to which a state©s employers were allowed to receive an offset credit against the FUTA tax on the 
basis of the administrative cost effectiveness of that state©s UC system. This admittedly extreme 
approach to "cost-rating" state UC systems presumably would induce both legislators and 
employers to press for administrative simplicity and efficiency in state UC programs. Whether 
this approach or some less drastic one were taken, however, cost-effective UC program 
administration should be strongly encouraged by whatever revised funding system might result 
from an intensive review of the present funding process.
109. See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 31-33); General Accounting Office 
(1984); National Governors© Association (1983); Thorne (1985a and 1985b); and Vaughn (1985).
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and increase productivity could include: (1) altering the current 
policy whereby any short-run cost savings are fully recaptured by 
USDOL through future Cost Model studies; (2) changing the 
current policy of rewarding relatively inefficient states with 
relatively high staff levels or salary levels by not directly relating 
NFS funding to overall staffing costs; (3) providing incentives 
for states to reduce costs below the levels at which their staff 
MPUs are fully funded; (4) creating incentives to emphasize 
long-run cost reductions; and (5) providing incentives for reduc 
ing program complexity (which should result in reduced overall 
administrative costs). Specific changes such as these and others 
suggested in this chapter, together with a strong emphasis on 
administrative efficiency, would greatly improve USDOL©s 
administrative funding process. However, USDOL evidently has 
rejected the possibility of encouraging states to minimize admin 
istrative costs through the adoption of federal cost standards 
(even though a USDOL-sponsored study concluded such an 
approach was feasible). 110
Incentives for Payment Accuracy and for Overpayment Detec 
tion and Recovery. The administrative funding process also 
could be improved by providing explicit incentives that would 
encourage states to emphasize payment accuracy (in terms of 
both underpayments and overpayments) and also the detection 
and recovery of UC benefit overpayments. 111 At least some 
portion of the administrative funding received by a state should 
be directly related to the results of such activities. Given an 
accurate payment error measurement system, it would be possi 
ble to evaluate the payment error detection procedures used 
routinely by state agencies. Alternatively, or in combination
110. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 74-75).
111. The raw data available for this study only relate to UC benefit overpayments (and, to a 
more limited extent, underpayments) to claimants, not UC tax underpayments (or overpayments) 
by employers. However, the frequent misreporting of wages by employers (for benefit 
determination purposes) found in the B-K-S study suggests that employer errors in paying taxes 
also may be a common problem. In any case, the current administrative funding system does not 
directly encourage the detection/collection of UC tax underpayments. Consequently, incentives 
similar to those that would encourage benefit payment accuracy and benefit overpayment 
detection/recovery efforts could be utilized to encourage UC tax underpayment 
prevention/detection/collection efforts. Nonetheless, only benefit payment issues are discussed in 
the text.
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with an emphasis on results, agency efforts in these areas could 
be encouraged by direct funding, instead of basing funding on 
overall claim load activity. Funding incentives to encourage state 
overpayment detection/recovery efforts have been strongly ad 
vocated by several state agencies, including those in Arizona, 
Florida, New York and Oregon. 112 Furthermore, Dunn has 
provided a careful analysis of the adverse incentives contained in 
USDOL©s past administrative funding process for overpayment 
detection/recovery efforts, and also has formulated a specific 
proposal for altering the administrative funding process. 113 
Another approach for enhancing benefit overpayment recovery 
efforts would be to allow states to make the recovery of 
(nonadministrative) benefit overpayments separate "profit cen 
ters" in which resources could be spent on recovering benefit 
overpayments as long as (marginal) recovery costs were less than 
or equal to (marginal) overpayments recovered. 114
Incentives for Payment Accuracy and Overall Program Qual 
ity. Emphasizing compliance with payment accuracy and other 
quality criteria through the administrative funding process would 
force states to directly confront the underlying causes of any 
problems they had in meeting such criteria. One possible 
paradox of utilizing funding incentives to enforce compliance 
with quality criteria is that states with programs of lower quality 
would receive less administrative funding (other things equal) 
than states with programs of higher quality. It could be argued, 
however, that the former states actually would need more 
administrative funds to correct their problems. Even though this 
paradox might represent a problem in the initial stages of 
implementing a revised funding system, it also must be recog 
nized that the financial rewards and penalties provided by the
112. See Vaughn (1985); Burnett and Pendleton (1985); Dunn (1985); and Thorne (1985a).
113. See Dunn (1985). In particular, among other deficiencies in USDOL©s funding system, 
Dunn points out that the real workload involved in controlling fraud is the actual number of fraud 
cases they process, not total weeks claimed (which has been USDOL©s basis for funding state 
"benefit payment control" activities). Dunn proposes that funding for benefit payment control 
activities instead be directly related to state efforts in detecting, establishing and prosecuting 
overpayments.
114. This approach would be consistent with a position taken by Arizona©s UC program 
administrator that direct incentives should be provided to state agencies for detecting/recovering 
overpayments. See Vaughn (1985).
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administrative funding system probably would be among the 
strongest incentives that realistically could be provided for 
complying with quality criteria. In the longer run, such an 
approach presumably would induce states to revise their UC 
systems in order to comply with quality criteria. However, it 
might be appropriate to provide for an initial grace period, prior 
to applying financial sanctions, to allow states to make the 
changes required to comply with such criteria.
Incentives for Research!Pilot Studies. Several suggestions for 
improving the existing administrative funding system have been 
provided above. Taken together, these recommendations would 
eliminate many of the adverse incentives which characterize the 
current funding system and would provide a number of positive 
inducements for states to reduce the complexity of their pro 
grams and to enhance the integrity of their payment systems. 
Once again, however, the importance of conducting research and 
demonstration projects to evaluate these proposals should be 
emphasized. The interactions that characterize the UC system are 
very complicated ones, and seemingly desirable changes in 
administrative funding policies or procedures could produce 
unanticipated and undesirable side effects. Consequently, an 
other important feature of a revised administrative funding 
system would be appropriate incentives to encourage state UC 
agencies to participate in such research and demonstration 
projects. Alternatively, USDOL could directly fund such re 
search and demonstration projects.
Administrative Funding for "Model" State Programs
Another approach to revising current administrative funding 
procedures would be for USDOL to fund each state only for 
performing the tasks contained in a "model" UC system that 
included cost standards to reflect efficient administrative proce 
dures and operations. Under this approach, a consensus view of 
an "ideal" or "acceptable" UC system would have to be 
developed. The development of any (reasonable) "model" 
system for funding purposes obviously would be an extremely 
difficult task, requiring substantial state input and a considerable 
research effort. In developing a "model" system, it also would
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be necessary to account for the adverse features of USDOL©s 
funding system (and suggested improvements) discussed above. 
As one example, any revised funding system could provide 
strong incentives for a reasonable level of payment accuracy and 
for the detection/recovery of benefit overpayments. Rather than 
discussing aspects such as these, however, a few comments on 
certain broad issues that would be involved in developing a 
"model" UC program for funding purposes are provided below.
Simply specifying the elements of a "model" UC system for 
administrative funding purposes would involve a number of 
difficult decisions, given the large degree of diversity currently 
found among state UC systems. A few of these issues are raised 
for illustrative purposes. One set of decisions involved in 
specifying a "model" system would relate to what eligibility 
criteria should be included for funding purposes. Relevant 
questions would include the following. What would the mone 
tary eligibility criteria be and would these include a weeks-of- 
work requirement? What would the job separation criteria be and 
would these criteria allow for distinguishing a few, many or no 
extenuating circumstances? What would the weekly eligibility 
criteria be and would these include an active search requirement? 
How long would maximum weekly support last? Should depen 
dents© allowances be allowed? Many other specific and difficult 
issues also would be involved in determining the content of a 
"model" UC system, but the above questions indicate the nature 
of the task.
Once the basic content of a "model" UC program were 
identified, it then would be necessary to deal with a number of 
other issues to determine the funding required in each state to 
administer the program. How much funding variation would be 
allowed for serving claimants in different areas (e.g., a claimant 
in rural Alaska v. one in Phoenix)? Would somewhat different 
funding levels per unit of activity be justified for smaller than for 
larger states? 115 How much funding variation would be allowed 
for processing claims in different ways, such as filing for
115. For example, the Florida UC agency has suggested that different funding models might 
be appropriate for small, medium and large states. See Burnett and Pendleton (1985).
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benefits in person v. by mail? The above questions are not 
exhaustive, but rather indicate the nature of the issues that would 
have to be resolved.
Such issues, in addition to questions of administrative and 
operational efficiency, would have to be carefully evaluated in 
order to develop cost standards that could be utilized in deter 
mining the actual funding allowed for particular state programs. 
Under this approach, it would be possible to emphasize admin 
istrative cost minimization by use of cost standards to define the 
maximum funding levels allowed for particular processes or 
activities. USDOL has attempted to improve state administrative 
efficiency in a number of ways through the years, so the idea of 
cost or efficiency standards would not be a novel one. Previous 
experience seems to suggest, however, that in the absence of 
effective incentives, at least some states are reluctant to replace 
less efficient with more efficient (and proven) operational 
techniques already utilized in other states. It was found in the 
"Operational Improvement and Cost Equalization" project 
jointly conducted by the states and USDOL in 1977 that many 
states failed to implement suggested improvements. 116 Accord 
ingly, the development and implementation of cost standards 
probably would be a difficult process. A report prepared for 
USDOL in June 1984 concluded it would be feasible to incor 
porate cost standards into USDOL©s funding process. 117 How 
ever, the concept of cost standards evidently was not accepted or 
further explored by USDOL (perhaps partly because of the recent 
emphasis of the Reagan administration on "devolvement," 
discussed later in this chapter, and on increasing state spending 
flexibility, discussed earlier in this chapter).
If a "model" UC system could be developed, it then could be 
used as the basis for funding state programs. States choosing to 
administer programs that were more costly than the "model" 
would have to fund the extra costs, since the federal-state 
funding system would provide funds only for the operation of a 
"model" system in each state. That is, states would be respon-
116. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 10-11).
117. House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 74-75).
126 CHAPTER 4
sible for their own administrative funding to cover the additional 
costs for: more complexity; less efficient techniques; extra 
monitoring of claimant compliance with eligibility criteria; and 
any other choices that resulted in a more costly program than that 
indicated by the "model" program.
The development of a "model" UC system for administrative 
funding purposes would be extremely difficult. Assuming that 
such a complex task could be accomplished, however, the end 
result could be a simpler funding system with fewer of the 
adverse features contained in the present funding system. This 
approach probably will not be a strong contender as a replace 
ment for the existing administrative funding process, however, 
because it likely would be perceived by many as an attempt to 
impose federal standards on state programs.
Federal Block Grants for State Programs
One defect in USDOL©s past funding process has been its lack 
of spending flexibility for the states. As noted above, the 
changes implemented by USDOL for FY 1987 allocations have 
greatly increased the flexibility states how have. If this concept 
were further extended, it could provide states administrative 
funds through block grants, which could be allocated among 
various cost categories at the discretion of each state. If such a 
system were combined with other improvements in the USDOL©s 
funding system suggested in this chapter, the result could be a 
very substantial improvement over USDOL©s past funding sys 
tem. A recent study by the House Committee on Appropriations 
also has concluded that the block-grant approach could simplify 
the existing funding system and "improve both the quality and 
efficiency of the UI program." 118 An issue that would arise 
under such an approach is the provision for contingency funding 
for the administrative costs of dealing with the sudden workload
118. See House Committee on Appropriations (1985: 75-76) for a discussion of federal block 
grants, including further details on how such an approach could be utilized in place of USDOL©s 
current funding system.
Possible Funding System Improvements 127
increases due to the need to process in a timely fashion the claims 
of all persons who file for benefits. 119
Devolution of Administrative Funding Responsibility to States
The final possibility discussed in this chapter for improving the 
funding process would place the main or sole responsi 
bility/authority for funding administrative operations on each 
state. In effect, such a change would carry the block-grant 
approach even further by essentially eliminating the federal role 
in administrative funding. The possibility of such "devolution" 
of administrative funding to the states has been discussed for 
some time among state and federal UC program administrators. 
In fact, at least one such proposal was advanced as early as 
1955. 12  The recent discussion on this topic has been generated 
by the fact that the existing funding process creates net "win 
ners" and "losers" among the states in terms of the portion of 
PUT A taxes paid by a state©s employers that is returned in the 
form of administrative funds. 121 Not surprisingly, many of the 
net losers tend to question the equity of the existing funding 
process.
A strong rationale for devolution proposals is that they could 
correct several of the adverse incentives in USDOL©s adminis 
trative funding process discussed earlier in this chapter. Making 
each state responsible for its own administrative funding might 
result in greater incentives for administrative efficiency, auto 
mation and innovations than have been contained in USDOL©s 
funding system. 122 In addition, such a change would effectively
119. Both the Arizona and Oregon UC agencies have stressed the importance of providing 
some mechanism for a contingency funding process in any administrative financing system. For 
example, see Vaughn (1985).
120. J. Eldred Hill, Jr. of UBA, Inc. pointed out that this early proposal included a provision 
for allowing state employers to take up to a 95 percent offset of their federal FUTA UC tax 
liability against state taxes paid. For the details of the proposal, see Study Committee on 
Unemployment Compensation and Employment Service (1955).
121. Any other federal funding system also would create net winners and losers, unless the 
federal government simply were to serve as a collection agent for each state (in which case the 
funding system would be controlled by the states, not by the federal government).
122. Improved state administrative efficiency also is cited as a major rationale in the Reagan 
administration©s May 1985 draft proposal for devolution. See National Foundation for Unem 
ployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985a).
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eliminate the inflexibility of USDOL in recognizing state diver 
sity, which has been a common complaint among the states. 123 It 
very well may be that devolution also would encourage states to 
reduce the complexity of their UC systems, as suggested by the 
Oregon agency. 124
Another rationale for the devolution of administrative funding 
to the states is simply to make the funding of administrative costs 
(the smaller part of total UC program costs) comparable to the 
funding of benefit costs (the larger part). Since there is no 
comparable pooling and redistribution of UC tax collections to 
fund benefit payments for regular claims among state programs, 
one clearly could question how a federal pooling and redistribu 
tion system can be justified for administrative funds. One could 
marshal at least as strong an argument for federal funding of 
benefit payments (which may reflect unemployment resulting 
from national economic policy) as for federal funding of admin 
istrative costs (which are more directly within the control of state 
officials); in fact, such reasoning was used to justify the federal 
share of extended benefits (EB) paid when unemployment rates 
exceed certain threshold levels.
Many other considerations not addressed above also would be 
relevant in evaluating various devolvement proposals. The over 
all desirability of such a step also depends on value judgments 
that reflect political and economic philosophy. For example, 
devolution might weaken the concept of a national UC system, 
which currently has certain broad guidelines for some uniformity 
in terms of coverage and benefit entitlement requirements. Also, 
because of the existing cross-subsidization of administrative 
costs in some states by employer taxes collected in other states, 
devolution obviously would have major practical ramifications, 
including immediate administrative funding surpluses and defi 
cits (relative to current operating levels) among various states. 
Another issue, as several state agencies have emphasized, is the 
need for a contingency funding process to allow states to serve 
all claimants in a timely manner, even though claims may vary
123. For example, see Dunn and Griffin (1984: 9); Ward (1985: 3); and House Committee on 
Appropriations (1985: 55).
124. Thorne (1985a).
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sharply from quarter to quarter. 125 Some of the legal/administra 
tive issues that would arise in implementing devolvement pro 
posals have been addressed in a specific proposal advanced by 
three state governors. 126
The devolution of administrative funding to the states has 
received some support from the Reagan administration. 127 In the 
February 4, 1985 USDOL news release on its FY 1986 budget, 
Ford stated:
Also included in this year©s budget submission is a recommenda 
tion that Congress transfer administration and financing of the 
State Unemployment Service and Employment Service from the 
Federal government to state governments beginning in 1988. 128
In May 1985, Deborah Steelman, special assistant to the President, 
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, released a draft proposal for 
giving states full control over UC program administrative funding. 129 
Further details on the administration©s devolvement proposal subse 
quently were provided by Cogan. 130 Although this preliminary pro 
posal lacks many of the specifics that would be required to implement 
such a change, it demonstrates that the Reagan administration has 
seriously considered such a change. Consistent with one of the main 
themes of this study, a major rationale given by the administration to 
support its proposal is the need to increase the administrative efficiency 
of state UC programs. 131
With the devolution of administrative funding to the states, 
many adverse features of the current federal-state funding 
process would still be issues for individual states in determining 
how to allocate funds in their own UC programs. Accordingly,
125. For example, see Vaughn (1985).
126. See Evans, Atyieh and Robb (n.d.).
127. Long-run reforms have not yet been announced by USDOL. It still is possible that 
devolution could represent such a long-run change, although it now appears to the authors that 
devolution is less likely than fundamental changes in the existing funding process.
128. Ford (1985: 3).
129. This proposal was presented during the national meeting of the National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation and Workers© Compensation. See National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation (1985a).
130. Cogan (1985).
131. National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers© Compensation 
(1985a).
130 CHAPTER 4
much of the earlier discussion of adverse funding impacts and 
suggested funding improvements could still be relevant at the 
state level.
Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that a number of 
USDOL©s funding procedures have adversely affected payment 
accuracy and overall program quality in state UC programs. 
Although a number of these adverse consequences probably were 
not anticipated by those who designed the federal-state admin 
istrative funding system, the consequences must be recognized 
by both UC program administrators and policymakers. More 
over, there appears to be little doubt that the adverse funding 
impacts are so serious that major reform of USDOL©s funding 
system would be required to correct them. A number of different 
approaches to improving that system could be taken. The 
discussion of possible solutions in this chapter indicates that 
correcting all the deficiencies would be an extremely complex 
undertaking, even given the best of intentions by those involved 
in the process. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the short-run 
administrative funding changes implemented by USDOL for FY 
1987 allocations appear to represent an important start toward 
potentially significant changes.
5
Federal Criteria for 
State Agency Performance
While the administrative funding process discussed in chapter 
4 probably represents the most important of a number of federal 
impacts on state UC program operations, there are many other 
ways in which federal policies and procedures affect state 
programs. For example, the Congress has established a number 
of standards and requirements to be administered by USDOL. 
Title III of the Social Security Act (which, along with Title IX, 
established the federal-state UC system) includes a requirement 
that state laws must contain provisions to ensure that UC benefits 
are paid when due, and Section 3304 of the Internal Revenue 
Code contains essentially the same requirement. 1 Subsequently, 
the Secretary of Labor determined that each UC jurisdiction©s 
employment security law must contain provisions for the detec 
tion, prevention and recovery of overpayments. 2 In addition, 
USDOL has the statutory responsibility for ensuring that states 
operate "effective and efficient" UC programs. These require 
ments and others, combined with control of the administrative 
funding process, give USDOL substantial power to regulate state 
UC programs, and this power has been upheld in a number of 
court decisions. In fact, Rubin contends that USDOL©s power 
over state administrative matters "is sufficiently broad to permit
1. U.S. Department of Labor (1979: 1). The Federal Unemployment Tax Act transferred Title 
IX of the Social Security Act to Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code, of which Section 3304 
is a part.
2. U.S. Department of Labor (1979: 1).
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virtually any federal control over administration the DOL sees fit 
to impose." 3
A number of federal standards and performance criteria have 
been established since 1935 relating to USDOL©s responsibility 
for ensuring that state UC programs are effectively operated and 
that claimants are paid benefits when due. 4 The number of such 
standards and other (less stringent) performance criteria have 
greatly increased since the early 1970s. 5 It appears that the 
escalation of federal standards and performance criteria during 
the 1970s can be traced partly to changes in federal law and, to 
a greater degree, to some major court cases that affected the UC 
system in that decade. Perhaps two of the most significant 
judicial decisions were the Supreme Court©s unanimous opinion 
in the 1971 Java case and the 1975 ruling of a federal district 
court in Illinois in the Burtton case. In the Java case, the 
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the administrative appeal 
procedures at issue failed to insure the payment of benefits 
"when due."6 According to the Court, the Social Security Act 
requires that benefits be paid at the earliest date that is "admin 
istratively feasible." In direct response to the Java ruling, 
USDOL issued a promptness standard for appeals in 1972 to 
ensure that claimants receive the prompt hearings required by 
federal law. 7 In the Burtton case, the federal district court was 
"appalled" by a state agency©s delays in paying benefits, and 
concluded the agency was violating the Social Security Act©s 
requirement to pay benefits * ©when due. " 8 Largely in response to 
this latter case, USDOL issued a benefit payment promptness 
standard in 1976, which was revised in 1978. 9 It is clear that 
USDOL©s initial development of a strong emphasis on prompt-
3. Rubin (1983: 42).
4. For an extensive discussion of federal standards, see Rubin (1983: Ch. 3).
5. For example, a revised standard for claim filing issued in 1970 describes in great detail the 
circumstances that states must adhere to in processing claims, including detailed requirements 
about the services that must be provided to different categories of claimants. For a detailed 
discussion of this standard and the escalation of other criteria since the early 1970s, see Rubin 
(1983: 11-33 and 41-64).
6. Java v. California Department of Human Resources Development, 402 U.S. 1 21 (1971).
7. Rubin (1983: 43).
8. Rubin (1983: 224).
9. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 4) and Rubin (1983: 225).
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ness was the direct result of the above (and other) court 
decisions. 10 In fact, Carolyn Golding, director of USDOL©s 
Unemployment Insurance Service, recently underscored the 
importance of these judicial decisions in causing USDOL to 
publish promptness standards. 11
The above background provides a context for the analysis of 
USDOL performance criteria and quality measures undertaken in 
this chapter. The focus is a fairly narrow one emphasizing: 
selected performance criteria and quality measures utilized by 
USDOL to evaluate state programs; some adverse incentives 
created by these measures, including the possibility that payment 
errors may have resulted in at least some states from attempts to 
comply with certain criteria; and some possible improvements in 
these performance measures. 12 The chapter is organized as 
follows. First, several dimensions of USDOL©s system for more 
broadly measuring state program quality the UI Quality Ap 
praisal system are considered. Then, the implications of the 
relative emphasis placed by USDOL on the quantity v. the 
quality of UC "production" are considered, particularly how 
this emphasis may have contributed to the payment error 
problems discussed in chapter 2. Finally, a brief discussion of 
possible improvements in USDOL performance criteria is pro 
vided. 13
Quality Appraisal System
A task force of federal and state staff was established by 
USDOL in 1975 to determine how USDOL should assess the
10. For a discussion of promptness standards for appeals, including the role of judicial 
decisions in leading to those standards, see Owen and Wood (1980) and Rubin (1980).
11. Golding (1985: 2-3).
12. Other important federal performance criteria include those contained in the pay/perform 
ance rating system that applies to USDOL employees. If the incentive system to which federal 
employees respond contained adverse features, such adverse features might contribute to some of 
the quality problems discussed in this and other chapters. Because the authors have no substantive 
basis for analyzing this issue, it is not considered in this chapter. However, the possibility that 
the federal bureaucracy may adversely affect the UC system has been discussed in a different 
context by Rubin (1983: 31-33).
13. A much briefer discussion of many of the adverse impacts and some of the responses 
discussed in this chapter may be found in a 1983 report prepared for USDOL. See Kingston, 
Burgess and St. Louis (1983).
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quality of state operations, consistent with its responsibility to 
ensure that states operate "effective and efficient" programs. 
According to USDOL, the basic approach taken was to restrict 
the performance levels developed to reflect only the require 
ments included in federal law. 14 The result was a Performance 
Appraisal Package which was utilized in all states in fiscal years 
1976 and 1977. 15 Following this initial effort, "desired levels of 
achievement" (DLAs) were established for several aspects of 
state program operations starting in FY 1978. 16 In FY 1979, the 
Performance Appraisal Package was further revised and retitled 
the UI Quality Appraisal program. Subsequently, annual revi 
sions have been made in the program, but the basic DLAs have 
remained quite similar since its inception.
DLAs and State Performance
The desired levels of achievement established by USDOL may 
be illustrated by those included in the FY 1984 Quality Appraisal 
program (see table 5-1). The 24 DLAs include 17 distinct criteria 
for the payment and processing of benefit claims, four for tax 
collection and processing activities, and three for state trust fund 
management activities. 17 Twelve of the DLAs for the payment or 
processing of UC benefit payments relate to promptness or 
timeliness, and only five relate to the quality of performance 
achieved in these activities. 18
If the Quality Appraisal results for benefit payment or pro 
cessing activities during the early years of this program could be 
accepted as good indicators of state UC program quality, then a 
case could be made that the states generally were more deficient 
in meeting promptness than quality criteria. For example, many
14. Golding (1985: 2).
15. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 3).
16. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 3).
17. A total of 20 criteria are listed in part I of table 5-1 for benefit payment/processing. 
However, six of the DLAs for initial claim promptness actually represent only three distinct 
criteria because separately stated criteria are included for states with v. without waiting weeks.
18. This mix is fairly similar to that in earlier years. For example, the mix for FY 1980 also 
was 12 promptness and 5 quality criteria, as reported in chapter 2 (see table 2-1). Also, the FY 
1982 mix included 11 promptness and 4 quality criteria, as reported in U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982c: 6).
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TABLE 5-1
USDOL Desired Levels of Achievement 
_____________________FY 1984_____________________
Part I. Benefit Payment/Processing
Initial Claims Performance
— A maximum of three confirmed issues per 100 cases
Initial Claims Promptness—Intrastate
— In Waiting Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of first payments made within 
14 days of first compensable week ending date
— In Nonwaiting Week States: A minimum of 87 percent of first payments made 
within 21 days of first compensable week ending date
— A mimimum of 93 percent of first payments made within 35 days of the first 
compensable week ending date
Initial Class Promptness—Interstate
— In Waiting Week States: A mimimum of 70 percent of first payments made within 
14 days of first compensable week ending date
— In Nonwaiting Week States: A mimimum of 70 percent of first payments made 
within 21 days of first compensable week ending date
— A minimum of 78 percent of first payments made within 35 days of the first 
compensable week ending date
Initial Claims Promptness—UCFE
— In Waiting Week States: A mimimum of 70 percent of first payments made within 
14 days of first compensable weeke ending date
— In Nonwaiting Week States: A minimum of 70 percent of first payments made 
within 21 days of first compensable week ending date
— A minimum of 78 percent of first payments made within 35 days of the first 
compensable week ending date
Weeks Claimed Performance
— A maximum of 7 percent of total weeks claimed affected by confirmed weeks 
claimed issues
Nonmonetary Determinations Performance—Intrastate
— For Separation Cases: A minimum of 75 percent of cases acceptable
— For Nonseparation Cases: A minimum of 80 percent of cases acceptable
Nonmonetary Determination Promptness—Intrastate
— A minimum of 80 percent of determinations timely
Combined Wage Claims
— A minimum of 75 percent of wage transfers made timely
Appeals Performance
— A minimum of 80 percent of cases scoring 80 percent or more
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TABLE 5-1 
(continued)
Part I. Benefit Payment/Processing
Appeals Promptness—Lower Authority
— A minimum of 60 percent of appeal decisions made within 30 days
— A minimum of 80 percent of appeal decisions made within 45 days
Appeals Promptness—Higher Authority
— A minimum of 40 percent of appeal decisions made within 45 days
— A minimum of 80 percent of appeal decisions made within 75 days
Part II. Tax Collection/Processing and Fund Management
Status Determination Promptness
— A minimum of 80 percent of determinations of employer liability made within 180 
days of the liability date
Field Audits
— A minimum of 4 percent penetration
Report Delinquency
— A minimum of 90 percent of employers filing reports by end of quarter
Collections
— A minimum of 75 percent of delinquent accounts with some monies obtained 
within 150 days from the end of the quarter
Fund Management
— A minimum of 90 percent of collected taxes deposited within 3 days of receipt
— A maximum of 2 days for which funds are on deposit in the Clearing Account 
before being transferred to the Trust Fund
— A maximum of one day for withdrawal of money from the Trust Fund before 
paying benefits
Source: USDOL (1984g: Figure 1-2).
more states failed to meet the promptness than the quality-of- 
performance criteria in FY 1980; similarly, more states failed to 
meet the promptness than the quality criteria in the FY 1982 
Quality Appraisal. 19 Such results could have been used as a basis
19. See U.S. Department of Labor (1980: 9-53) and U.S. Department of Labor (1982c: 
9-24).
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for an increased emphasis by USDOL on promptness in process 
ing and paying claims.
More recent Quality Appraisals, however, yield a different 
pattern of results. For FY 1984, for example, the findings 
indicate that the percentage of states deficient in meeting 
promptness criteria and quality criteria generally does not differ 
sharply. Between 10 and 59 percent of the participating states 
failed to meet the five quality criteria listed in table 5-1, with a 
simple average of about 30 percent failing to achieve these 
DLAs, 20 while between 2 and 54 percent failed to meet the 12 
promptness DLAs, with a simple average of about 25 percent 
failing to satisfy these criteria. 21 One possible explanation for the 
change in the extent to which states have satisfied the promptness 
v. quality DLAs over the past several years could be that 
USDOL increased its emphasis on the promptness criteria in 
those years. Such pressures, in turn, could have led to increased 
overpayments and reduced program quality, as discussed in more 
detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.
Selected Limitations of the Quality Appraisal System
The Quality Appraisal system does not constitute a compre 
hensive or valid system for measuring the overall quality of state 
UC program administration. The purpose here, however, is not 
to provide an in-depth evaluation of this system, or even of that 
portion related to benefit processing and payment activities. 
Rather, a few important limitations of the benefits component of 
the Quality Appraisal program are identified, including: (1) an 
overemphasis on the promptness v. the quality of claim process 
ing and payments; (2) sampling and statistical issues; (3) the 
review process; and (4) certain other limitations. These are noted 
as background for a discussion of their effects on the problem of 
payment errors and its control.
Promptness v. Quality. A major limitation of the Quality 
Appraisal system is that prompt processing has been emphasized 
much more heavily than the quality with which claims are
20. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 8-32).
21. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 8-32).
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processed and paid. This is indicated in part by the mix of DLAs 
in the system, with nearly two-thirds of the DLAs concerned 
specifically with processing and payment promptness. The 
imbalance of emphasis is even more clearly illustrated by the fact 
that an explicit DLA related to either overpayments or under 
payments has not been included in the Quality Appraisal pro 
gram. 22 Combined with the historical emphasis which has been 
placed on processing and payment promptness, the absence of 
any DLA related to payment accuracy is, in our view, a 
particularly serious limitation of the Quality Appraisal pro 
gram. 23
It should be noted, however, that just as the earlier USDOL 
emphasis may have led to improved state promptness, additional 
emphasis on quality could lead to improved state performance in 
this area as well. As noted in chapter 4, USDOL already has 
begun to move in the direction of encouraging the states to 
improve their performance with respect to the control of over 
payments. As early as FY 1983, USDOL began to add an 
emphasis on payment integrity and overpayment detection and 
recovery procedures to its Program and Budget Planning (PBP) 
process. 24 More recently, USDOL has added Measures of 
Achievement in its PBP process to encourage state UC agencies 
to set explicit goals for improving procedures to prevent, detect 
and recover overpayments. 25 In fact, beginning in FY 1985, 
states with overpayment problems (documented through Random 
Audit program results) were expected to formulate and submit
22. The desired levels of achievement for fiscal year 1985, for example, included no DLAs for 
overpayment prevention or detection. See U.S. Department of Labor (1984a: 29-31). Further 
more, no DLAs were added for overpayment prevention or detection for FY 1986; see U.S. 
Department of Labor (1985b).
23. The findings of the 1980 K-B study discussed in chapter 2 indicate that most overpayments 
are not detected by routine state UC agency procedures; even if USDOL had wanted to monitor 
state performance in detecting overpayments, an accurate measure of such performance could not 
have been obtained from operational data in past years in any case. However, it also should be 
noted that either the Random Audit system implemented in 46 states by 1984 or the recently 
introduced Quality Control Program could provide the basis for more accurately determining 
actual overpayment rates and for measuring state UC agency performance in detecting (but not 
in preventing or recovering) overpayments.
24. U.S. Department of Labor (1984a and 1985b).
25. For the Measures of Achievement included in the planning process for fiscal years 
1985-86, see U.S. Department of Labor (1984a and 1985b).
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corrective action plans (including specific dates by which certain 
goals were to be achieved) as a part of the budgeting and 
planning process. 26
While it appears that USDOL is moving to correct the 
historical imbalance in its emphasis on promptness v. payment 
accuracy, such measures and the necessity for them do not imply 
that the prompt payment of UC benefits is unimportant or 
unnecessary. Undue delay in the payment of benefits can cause 
considerable hardships for claimants and their families. Further 
more, given that the pressures for the prompt payment of benefits 
have originated primarily from judicial decisions that cannot be 
ignored, the timely payment of benefits will continue to be 
among the priority goals of UC program administrators. None 
theless, it still remains our judgment that the past imbalance 
between speed and quality has not been sufficiently corrected. It 
will be important to ensure that the information provided by the 
Random Audit program and the recently initiated Quality Con 
trol program is effectively utilized to enhance program quality. 
The formulation of Measures of Achievement for various pay 
ment control activities in the PBP process constitutes an impor 
tant first step but will not, of itself, be sufficient to overcome the 
overemphasis on the promptness criteria.
Sampling and Statistical Issues. Another major limitation of 
the Quality Appraisal system is related to a number of technical 
limitations in the guidelines provided by USDOL for selecting 
samples for measuring state performance in terms of initial 
claims, weeks claimed, nonmonetary determinations and appeals 
(reported above in table 5-1). 27 One of these limitations is that 
the sampling methodology does not provide for the selection of 
samples from the annual population of claims in a state. Instead, 
the samples are selected during a very short interval of a few 
weeks, and the results obtained from examining these samples
26. According to the PBP guidelines for FY 1986, corrective action plans were suspended 
during FY 1985 in anticipation of the implementation of USDOL's new Quality Control program, 
but some states evidently continued to emphasize such corrective action plans. See U.S. 
Department of Labor (1985b: Cover Memorandum).
27. For the sampling methodology developed by USDOL, see U.S. Department of Labor 
(n.d.). For a summary of the sample selection procedures for FY 1984, see U.S. Department of 
Labor (1984g: 46-47).
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are presumed to be indicative of the operations of a state's UC 
program over an entire year.
A second limitation related to sampling procedures is the 
practice of selecting only a few local offices from which 
information on UC claims or claimants is obtained for the 
appraisals. Even though the findings generally are interpreted as 
reflecting statewide performance, no statistical tests are con 
ducted to ascertain the extent to which the samples are represen 
tative (in terms of sex, age, industry, etc.) of the statewide 
population of claims. 28 In fact, it is quite possible that the 
samples selected are not even representative of the small subsets 
of statewide populations from which they are selected, particu 
larly because the samples specified in USDOL guidelines are 
extremely small ones. 29 Another sampling limitation is that the 
guidelines for selecting samples within each local office also are 
deficient; they refer to "random samples" but do not provide 
specific rules for identifying the exact population to be sampled 
and the exact sampling procedures to be utilized to obtain a 
random sample (that could be replicated) from a well-identified 
population. 30
Unfortunately, these and other sampling deficiencies in the 
Quality Appraisal system make it impossible to statistically 
generalize the findings to meaningful and identifiable statewide 
populations of claims or claimants. 31 The sampling guidelines 
thus make it impossible to obtain statistically sound estimates of
28. For a brief discussion of why representative samples (not just randomly selected samples) 
are an important consideration, see Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 86-89).
29. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: 46-47).
30. As one example, USDOL guidelines for selecting samples of active claimants within 
particular local offices for evaluating initial claims and weeks claimed in the Quality Appraisal 
indicate that at least 50 percent more claimants than required should be scheduled for interviews; 
this overscheduling is intended to compensate for the fact that some claimants probably will not 
appear at the designated times and places. These guidelines further suggest that in the event that 
too few claimants appear for such interviews, additional persons should be selected from among 
the claimants found in those local offices on the days the interviews are scheduled. Even if the 
sampling methodology for the selection of claimants were otherwise appropriate, no provisions 
are made in USDOL guidelines to identify or correct the serious sample biases that may result 
from these procedures.
31. A discussion of making inferences about populations on the basis of sample evidence may 
be found in introductory texts on sampling theory. For example, see Scheaffer, Mendenhall and 
Ott (1979) and Winer (1971).
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statewide population characteristics on the basis of the sample 
evidence obtained. 32
It is important to emphasize that the above sampling deficien 
cies are not relevant for USDOL's established DLAs for payment 
promptness. In contrast with procedures used in the Quality 
Appraisal program to assess state compliance with quality 
criteria, the procedures involved in measuring state compliance 
with the payment promptness criteria avoid all of the statistical 
and sampling problems described above. These latter procedures 
involve a census rather than the selection of samples, so that 
sampling errors are irrelevant for the DLAs for payment prompt 
ness. Moreover, information on payment promptness is gathered 
by USDOL every month of the year, rather than during a few 
weeks of each year. 33 These differences in the quality of 
information sought by USDOL about state compliance with the 
promptness criteria again suggest the extent of imbalance in the 
relative emphasis placed on compliance with the two types of 
criteria.
Review Process. Another limitation of the Quality Appraisal 
system has been the process utilized to review the potential 
issues detected for initial claims and weeks claimed. Periodi 
cally, teams of out-of-state adjudication experts, selected by 
USDOL, review the performance of each state's own personnel 
in processing cases. These review teams make site visits to local 
offices or mail claim centers to conduct detailed reviews of the
32. USDOL strongly disagrees with our assessment. In fact, Golding (1985: 3) recently stated 
that:
... in the development of the quality appraisal system, there was extensive input 
in developing the statistical sampling component of the program from a private 
contractor who specializes in that area and from another contractor to validate the 
process. We also drew substantially upon our own staff capabilities.
Note that our criticisms of the statistical sampling plans used in the Quality Appraisal program 
do not relate to the techniques used to measure the promptness with which claims are processed 
and paid. No sampling is required for these measures because the time lapse performance 
measures used by USDOL are based on a monthly census of claims. The criticisms discussed in 
the text relate primarily to the sampling plans used to measure other dimensions of program 
quality. The weaknesses associated with these plans are sufficient, in our view, to seriously 
impair the usefulness of the statistics produced, either for individual local UC offices or for 
statewide UC programs.
33. These monthly reports are regularly published by USDOL and have been required since at 
least 1980. For a typical monthly report, see U.S. Department of Labor (1983).
142 CHAPTER 5
quality and correctness of the decisions made in processing 
initial claims and weeks claimed for sampled cases. However, 
each state's eligibility rules are quite complex, and it is probable 
that only experts from a particular state could appreciate all the 
subtleties that might arise in specific cases for that state. This is 
apparently the rationale for allowing each state to appoint a 
policy committee of its own personnel to review the preliminary 
findings of the out-of-state experts. These state policy commit 
tees evaluate the findings of the performance appraisals con 
ducted by the out-of-state review teams and either accept 
(confirm) or reject each potential issue. 34
Although the rationale for the review process can be easily 
understood, the practical effect of using state policy committees 
often may be quite different from the intended effect. Because 
the desired levels of achievement established by USDOL for 
Quality Appraisal results relate to confirmed issues, a strong 
incentive exists for state policy committees to confirm only a 
certain number of potential issues to ensure that their states at 
least meet the desired levels of achievement established by 
USDOL. Indeed, a review of published Quality Appraisal 
results, which include both potential and confirmed issues, 
indicates that the discrepancy between the two is very large in 
some states. 35 Although many states may not respond to the 
incentive to confirm only an acceptable number of potential 
issues, the incentive obviously exists and it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that some states respond to that incen 
tive. Potential incentives of this type should be carefully consid 
ered in structuring whatever review process might be established 
for payment accuracy (and other quality) indicators in either the 
Quality Appraisal system or the Quality Control program.
Other Limitations. Other limitations of the Quality Appraisal 
system include: (1) comprehensive measures of program quality, 
particularly for payment accuracy, are lacking; (2) much of the
34. For a discussion of these Quality Appraisal procedures, see U.S. Department of Labor 
(n.d.). It should be noted that, where Random Audit program results were available, USDOL 
substituted these results for the weeks-claimed and initial-claim portions of the Quality Appraisal 
program.
35. For example, see U.S. Department of Labor (1982c and 1984g).
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review procedure relies on a simple review of the information 
originally used to process the case, and thus largely ignores the 
major issue of whether other information (that could have been 
but was not obtained) would have produced a different decision; 
(3) much of the review procedure does not require that original 
source documentation be obtained or verified; (4) the results are 
available only on an annual basis, rather than more frequently; 
and (5) perhaps partly because of the limitations discussed 
above, the Quality Appraisal system is not effectively utilized to 
improve program quality, at least in the view of UC program 
personnel in some states. 36 In summary, it appears that the 
Quality Appraisal system would require substantial modification 
to become an effective system for comprehensively measuring 
and evaluating many aspects of statewide UC program quality 
beyond the promptness criteria that are currently emphasized.
Effects of Overemphasis on Promptness
The prompt processing and payment of benefit claims obvi 
ously is one important aspect of overall UC program quality, 
consistent with the requirements of the Social Security Act. 
When promptness is emphasized so heavily as to virtually 
exclude concern about other factors, however, undesirable and 
unintended side effects are likely to occur. These impacts merit 
careful consideration. The expected impact of USDOL's empha 
sis on payment promptness, for example, may be appropriately 
compared to the effects of dropping the penalty for errors in a 
timed typing test. Just as typists would type much faster if there 
were no penalties for errors, UC program personnel would be 
expected to process or pay claims much more rapidly with no 
"deductions" for processing or payment errors. In fact, at least 
during the 1979-1982 interval when both the K-B and B-K-S 
studies were being conducted (and apparently also since that 
time), at least some UC jurisdictions evidently have participated
36. For example, approximately three-fourths of the respondents to a survey of state UC 
program personnel conducted as part of the 1979-80 K-B study disagreed or strongly disagreed 
that Quality Appraisal results were effectively utilized to improve efforts by local office personnel 
in their states to prevent overpayments. See Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 55).
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in a nationwide "contest" in terms of the percentages of first 
payments that were promptly made. 37
The unbalanced emphasis USDOL places on prompt payments 
appears to adversely impact state UC program operations, as 
would be expected. For example, the state UC agency personnel 
who participated in the 1979-80 K-B study were of the opinion 
that the USDOL promptness standards reduced the emphasis on 
payment accuracy in state programs, as indicated by the follow 
ing composite opinion:
Unfortunately, the work environment and the "incentives/ re 
ward" system for local office employees do not effectively 
encourage the prevention of overpayments. Even though the UI 
cost model provides minutes per unit (MPUs) for the prevention 
of overpayments by local office personnel, the primary emphasis 
within the local office is on "production" and not on preventing 
overpayments. Local office employees do not believe they are 
given sufficient time to effectively conduct the activities de 
scribed above and, beyond the cost-model time credited for 
issuing a nonmonetary determination, local office personnel 
believe that they receive no positive encouragement to prevent 
overpayments.
Employees with the least experience oftentimes are placed on 
the new claims line and, because they lack training and experi 
ence, they are unable to detect a number of potential issues that 
should be referred for adjudication. Moreover, once potential 
issues are referred for adjudication, the local office deputies 
typically are under great pressure to issue nonmonetary determi 
nations within a relatively short period of time. Personnel 
performance evaluations for these local office deputies often place 
a great weight on the number of determinations issued per day or 
per week .... local office employees are encouraged to achieve
37. For example, Tennessee often ranks as the first-payment promptness "winner." In fact, 
the Tennessee UC agency hailed its first place finish for the year ending March 1980 in its agency 
newspaper during the K-B study. See the May 1980 issue of Searchlight News, published by the 
Tennessee Department of Employment Security.
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relatively high rankings for their local offices, as measured by the 
monthly reports of first pay timeliness performance. 38
The above summary view makes it clear that efforts to achieve 
USDOL performance criteria for first payments may have 
important effects on the overall incentive and reward structure 
used to evaluate employee performance in local UC offices. 
Such effects clearly would be expected to adversely impact on 
overall state UC program quality, particularly given limited 
administrative funding and the absence of any payment accuracy 
criteria. Moreover, the summary statement is not an isolated or 
outdated perception by state UC program personnel. For exam 
ple, despite the recent steps taken by USDOL to add an emphasis 
on quality, the Interstate Conference of Employment Security 
Agencies, Inc. has raised the issue of how to balance this new 
emphasis with USDOL's long-standing emphasis on prompt 
processing:
We need a definite understanding of the desired balance between 
the emphasis on quality which now appears to be in vogue as 
opposed to the emphasis on quantity and promptness which has 
been stressed for the last 10-12 years. Are we now to assume both 
tasks with the understanding that they are to require equal 
emphasis? Will additional dollars be provided to implement 
quality standards? It is one thing to develop and implement data 
collection but quite another to implement and carry out corrective 
action. 39
The adverse incentives of emphasizing promptness have been 
stressed recently by several state UC agencies. For example, in 
commenting on an earlier version of this chapter, Oregon's 
Employment Division director, Raymond Thorne, wrote:
38. Kingston and Burgess (1981: J-l and J-2). Respondents to the K-B study survey were the 
personnel who worked on that project in their respective states. Because the respondents were not 
chosen randomly, their views cannot be considered to statistically represent the views of the 
larger populations of other UC agency personnel in the study states. Also, the questionnaire was 
not distributed to state UC program directors, regional/district supervisors or local office 
managers. It is possible that the views of these groups might not coincide with the views 
summarized in the text. For further details on the survey, see Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 
49-60 and Appendix J).
39. Heartwell, Jr. (1985: Attached Briefing Paper, 3).
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I agree with your statements that incentives to parties involved 
with UI are lacking. Essentially, DOL expects speedy completion 
of all benefit payment procedures and penalizes those that cannot 
meet [the]. . . timeliness [criteria]. It puts our field staff into a 
"survival mode" of simply processing the claims within the 
underfunded time allocation. It caused us to cut our own 
management information system in favor of putting additional 
staff out on the "front lines." We have seen quality deteriorate in 
Oregon dramatically in the last two years, resulting in the errors 
that Random Audit is beginning to find. 40
This same theme of the pressure of time lapse performance criteria, 
combined with limited administrative funding, has been emphasized 
by New York's former UC program administrator, Gerald Dunn. 41 The 
adverse impacts of USDOL timeliness criteria on state operations also 
have been stressed recently by James Hanna of the Nevada UC agency 
and Thurman Burnett and James Pendleton of the Florida UC agency. 42
Some critics have contended that the evidence produced by the 
K-B and B-K-S studies fails to support the above contentions. 
They argue that, if federal timeliness requirements were respon 
sible for many overpayments, the principal causes of the over 
payments detected in those studies should reflect incorrect 
decisions when first payments are made. Because the most 
frequent overpayments in both the K-B and B-K-S studies were 
those due to violations of worksearch requirements, these critics 
have argued that federal promptness criteria apparently have 
little impact on UC overpayments. 43
The first weakness in the reasoning of the critics is that federal 
promptness criteria are imposed for issuing nonmonetary deter 
minations, not just for processing initial claims and making first
40. Thorne (1985b: 2).
41. Dunn and Griffin (1984: 12).
42. Hanna (1985) and Burnett and Pendleton (1985: 7).
43. Although only a small proportion of the total UC benefits paid statewide in the B-K-S 
study were overpaid because of errors in original monetary determinations, a relatively large 
percentage of all sampled cases involved errors in initial monetary determinations that affected 
either weekly or maximum benefit awards. To some extent, these errors in monetary determi 
nations may reflect time-lapse pressures, as well as the absence of strong incentives for accurately 
obtaining wages by UC agency personnel or for accurately reporting wages by employers, and 
perhaps undue complexity in reporting requirements or reporting forms.
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payments. These nonmonetary determinations relate specifically 
to eligibility criteria—including the ability, availability and, in 
most states, the active search requirements—that must be 
monitored for claimants on a weekly basis by UC agencies. 
Hence, to the extent that federal time lapse criteria relate to the 
nonmonetary eligibility criteria, the findings of both the K-B and 
B-K-S studies would be consistent with the potential for conflict 
between speed and quality in processing UC claims.
A second response to the argument is that the emphasis placed 
on rapid processing would be expected to set the overall tone and 
affect the incentive environment within which many other local 
office functions would be conducted. Great pressure on local 
office personnel to emphasize production speed probably results 
in reduced emphasis on payment accuracy. However, as noted in 
chapter 2, there was little substantive evidence prior to 1980 to 
support the belief that the timeliness criteria may have contrib 
uted to the problem of payment errors.
Since these payment error problems have been documented in 
the K-B and B-K-S studies and confirmed by USDOL's ex 
panded Random Audit program, there has been an increase in 
emphasis on payment accuracy by USDOL. Particularly in light 
of the lead time required for a large bureaucracy to effectively 
respond to politically sensitive issues, USDOL's recent move 
ment towards a more balanced emphasis that includes payment 
accuracy in evaluating the performance of state programs is 
certainly an encouraging development.
Some Possible Improvements in USDOL Performance Criteria
The overall implication of the analysis in the prior two sections 
is that USDOL performance criteria may have contributed both 
to increased overpayments and to other quality problems in state 
UC programs. It also appears likely that these problems may be 
important ones for some, and perhaps many, state UC agencies. 
Accordingly, a number of issues related to the improvement of 
the performance criteria by which USDOL evaluates state UC
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programs are discussed in this section. 44 In considering possible 
policy responses, however, it is important to reemphasize a 
major theme of this study. High overpayment rates are not the 
only problem; they also very likely are symptomatic of even 
more important problems, including: undue program complexity 
(chapter 3); adverse incentives (chapters 4, 5 and 6); and the 
severe problems state UC agencies confront in attempting to 
monitor claimant compliance with the continuing UC eligibility 
criteria (chapter 7). Federal and state responses to perceived 
overpayment problems should be formulated in light of these 
broader considerations, rather than being myopically targeted 
just on reducing payment errors.
Payment Accuracy Criteria
One basis for emphasizing benefit payment accuracy is the 
Social Security Act's requirement that benefits be paid "when 
due," assuming this requirement also implies that such payments 
should be made only when due. In fact, USDOL has explicitly 
argued that this interpretation of the "when due" clause is 
appropriate in a recent conformity hearing before an administra 
tive law judge (even though USDOL never has adopted any 
payment accuracy performance criteria). In this case, USDOL 
contended that it "has consistently construed" the Social Secu 
rity Act
... to require state laws to insure full payment of unemployment 
compensation when due and also to prevent payment when not 
due. Each state agency is under an obligation to protect the 
financial integrity of its unemployment insurance fund by avoid 
ing unjustified payments. 45
Significantly, the administrative law judge in this case agreed with the 
USDOL position in a February 1985 decision in which the "when
44. A few of the ideas contained in this section have been briefly discussed by the authors in 
earlier work. Some possible improvements suggested by an analysis of the K-B study are 
provided in Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 51-56) and in Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1981). 
Some possible improvements suggested by an analysis of both the K-B and B-K-S study data are 
contained in Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983).
45. Commerce Clearing House (1985: Para. 21, 749, 3999-69).
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due" clause was interpreted as not referring solely to the timeliness of 
payments to claimants. 46 A logical and direct extension of the position 
USDOL has taken in the above case obviously would be to develop 
payment accuracy criteria for state programs.
Payment accuracy criteria would, of course, most appropri 
ately encompass underpayments as well as overpayments. 47 As 
noted in chapter 2, however, until very recently USDOL had no 
accurate basis for measuring compliance with any payment 
accuracy criteria that might have been developed for either 
overpayment or underpayment errors. Nonetheless, the Random 
Audit program (which was operating in 46 states by 1984) did 
provide a conceptually sound basis for measuring payment error 
rates in statewide UC programs. In anticipation of implementing 
a new Quality Control program, however, the Random Audit 
system was discontinued as of March 1985. At that time, 
Secretary of Labor Brock suspended the implementation of the 
proposed Quality Control program, pending a review of its 
purposes and design. 48 The core component of the Quality 
Control program was implemented in April 1986; it provides for 
the estimation of both overpayment and underpayment errors. 
The program has limitations, however, which will result in an 
underestimation of underpayment errors, as explained in the 
appendix to chapter 2.
One problem likely to be encountered in defining "acceptable 
levels" of state performance with respect to payment accuracy 
(and other quality) criteria arises from the diversity among 
different state UC systems. States with a worksearch require 
ment, for example, are much more likely to have high overpay 
ment rates than states without this requirement (as explained in 
detail in chapter 7). As another example, states with more
46. Commerce Clearing House (1985: Para. 21, 749, 3999-67 and 3999-71).
47. Underpayments represent a relatively small percentage of benefit payments actually made 
in error, so the main payment accuracy issue would be overpayments. The main issue in terms 
of broadly defined underpayments presumably revolves around claimants who are incorrectly 
denied any payment, not claimants who incorrectly receive a smaller payment than that to which 
they are entitled. However, no reliable evidence yet is available on broadly defined underpay 
ments.
48. For the announcement of the decision to review the design of Quality Control after its 
recent suspension, see Federal Register (1985: 31787-31792).
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complex eligibility requirements are likely to experience higher 
payment error rates than otherwise similar states with simpler 
requirements. 49 In developing payment accuracy or other quality 
criteria, policy makers will have to determine whether to impose 
the same or different criteria on all states because of the 
widespread differences that characterize state programs. Overall, 
it is our view that the state diversity argument does not constitute 
a valid basis for preventing or discouraging the development of 
payment accuracy (and other quality) criteria, although state 
diversity will make the development of such criteria a much 
more difficult task than would be the case in a system that had no 
state differences.
Other Program Quality Criteria
Many factors other than the prompt or accurate payment of 
benefits could be included in a full set of UC program quality 
criteria. Several possibilities for developing some of these other 
criteria are briefly set out in this section. It should be strongly 
emphasized at the outset that the discussion is merely suggestive 
of some of the issues that may merit consideration. The experts 
in this area would be the federal and especially the state UC 
program administrators and operational personnel, who have a 
detailed working knowledge of the UC system. Any quality 
criteria developed should rely heavily both on the input of these 
experts and on the informed opinions of the claimants and 
employers served by the system. Given that qualification, the 
following types of UC program interactions might be relevant for 
consideration. The aspects of UC program quality discussed 
relate to UC agency/claimant interactions, UC agency/employer 
interactions and internal UC agency operations.
Claimant Interactions. Many UC agency/claimant interactions 
would be relevant in evaluating overall UC program quality. First, 
despite its limitations discussed earlier in this chapter, the existing
49. The Florida UC agency has made the point that state UC administrators must decide what 
will be emphasized in their states. Burnett and Pendleton argue that, given fixed administrative 
funding, more complexity in state law/policy implies more aspects of that law/policy must be 
ignored, and this results in more payment errors. See Burnett and Pendleton (1985: 8).
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Quality Appraisal system does include the following quality-of- 
performance criteria for such interactions (see table 5-1 above): 
(1) state performance in processing initial claims (focused nar 
rowly on confirmed issues); (2) state performance in processing 
continued claims (focused narrowly on weeks claimed which are 
affected by confirmed issues); (3) state performance in terms of 
the completeness and correctness of nonmonetary determinations; 
and (4) the quality of appeal hearings and decisions rendered. 
Given an appropriate sampling framework, these items (or similar 
ones) could be included as part of a comprehensive system for 
evaluating overall UC program quality.
Other quality dimensions that might be considered for evalu 
ating UC agency/claimant interactions could include the follow 
ing: (1) accurate estimates of errors in incorrect denials of 
payments to eligible claimants (as discussed in the appendix to 
chapter 2); (2) an evaluation of the monetary determination 
process, including monetary determination errors that affect 
weekly benefit amounts or maximum benefit awards; (3) the 
extent of horizontal equity achieved in the nonmonetary eligibil 
ity determination process, including determinations that are or 
are not made; (4) the extent to which routine benefit payment 
control functions actually detect payment errors that occur; (5) 
evaluation of the overpayment collection process, probably 
including some emphasis on the volume (but not the percentage 
alone) of overpayments recovered; and (6) additional criteria for 
appeals, including the accuracy and horizontal equity involved in 
the decisions made.
Employer Interactions. Employer/UC agency interactions also 
are important in evaluating overall program quality. The existing 
Quality Appraisal system already includes the following quality- 
of-performance criteria for such interactions (see table 5-1 
above): (1) a field audit penetration criterion for employer 
accounts; (2) an employer reporting delinquency criterion; and 
(3) a criterion for collecting funds due from delinquent employer 
accounts. Some other relevant employer/UC agency interactions 
to consider in developing quality criteria might include: (1) wage 
reporting errors (even if they do not result in underpayments or 
overpayments); (2) errors in benefit charges to employer ac-
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counts; (3) the overall tax collection process, including errors in 
tax rate determinations and payments; (4) employer interactions 
in the overall nonmonetary determination process, especially in 
terms of separation issues; (5) the overall process of identifying 
and acting on job refusals; (6) the overall process of identifying 
and acting on unreported earnings in covered employment; (7) 
the overall process of identifying employers who do not volun 
tarily report their existence; and (8) employer participation in the 
appeal process, including the accuracy and horizontal equity of 
the decisions made.
Internal Agency Operations. Other aspects of overall UC 
program quality relate more directly to factors involved with 
internal agency operations. The Quality Appraisal system al 
ready includes three technical criteria for the deposit, manage 
ment and withdrawal of funds in UC trust fund accounts. 
Additional quality criteria for internal UC agency operations that 
relate more nearly to the focus of the present study might include 
factors such as: (1) measures of program complexity; (2) the 
effectiveness of agency personnel performance and compensa 
tion criteria in encouraging effective employee performance 
(including the minimization of payment errors) and in fostering 
other dimensions of program quality; (3) whether state law/policy 
conforms to federal law; (4) whether UC agency administrative 
policies and procedures are consistent with federal and state law; 
(5) the level of knowledge of UC agency personnel about 
existing provisions of state law, policy and procedures; (6) the 
overall quality of agency training and retraining policies and 
procedures; (7) the flow of pertinent information within the 
agency, including the effectiveness of communicating new 
policies/procedures and whether payment/processing errors are 
effectively brought to the attention of those responsible for the 
errors; and (8) measures of the effectiveness with which agency 
personnel prevent potential overpayments and detect actual 
overpayments.
Some Issues in Developing Performance Criteria
A number of factors should be considered in developing either 
the above suggestions or other proposals for evaluating state UC
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program quality. These include: (1) the use of a benefit/cost 
framework; (2) the importance of state UC agency input; (3) 
public perceptions; (4) timing delays; and (5) inducing state 
compliance. Each is briefly discussed below.
Benefit I Cost Framework. The appropriateness of any perfor 
mance criteria for state UC programs depends on the costs as 
well as the benefits of imposing and assessing compliance with 
such criteria. Even though the benefits of introducing additional 
quality indicators appear obvious, indicators would have to be 
developed that could be implemented and administered in a 
cost-effective manner. Compliance by state UC agencies might 
be difficult to determine in many instances, especially given the 
limited staff available to USDOL for such purposes.
Other potential costs of quality criteria would include any 
unintended and undesirable side effects that might result from the 
imposition of particular criteria. This possibility is illustrated by 
the discussion earlier in this chapter of the likelihood that 
USDOL's promptness criteria have (unintentionally) resulted in 
some decrease in payment accuracy in the UC system. As 
another example, several years ago USDOL established a desired 
level of achievement for state performance that related to the 
percentage—but not the volume—of overpayments that were 
recovered; one unintended side effect of this criterion was an 
inducement for states to establish only (or primarily) those 
detected overpayments that were likely to be recovered. 50 These 
considerations suggest that a substantial amount of research and 
pilot-testing would be required to develop an effective and 
comprehensive set of UC program quality criteria free of such 
unintended and negative side effects.
50. During FY 1982, USDOL included a DLA that required state agencies to recover at least 
55 percent of established overpayments. Such a DLA could produce undesirable side effects, 
including the possibility that states actually would reduce their emphasis on establishing 
overpayments (or at least difficult-to-recover overpayments) to ensure the recovery of a high 
percentage of established overpayments. Possibly in recognition of these adverse side effects, 
USDOL removed this recoupment criterion from the list of DLAs for the FY 1983 Quality 
Appraisal Program. Nonetheless, a similar overpayment recovery criterion was again included in 
fiscal years 1985 and 1986 (see U.S. Department of Labor, 1984a: 30 and 1985). The possibility 
that such a criterion may produce undesirable side effects also has been noted by a number of UC 
program administrators. For example, Dunn provides a particularly good discussion of the 
possible consequences (see Dunn, 1985: 2 and 4).
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State UC Agency Input. Given the diversity among state UC 
programs, it is strongly recommended that state UC program 
personnel be involved in a very major way in the development of 
state performance criteria. Although the state diversity issue does 
not, in our view, lessen the need for or the desirability of 
performance criteria, it does merit full consideration in the 
development of the criteria to be imposed on most or all state UC 
systems. Because state UC program personnel are most likely to 
be sensitive to the state diversity issue, they should be heavily 
involved in any effort to develop performance criteria for state 
programs.
Public Perceptions. Another issue likely to arise in the 
formulation of additional performance criteria is that realistic 
desired levels of achievement might not necessarily be accept 
able to the general public. For example, a reasonable overpay 
ment rate criterion (defined as one that realistically could be 
achieved by most states) initially might have to be set as high as 
10 percent (or even higher) of total benefit payments. Although 
the public might well question such a high overpayment rate 
criterion,51 both USDOL and the states would know that the 
relatively low overpayment rates acceptable to the public at-large 
would likely be unattainable by the great majority of state UC 
programs. Despite the discomfort this problem may cause UC 
program administrators, this public acceptance issue is one that 
we believe should not (and probably cannot) be avoided.
Timing Delays. The development of appropriate criteria for 
evaluating the quality of claim processing and payment activities 
in state UC programs is likely to be a very time consuming 
process. Until such criteria have been developed and imple 
mented, the imbalance between the promptness and quality 
criteria is likely to continue to contribute to overpayment and 
related quality problems. An interim approach that may merit 
consideration would provide for a reduction in USDOL's strong 
emphasis on the promptness criteria until additional quality
51. It may be the case that public acceptance of overpayments varies with the type of 
overpayment. Burnett and Pendleton (1985: 8) argue the public probably would not tolerate even 
a small percentage of overpayments due to unreported earnings, whereas much larger overpay 
ment percentages might be tolerated for errors in applying eligibility criteria.
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criteria have been implemented. The extent to which USDOL 
may relax its promptness criteria—pending the implementation 
of an offsetting emphasis on payment accuracy—is not entirely 
clear. In surveying the history of conformity issues and related 
court cases, Rubin states:
A Federal District Court in Illinois, appalled by the long time 
lapse of that state, concluded that the state agency did not adhere 
to the requirements of Section 303(a)(l) of the Social Security 
Act. Although it did not determine that DOL had improperly 
certified the state for granted funds, it did determine that the state 
was not making payments "when due." The court concluded that 
the "when due" requirement meant that the state agency must 
mail checks out within 14 days from the end of the first 
compensable week of unemployment in all cases in which the 
claimant has provided all necessary information, and external 
factors beyond the agency's control do not intervene. . . .
It became obvious that unless DOL developed a promptness 
standard (rather than merely guidelines) the courts would do so. 
And different courts may well develop different standards. On 
March 5, 1976, a proposed standard for Benefit Payments 
Promptness was published in the Federal Register. 52
Under these circumstances, it may not be possible for USDOL to 
reduce the 14 or 21 day limits currently included in the promptness 
criteria. It may, however, be possible to establish desired levels of 
achievement with respect to percentages processed within these time 
limits that are lower than those currently in place (e.g., the 87 percent 
criterion for the 14/21 day time limit for initial, intrastate claim 
processing might be reduced).
Another approach that might, at least in some states, have an 
effect similar to reducing the percentage requirements for the 
existing timeliness criteria would be to discourage the states from 
engaging in any sort of national "contest" with respect to 
time-lapse performance. When a criterion is set that requires 87 
percent of first payments to be made within the current 14/21 day 
time limits, it is at least worthwhile to question how or why
52. Rubin (1983: 224-5).
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states endeavor to substantially exceed that criterion. For exam 
ple, during FY 1984, 4 states were able to pay in excess of 95 
percent of intrastate initial claims in a timely manner and 12 
states were able to pay more than 93 percent of such claims 
within the 14/21 day time limit. 53 Just as there currently is 
special attention given to those states that do not meet the 
time-lapse performance criteria, perhaps there also should be a 
careful review in those instances in which the criteria are 
substantially exceeded. If such performance resulted from espe 
cially efficient procedures, then other states would undoubtedly 
be interested in determining whether they could adopt the same 
or similar procedures. In contrast, if rapid processing were 
obtained only or primarily at the expense of reduced payment 
accuracy or other reductions in overall program quality, ques 
tions about such adverse effects would be appropriate.
Inducing State Compliance. In addition to developing and 
implementing performance criteria for UC program quality, the 
issue of effectively inducing state compliance with the criteria 
also arises. One approach would be to periodically release to the 
public the results for any quality indicators utilized, on the 
assumption that public pressure would induce appropriate state 
responses. This apparently is the approach USDOL plans to use 
with respect to the payment error findings by the Quality Control 
program. 54 However, an effective emphasis on quality may well 
require stronger incentives for inducing state compliance with 
whatever performance criteria are developed.
One way to induce state compliance with USDOL perfor 
mance criteria would be to formulate these criteria in terms of 
formal standards established by the Secretary of Labor. States 
found to be out of compliance with such administrative standards 
would confront the possible loss of the administrative funds 
allocated by USDOL to the states. However, because such a 
challenge is a drastic step, it is a response that has been used very
53. U.S. Department of Labor (1984g: Figure 1-5).
54. USDOL established a technical workgroup and an advisory roundtable group to assist in 
the design and implementation of the Quality Control program. Both groups have considered the 
format of a proposed national report on QC program results, but the final design had not been 
announced by April 1987.
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infrequently by USDOL. Moreover, compliance challenges may 
invite expensive legal responses that may take years to resolve. 
For these and other reasons, including the potential strain on the 
"partnership" concept, such challenges do not appear to be the 
most desirable approach for encouraging states to comply with 
performance criteria. Other approaches to link administrative 
funding allocations to various measures of state UC program 
quality would appear to be potentially more useful to achieve 
desired qualitative changes in state programs. 55 More discussion 
and perhaps considerable innovation might be fruitful in terms of 
developing a more flexible set of tools for inducing state 
compliance with an appropriate set of performance criteria.
Conclusions
The potentially adverse impacts of existing USDOL perfor 
mance criteria on payment accuracy are indicated by the analysis 
in this chapter. It seems particularly clear that the strong 
emphasis placed on the prompt processing and payment of 
benefits, in the absence of an offsetting and effective emphasis 
on payment accuracy, very likely has resulted in increased UC 
payment errors. The likelihood of such a result is, of course, 
increased by the existing level of program complexity discussed 
in chapter 3, combined with the relatively limited administrative 
funding and the adverse impacts of USDOL's administrative 
funding procedures discussed in chapter 4. Perhaps the analysis 
in this chapter will serve to clarify the nature of the potentially 
adverse impacts of existing USDOL performance criteria and 
thereby stimulate the further work required to devise an im 
proved set of criteria. It is clear that developing an effective and 
comprehensive set of performance criteria would be a much 
larger undertaking than identifying the deficiencies in the exist-
55. Such an approach also would be consistent with one of the recommendations made by the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation. The Commission made the argument in 
its final report that less drastic sanctions than conformity challenges presumably would be more 
effective in achieving compliance with broad federal guidelines, simply because such sanctions 
would be more frequently utilized than conformity challenges. See National Commission (1980: 
144-48).
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ing performance criteria and providing the general suggestions 
for improvements contained in this chapter. Although such an 
undertaking would be a major one, it could contribute to an 
improved UC system in general and to payment accuracy in 
particular.
Adverse Incentives in 
State UC Programs
Federal impacts on state UC programs were emphasized in the 
prior two chapters. At the state level, it also is the case that 
program participants—claimants, covered employers and state 
UC agency personnel—respond to the incentives provided by 
those who legislate and administer UC law/policy in each state. 
Over a decade ago, in fact, Martin Feldstein drew widespread 
attention to the "adverse incentives" and "distributional anom 
alies" that characterized some aspects of state systems. 1 Since 
that time, a large number of academic papers on the incentive 
effects of the UC program on the behavior of individual UC 
program participants have emerged. Initially, most attention was 
given to the impact of UC support on various dimensions of the 
labor market experiences of UC claimants, including the dura 
tion of unemployment, the frequency of unemployment spells, 
reemployment earnings, job search intensity, and, more re 
cently, the misreporting of job search activity in order to collect 
UC benefits. 2 In recent years, considerable emphasis also has 
been placed on analyzing how the experience rating provisions of 
the UC system impact on the behavior of employers; these 
studies have emphasized how deviations from "perfect" expe 
rience rating have increased the likelihood of temporary layoff
1. Feldstein (1973 and (1974).
2. See, for example Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976); Burgess and Kingston (1976 and 1981); 
Kingston and Burgess (1977); Barren and Mellow (1979); Black and Carr (1980); and St. Louis, 
Burgess and Kingston (1986).
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unemployment and, consequently, the overall rate of unemploy 
ment. 3
The focus of this chapter is on how the incentives confronted 
by state UC program participants relate to the problems of 
payment errors and other quality problems in the UC system. An 
understanding of these incentives should prove useful in formu 
lating effective proposals to reduce overpayments, promote 
horizontal equity and enhance the general quality of state UC 
systems. Many of the adverse incentives analyzed in this chapter 
may have resulted in part from the federal/state interactions 
discussed in the prior two chapters. Nonetheless, the incentives 
provided within state programs are largely shaped by the states 
themselves. In keeping with the overall limitations of the study 
discussed in chapter 1, it should be noted again that the analysis 
in this chapter is a generalization for state UC systems taken as 
a group; particular aspects of the discussion do not necessarily 
apply to particular states. Also, although the focus is on 
incentive problems within individual state systems, effective 
resolution of these problems would be facilitated by appropriate 
support from the federal partner.
The analysis in this chapter fits well within the framework 
developed more than a decade ago by Alchian and Demsetz for 
analyzing behavior within a business firm. 4 They explained that 
incentives to "shirk" on contractual obligations are significantly 
related to the benefits and costs of monitoring compliance with 
such obligations. From the perspective of noncompliance with 
UC eligibility criteria, the Alchian/Demsetz analysis suggests 
that frequent "shirking" in the UC system—as documented by 
high overpayment rates—may be related to the benefits and costs 
of monitoring compliance with the criteria. Hence, the factors 
that influence these benefits and costs are emphasized in the 
following discussion.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. First, 
consideration is given to how state UC program procedures and
3. See Feldstein (1973); Brechling (1979); Backer (1981); Topel and Welch (1980); and 
Topel (1983, 1984 and 1986).
4. Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
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policies impact on the incentives confronted by claimants, 
covered employers and state agency personnel. 5 In each section, 
existing incentives are evaluated and possible responses are 
discussed. A brief conclusion completes the chapter.
UC Claimants
UC benefit claims that are overpaid may be the result of either 
deliberate noncompliance or they may occur by accident. Given 
the complexities of the program and the limited funds available 
for program administration, accidental payment errors might 
occur frequently. In fact, however, there is evidence to suggest 
that deliberate noncompliance with UC eligibility criteria also 
may be a relatively common occurrence. It should be empha 
sized from the outset that such evidence does not imply that UC 
claimants are less honest than labor force participants as a whole. 
Rather, such evidence suggests that UC recipients respond to the 
incentives that they confront in the UC system. In this context, 
the existence of adverse incentives would be expected to encour 
age claimant behavior that, from society's viewpoint, may be 
considered undesirable. In the discussion below, the reasons for 
expecting deliberate noncompliance within the UC system are 
first briefly explained. Thereafter, some possible responses that 
would alter the adverse incentives currently provided to UC 
claimants are considered.
Claimant Incentives for Deliberate Noncompliance
UC claimants may choose to knowingly accept UC benefits to 
which they are not entitled if they estimate that the expected 
monetary benefits of such actions exceed the expected monetary 
costs. 6 The monetary benefits are, of course, determined by the
5. A brief analysis of the incentives confronted by UC program participants is contained in 
a 1983 report prepared for USDOL. See Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983). For a more 
recent discussion, see Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986).
6. Other factors, however, obviously are involved. The time and psychic costs (or benefits) 
of filing for and receiving UC support to which they are not entitled also would be expected to 
influence the behavior of claimants. These additional factors are ignored in the text discussion.
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size of the weekly benefit payment. The expected monetary costs 
of receiving benefits to which they are not entitled depend on 
claimants' perceptions of the extent to which stated program 
eligibility criteria are actually enforced. Many claimants no 
doubt are aware of the complexities that characterize the existing 
UC system and they may correctly perceive the limited extent to 
which stated program requirements are enforced. Given that both 
the time and other costs associated with filing claims for UC 
support generally may be quite low for many claimants (and 
hence are ignored in the discussion which follows), these 
circumstances may explain why ineligible claimants are encour 
aged to file for benefits. In fact, for any given weekly benefit 
payment, the expected net monetary gain associated with delib 
erate action to obtain an overpayment depends on the expected 
cost of such a decision. These costs of receiving UC benefits as 
an ineligible claimant, in turn, are dependent on claimant 
estimates of: (1) the likelihood of noncompliance with UC 
eligibility criteria being detected; (2) the likelihood that an 
overpayment would be established (i.e., formally processed by 
the state UC agency) in instances of detected noncompliance; (3) 
the nominal penalties associated with established overpayments; 
and (4) the extent to which nominal penalties are effectively 
enforced. It appears that these cost factors typically are quite low 
in the UC system.
Likelihood of Detecting Noncompliance. Strong evidence that 
many instances of noncompliance occur but are not detected by 
routine claim processing and benefit payment control procedures 
is available from both the K-B and B-K-S studies. For example, 
as shown in table 2-2 of chapter 2, the rates of overpayments 
detected by the special investigative procedures utilized in six 
metropolitan areas were: at least double the rates detected by 
routine state procedures in all six of the cities; at least four times 
the rates detected by routine procedures in five cities; and 42 
times the rate detected by routine procedures in one city. 7 The 
estimated dollar amount of overpayments uncovered by the 
special procedures used in the B-K-S study for just five states (of
7. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 46).
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$392 million) exceeded by 60 percent the total overpayments 
actually detected/ established/reported by all 53 UC jurisdictions 
combined for a comparable one-year period. 8 In light of the fact 
that these studies tended to produce low-side estimates of actual 
overpayment rates (including the absence of postaudit proce 
dures in the B-K-S study), these findings provide substantive 
documentation that many overpayments are not detected by 
conventional UC program procedures.
Other evidence of deliberate noncompliance has been provided 
by Black and Carr, who analyzed unreported earning violations 
among UC recipients in the Seattle and Denver Income Mainte 
nance Experiments. Although the samples analyzed by Black 
and Carr—claimants from relatively low-income families— 
cannot be viewed as representative of UC claimants generally, 
the findings for unreported earnings support the implications of 
the K-B and B-K-S studies that noncompliance with UC eligi 
bility criteria often is undetected. Black and Carr found that:
The empirical findings for the samples of Seattle and Denver UI 
recipients quite consistently reveal that undetected underreporting 
of earnings and, by implication, overpayments, is a major 
problem. On the average, underreporting over the 3-year period 
occurred in 7.6 and 13.6 percent of the person-weeks in Seattle 
and Denver, respectively. Furthermore, the average weekly dollar 
amounts of underreported earnings are quite large for the subset 
of misreporters. . . . When extrapolated to the statewide claimant 
population, these estimates imply large aggregate amounts of 
overpayments. 9
In addition to the above direct findings on UC overpayments, 
it also should be noted that economic activity "off the books" 
apparently has been increasing over the past decade, and this 
trend may further increase the difficulty of detecting unreported 
earnings in the UC system. For example, one study found that 
the size of the underground economy has been increasing since 
the mid-1960s and estimated that it may have accounted for as
8. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983: 16).
9. Black and Carr (1980: 554).
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much as 6 percent of GNP in 1980. 10 More recently, some 
estimates indicate that the size of the underground economy may 
have nearly tripled between 1975 and 1982, and could have 
amounted to as much as 14 percent of GNP in 1982. n If such 
estimates are at all accurate, it appears that it may become 
increasingly difficult to detect claimants who simultaneously 
work in the underground economy and collect UC benefits.
Violations of the weekly UC eligibility criteria other than 
unreported earnings—especially those for refusals of suitable 
work and inadequate job search—also are very difficult to detect. 
However, because the problems of monitoring compliance with 
the worksearch requirement are considered in more detail in 
chapter 7, the final illustration provided here relates to detecting 
claimant refusals of suitable work. Unless it is the case that very 
few UC claimants in fact refuse suitable work, available evi 
dence strongly suggests that it is virtually impossible to detect 
such violations. For example, notwithstanding the resource- 
intensive nature of the B-K-S study (involving 8-13 hours of 
investigative time for a single week of unemployment), not a 
single overpayment was established for refusal of suitable work 
in that study in any one of the five pilot test states over a one-year 
period. 12 Furthermore, USDOL data on actual nonmonetary 
determinations issued in all 53 UC jurisdictions combined for FY 
1983 indicate that only about 3 percent of all nonmonetary 
determinations for nonseparation issues were for refusals of 
suitable work, and that less than 30 percent of these determina 
tions led to a denial of benefits. 13 In fact, for the nationwide 
system as a whole during FY 1983, only about two per 10,000 of 
all weeks claimed were denied for refusal of suitable work. 14
It is perhaps worth exploring for illustrative purposes some of 
the problems involved in attempting to detect instances of 
suitable work refusals. Although the rationale for this eligibility 
criterion is obvious, several factors interact to reduce the
10. Tanzi (1983: 302).
11. Porter and Bayer (1984: 178-179).
12. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983: 33).
13. U.S. Department of Labor (1984b).
14. Computed from data in U.S. Department of Labor (1984b and 1984c).
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likelihood that such violations can be detected. First, it is 
extremely difficult to determine precisely what constitutes an 
offer of suitable work, as summarized by Felder:
These (eligibility) criteria include the health and safety of the 
worker, the moral hazard of the job; the job requirements as they 
relate to the claimant's educational background, experience, and 
physical fitness to do the work; the wages, hours and length of 
potential employment in that position; the relationship of the 
employment to the customary occupation of the claimant; and the 
distance of the job from the claimant's home. Federal statutes 
forbid any state law's definition of suitable work to include as 
suitable any job that is vacant due to a labor dispute, that has less 
favorable conditions of work than those prevailing in the local 
economy, that requires the joining of a company union, or that 
requires resigning from a bonafide labor organization. 15
Other factors that could impact on the concept of suitable work 
include: how long an individual is unemployed; whether the claimant 
previously had voluntarily left a similar position or had previously 
refused a similar position; the reputation of the business offering the 
work (if it could be shown that the claimant's moral standards could be 
injured); and whether the claimant is satisfactorily pursuing an 
approved training program. 16 As a result, determining whether a 
refusal of suitable work has occurred almost necessarily becomes an ad 
hoc process in which even well-trained UC program personnel might 
render quite different judgments for any given set of facts surrounding 
a particular case.
A second reason why it is so difficult for state UC agencies to 
detect refusals of suitable work is that, in the absence of active 
employer cooperation, there is virtually no way that UC program 
personnel ever would be aware of such violations. It would be 
neither cost effective nor feasible to have UC agency personnel 
routinely contact all employers to determine if suitable job offers 
had been refused. Also, it oftentimes is the case that an
15. Felder (1979: 12).
16. Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: Section 533330).
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individual employer would not find it worthwhile to report such 
an occurrence.
A third reason why so few refusals of suitable work are 
detected is that UC claimants can, by their own behavior, avoid 
job offers they do not wish to accept. How claimants respond 
during personal interviews and how well they perform on any 
on-site tests that might be conducted both could impact on the 
likelihood that job offers would be extended. Thus, it would be 
quite easy for a claimant who would not accept an offer of 
suitable employment to avoid receiving such a job offer.
The above discussion indicates that many violations of UC 
eligibility criteria may not be detected, especially by the routine 
procedures typically employed by state agencies for benefit 
payment control purposes. Because of these relatively low 
detection likelihoods for selected types of noncompliance, many 
claimants might be encouraged to obtain UC benefits to which 
they are not entitled. In any case, relatively low detection 
likelihoods certainly do not effectively discourage deliberate 
noncompliance with eligibility criteria.
Likelihood of Establishing Overpayments. Detected instances 
of noncompliance with UC eligibility criteria often do not result 
in the establishment of overpayments. Several examples serve to 
illustrate this point. In the K-B study, there was substantial 
resistance by UC agency officials in one project city to "retro 
actively" establish overpayments for certain violations of the 
weekly eligibility criteria. 17 In three of the five B-K-S study 
states, overpayments for violations of the active worksearch 
requirement could not be established (either for the entire study 
period or for a portion of it) unless the claimant had previously 
received a written warning that his/her job-seeking activities 
were deficient. 18 Also, the existence of certain "finality rules" 
in state employment security laws or policies often prohibit, after 
the expiration of some definite period, the establishment of an 
overpayment for an issue that has been considered previously, 
even if it subsequently were determined that the original decision
17. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 35-36).
18. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983: 25).
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was erroneous. 19 As a final example, it may be noted that, 
despite the intensive efforts to verify job search contacts in the 
B-K-S study states, nearly half or more of all job contacts 
reported by UC claimants could not be verified as either 
acceptable or unacceptable contacts in three of the five states; 
nevertheless, no overpayments were established for this lack of 
verifiable job contacts alone in any of these states. 20
The example of unverifiable job contacts merits additional 
comment because it illustrates the basic "burden of proof" 
presumption that characterizes many state programs. The basic 
issue involved is whether the "burden of proof" rests with the 
UC claimant (to demonstrate eligibility) or the state UC agency 
(to demonstrate ineligibility). At the time claims are filed and 
prior to the payment of benefits for particular weeks, the burden 
of proof typically is shared, with perhaps a somewhat greater 
responsibility placed on claimants to provide whatever informa 
tion is routinely requested for the processing of continued 
claims. Once the decision has been made to pay benefits for a 
particular week, however, this burden of proof shifts markedly 
towards the UC agency in most states. That is, establishing an 
overpayment for a previous payment (or disallowing a previous 
payment) typically requires that the state UC agency convinc 
ingly demonstrate that an error has been made. In the event that 
such compelling and substantive evidence cannot be obtained, an 
overpayment typically would not be established or, if estab 
lished, likely would be reversed on appeal. Because of the 
difficulties involved in obtaining the documentation required to 
satisfy this burden of proof, especially for suspected violations of 
the weekly eligibility criteria (e.g., refusals of suitable work, 
worksearch violations, etc.), state UC program personnel are not 
likely to establish many actual overpayments.
Nominal Overpayment Penalties. The nominal penalties asso-
19. Typically, in order for an overpayment to be established in such circumstances, 
compelling new evidence not originally considered must be found. See Burgess, Kingston and St. 
Louis (1982: 23).
20. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1983: 28-29). Also see chapter 7 and Kingston, 
Burgess and St. Louis (1986) for further analysis of worksearch verification difficulties and for 
estimated "worksearch noncompliance" rates for the five B-K-S study states.
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elated with overpayments established for most types of noncom- 
pliance with UC eligibility criteria tend to be quite low. This is 
the case primarily because, at least in most UC jurisdictions, the 
great majority of detected violations are established as nonfraud 
overpayments. 21 During FY 1984, about 75 percent of all 
overpayment cases established nationwide were processed as 
nonfraud overpayments. 22 These circumstances result from the 
fact that most state employment security laws require that 
"willful intent" must be proven before a fraud overpayment is 
established or upheld on appeal. Given the difficulties involved 
in ex-post efforts to verify a claimant's eligibility for UC 
support, including the "burden of proof" issue noted above, it 
becomes extremely difficult in most instances to prove such 
intent on the part of the claimant.
In contrast with fraudulent overpayment penalties, which may 
even include fines and imprisonment, the typical (nominal) 
penalty imposed for a nonfraud overpayment is the repayment of 
the benefits erroneously received by the claimant. Consequently, 
assuming fraud may be ignored, an ineligible claimant who was 
evaluating the expected benefits and costs of receiving a UC 
payment would compare the virtual certainty of receiving the 
weekly UC payment with the less certain prospect that the 
payment would have to be refunded to the state UC agency; 
under these circumstances and on purely monetary grounds, the 
claimant probably would be willing to risk having to repay the 
UC benefits and would accept monies to which s/he was not 
entitled.
Enforcement of Nominal Penalties. Effective penalties for 
violations of UC eligibility criteria typically are considerably 
smaller than the nominal penalties imposed for such violations. 
For example, cash repayment is not required for overpayments 
established in some states; rather, the overpayments are "offset"
21. See Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 34) and Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 53). 
The State of Louisiana represents at least one exception to this generalization, however. In the 
B-K-S study, 37 percent of the dollars overpaid in Louisiana were set up as fraud overpayments. 
In contrast, the simple average of the percentages of dollars overpaid that were established as 
fraud cases in the other four states amounted to only 10.5 percent. See Burgess, Kingston and St. 
Louis (1982: 53).
22. U.S. Department of Labor (1985f: 3).
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against the benefits that the claimant otherwise would receive 
during a subsequent claim period. Some states limit the percent 
age of presently due benefits that may be utilized as an offset for 
the repayment of prior overpayments. Some states "waive" the 
repayment of outstanding overpayment balances after a certain 
period of time. Also, some states do not charge interest on 
outstanding overpayments, so that an implicit subsidy is pro 
vided to overpayment recipients even if repayment ultimately 
occurs. In fact, however, repayment oftentimes does not occur. 
An Assistant Inspector General for Audit in USDOL reported in 
1983 that:
In summary, SESAs [state employment security agencies] are 
neither effectively nor efficiently detecting and collecting benefit 
overpayments. Because of the size of the UI benefit payment 
program—more than 15 billion in calendar year 1981—and the 
program's susceptibility to both fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
overpayments, changes in laws, procedures and practices must be 
made immediately. 23
For many years, effective enforcement of nominal penalties 
also was limited because federal law prohibited the "offsetting" 
of benefits paid under most federal programs to repay amounts 
overpaid under state programs. This federal restriction was not 
removed until 1986. 24 Consequently, only very recently have the 
states had the opportunity to obtain repayment for overpayments 
in state programs through offsets of benefits paid under federal 
programs.
Other evidence also indicates that overpayment recoupment 
rates are quite low. For example, the results of the FY 1982 
Quality Appraisal indicated that only 22 state UC agencies met 
the desired level of achievement of recouping at least 55 percent
23. Peterson (1983: 1).
24. For a discussion of this issue from the perspective of the Oregon UC agency, see Richey 
(1985). Section 12401 of Public Law 99-272 signed into law April 7, 1986 amended Section 
303(a)(5) of the Social Security Act and Sections 3304 (a)(4) and 3306(f) of the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act to permit states to recover overpayments made under any federal or state 
UC law through cross program and interstate offset from any unemployment benefits payable to 
the overpaid individual.
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of overpayments subject to recovery. 25 For all UC jurisdictions 
combined, overpayment recoveries during FY 1982 amounted to 
about 53 percent of all overpayments subject to recovery during 
that year. 26 Similar information was not released by USDOL for 
FY 1983, but the comparable overpayment recovery percentage 
for FY 1984 for the UC system as a whole was 55.6 percent. 27
Even if overpayments were detected, established and re 
couped, however, it also should be noted that many states 
"restore" the amounts overpaid to claimants' maximum benefit 
awards. This tends to further reduce the severity of nominal 
penalties imposed, since the same funds originally overpaid may 
be paid again to the claimant at a later point in his/her benefit 
year. The impact of restoring overpaid amounts in this manner 
would be greatest, of course, for those who exhaust their 
entitlements to benefits; for these individuals, the establishment 
and even recoupment of an overpayment simply would delay the 
second payment of the same benefits during the benefit year.
Conclusions. Most types of deliberate noncompliance with UC 
eligibility criteria—especially those in which fraud cannot be 
established—are only weakly discouraged in the existing UC 
program. Available evidence indicates that detection likelihoods 
for deliberate noncompliance are low and that even a detected 
instance of noncompliance often may not be established as an 
overpayment because of the difficulties involved in assembling 
the required compelling evidence and documentation. Further 
more, nominal penalties for established overpayments tend to be 
quite small and the ineffective application of nominal penalties 
further reduces their deterrent effect.
Not all UC overpayments occur because of deliberate calcu 
lations by claimants, however. Some claimants receive benefits 
to which they are not entitled simply because they are not aware 
of certain eligibility rules or because they incorrectly interpret 
those rules they do know. The complexity of UC eligibility 
criteria contributes to each of these problems. It should be noted,
25. U.S. Department of Labor (1982b: 26).
26. U.S. Department of Labor (1982a: 3).
27. U.S. Department of Labor (1985f: 3).
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however, that claimants also lack appropriate incentives to 
become knowledgeable about UC eligibility rules.
Responses to Encourage Claimant Compliance
Claimant compliance with UC eligibility criteria could be 
increased by either reducing the expected benefits or increasing 
the expected costs associated with the receipt of an overpayment. 
The expected benefits of noncompliance are determined primar 
ily by the size of the weekly benefit amount. Although it would 
be possible to lower these benefits by reducing the amount of 
weekly UC program support, such an approach would lower the 
weekly benefit amount for eligible as well as ineligible claim 
ants. 28 Consequently, it would seem most appropriate to increase 
claimant compliance with UC eligibility criteria by raising the 
expected costs to claimants of accepting UC benefits to which 
they are not entitled. The approaches for increasing such costs, 
discussed below, include: (1) making claimants more aware of 
eligibility criteria and enforcement provisions; (2) increasing 
noncompliance detection likelihoods; (3) increasing the rate at 
which overpayments are established for instances of detected 
noncompliance; (4) increasing nominal penalties for established 
overpayments; and (5) more effectively applying any nominal 
penalties assessed.
Increasing Claimant Awareness. Some overpayments no doubt 
occur simply because claimants do not fully understand UC 
eligibility criteria and what must be done to satisfy these 
requirements. Thus, it would seem appropriate to more com 
pletely inform claimants about UC eligibility criteria, what 
actions are required to demonstrate compliance with these
28. The incentive effects of supplementing the weekly benefit amount with cash bonuses for 
reemployment have been emphasized in a recent paper by Spiegelman and Woodbury. This 
research is relevant in the present context because it provides an additional illustration of how the 
behavior of UC claimants may be influenced by changing the benefits associated with certain 
aspects of their labor market behavior. See Spiegelman and Woodbury (1986). Even more 
recently, the U.S. Department of Labor and the New Jersey Department of Labor approved the 
experimental design for the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration 
Project. Among other features, this design provides for the payment of reemployment bonuses for 
structurally unemployed workers. For details, see U.S. Department of Labor (1986a). This 
experiment also is further discussed in chapter 7.
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requirements, and the penalties for noncompliance with these 
criteria. Providing additional information about claimant respon 
sibilities presumably would tend to reduce overpayments that do 
not result from deliberate claimant actions, whereas providing 
more information about existing penalties for noncompliance 
might increase claimant perceptions of the expected costs of 
deliberate noncompliance. Moreover, if increased (nominal) 
noncompliance penalties and more effective application of such 
penalties were implemented, it would be especially important 
that claimants understand UC eligibility criteria and the associ 
ated penalties for noncompliance.
Increasing Noncompliance Detection Likelihoods. The typical 
approach to monitoring claimant compliance with UC eligibility 
criteria in most state programs is to treat nearly all claimants 
identically. Most claimants pass through a relatively superficial 
verification process before benefits are paid to them. As a result, 
most claimants with experience in the UC system undoubtedly 
perceive that the likelihood of detecting any overpayment they 
might receive is very low.
Possibilities for increasing noncompliance detection likeli 
hoods could include any or all of the following: (1) an increase in 
the administrative funds available for monitoring claimant com 
pliance with UC eligibility criteria; (2) implementing more 
specific criteria that may be more easily or effectively monitored 
with existing administrative resources; (3) eliminating some 
eligibility criteria that cannot be effectively administered with 
either presently available or even increased administrative fund 
ing, so that increased monitoring could be directed at enforcing 
compliance with the remaining criteria; or (4) reallocating any 
given level of administrative resources to more effectively detect 
overpayments that do occur.
As discussed in chapter 4, significant increases in administra 
tive funding for monitoring claimant compliance with UC 
eligibility criteria (option (1) above) are not likely. Possibilities 
(2) and (3) are not discussed further in this chapter because they 
are discussed in more detail in chapter 7 as those options relate 
to the active worksearch requirement. Consequently, the discus 
sion below focuses on the more effective use of existing
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administrative resources and specifically on the use of comput 
erized screening profiles to more effectively detect overpayments 
that occur (option (4)).
Currently, most state UC agencies attempt to verify eligibility 
for nearly all claimants in a virtually uniform manner before 
payments are made, and postaudits constitute the primary over 
payment detection device for payments already made. Under a 
revised approach, discussed in more detail elsewhere,29 most 
claims would be processed routinely each week without any 
attempts at even superficial verification (as long as claimants 
certified that they had met the eligibility requirements). Then, a 
relatively small group of "high-risk" claimants, who would be 
selected on the basis of computerized screening profiles, would 
be given in-depth benefit eligibility reviews to determine if 
overpayments had occurred. The intended effect of this ap 
proach—combined with sufficient publicity—would be to con 
vince the claimant population as a whole that there was some 
reasonable chance that any overpayment they might receive 
would be detected by these intensive audits. As a result, more 
claimant self-compliance with UC eligibility criteria could be 
encouraged.
An important issue in determining the feasibility of this 
approach is whether the limited administrative resources devoted 
to this effort could be effectively targeted on groups of claimants 
who tend to have above-average overpayment rates. Although 
very little work has been done along these lines, the available 
evidence suggests that it may be possible to identify groups with 
higher than average overpayment propensities on the basis of 
personal, labor market and UC program characteristics. Burgess, 
Kingston, St. Louis and De Pippo explored the feasibility of 
developing "high-risk" profiles for violations of worksearch/
29. See Kingston and Burgess (1986) and St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986). The 
computerized screening profiles relate to identifying violations of the weekly eligibility criteria 
other than those due to unreported earnings by those who also are receiving UC support. This 
approach is taken because effective techniques for detecting overpayments due to unreported 
earnings in covered employment already exist (if states choose to utilize them), and those 
techniques previously have been analyzed by Porterfield, St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston 
(1980).
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availability requirements in the five Random Audit program pilot 
test states, and concluded that:
The results presented in the Summary Table strongly indicate that 
the prediction profiles developed in this study are more accurate 
in identifying "high risk" claimants than a random selection of 
claimants. . . . The results, however, must be cautiously 
interpreted since the same data were used to build and test the 
models. . . . Hence, although the results indicate potential, further 
work is required before any state should attempt to implement 
such a procedure in an operational setting. 30
Although the conclusions were cautiously stated, the findings in this 
study and the further analysis of the same data set by Kingston and 
Burgess have clearly established the potential usefulness of conducting 
further work on the screening profile approach. 31 Furthermore, a 
subsequent analysis of data for the same five states by St. Louis, 
Burgess and Kingston indicated that the propensity of UC claimants to 
over-report the number of job contacts they made was strongly related 
to a number of labor market and demographic variables, including the 
size of the weekly UC benefit payment, usual weekly earnings in the 
preunemployment period, union status, sex, age and the duration of the 
current unemployment spell. 32 In short, it may be feasible to design 
effective screening profiles to detect UC claimants who have above- 
average likelihoods of receiving worksearch/availability overpay 
ments. Whether or to what extent similar profiles could be developed 
to detect deliberate noncompliance with other aspects of UC eligibility 
criteria remains an open question, but further research in this area 
certainly appears to be warranted.
Development of statistical profiles essentially involves the use of 
group characteristics to select individual claimants for comprehensive 
audits. Such a procedure is, in a technical sense, a "discriminating" 
one because personal, labor market and UC-related characteristics are 
used to estimate the probabilities that overpayments have been 
received by particular individuals. A fundamental question to be
30. Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and DePippo (1983: vii).
31. Kingston and Burgess (1986).
32. St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986: 109).
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addressed is whether the development of high-risk profiles from the 
analysis of randomly selected samples of claimants would unfairly 
discriminate against certain groups of claimants. 33 A random selection 
of claimants may well result in the conclusion that variables such as 
sex, age or ethnic status would be important ones in identifying 
high-risk claimants. Consequently, the political/legal feasibility of 
using screening profiles in the operational UC system obviously must 
be evaluated before a major effort is undertaken to explore the 
technical feasibility of developing such profiles.
An argument for the development of high-risk screening 
profiles—regardless of the particular characteristics that might 
be important in identifying high-risk claimants—is that the UC 
program would unfairly discriminate against those claimants 
who do not accept overpayments if existing administrative 
resources could be, but were not, targeted on those who have the 
highest propensities to be overpaid. Also, because it would be 
necessary to periodically update such screening profiles to 
account for changes in the characteristics of high-risk v. low-risk 
claimants through time, adaptive behavior by particular types of 
claimant groups originally found to have above-average over 
payment propensities could subsequently remove them from the 
high-risk target groups identified by such screening profiles. 
Overall, it probably is the case that the efficient allocation of any 
given amount of administrative funds would be enhanced through 
the use of screening profile techniques.
Establishing Overpayments for Detected Noncompliance. A 
complementary approach to increasing the likelihood of detect 
ing noncompliance would involve increasing the chances that 
detected instances of noncompliance result in the establishment
33. The development of accurate screening profiles requires data sets that accurately classify 
claimants as overpaid v. properly paid. Routine operational data in the UC system do not contain 
accurate classifications of claimants into these two groups because many claimants with 
overpayments are not detected in the routine system. The only data sets available (prior to those 
that will result from the Quality Control program) that are reasonably accurate in classifying 
claimants into these two groups are the Random Audit program data sets that have been classified 
on the basis of intensive eligibility verifications. Because these data sets represent random 
samples of payments made in each participating state, utilizing them would result in the 
development of high-risk profiles on the basis of a random selection of claimants. For a 
discussion of this issue, see Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and DePippo (1983: 7-8) and Kingston 
and Burgess (1986).
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of overpayments. State UC agencies could, of course, review 
their employment security laws and policies to identify those 
provisions that limit the establishment of overpayments in 
instances of detected noncompliance (e.g., formal warning 
requirements). Whether specific changes should be made obvi 
ously is a subjective decision that would depend on the perceived 
benefits and costs of such changes in particular states. For the 
most part, these decisions presumably are best left to individual 
state policymakers and administrators who are most knowledge 
able about both the intended and actual consequences of such 
provisions in their states.
Attempts to increase the likelihood of establishing overpay 
ments for detected instances of noncompliance also will confront 
the "burden of proof" issue discussed previously. For several 
reasons, this issue must be approached both cautiously and 
realistically. Caution is warranted because of possible unin 
tended and undesirable side effects that could result from 
fundamental changes in current requirements. Placing the burden 
of proof on the claimant to demonstrate his/her eligibility could, 
at some point, involve undue hardships for and horizontal 
inequities among claimants, in addition to costly reporting 
requirements for employers to provide the types of documenta 
tion needed by claimants. Issues related to the type of documen 
tation required, the length of time that such evidence would have 
to be retained, and similar matters would have to be resolved if 
claimants were to bear significantly increased responsibilities in 
this regard. Care must be taken that, because of varying 
circumstances among claimants, inequities do not arise as a 
result of imposing uniform reporting or record-keeping require 
ments.
Realistic expectations of what might be gained by altering the 
burden of proof also are required. For example, it would be 
impossible for a claimant to provide evidence (beyond a certifi 
cation) that he/she did not participate in certain types of 
disqualifying behavior (e.g., a refusal of suitable work or the 
receipt of disqualifying earnings). If changes were made to 
increase the claimant's responsibility for demonstrating eligibil 
ity for UC program support, such measures should be carefully
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developed and most probably should be carefully pilot-tested to 
determine whether they should be operationally implemented. 
Furthermore, it should be recognized that, in the absence of other 
changes (e.g., the simplification or removal of certain eligibility 
criteria), the benefits of altering the burden of proof might not 
exceed the costs, given the possible problems that such actions 
could impose on all system participants. 34
Despite the above cautions, placing the burden of proof more 
on individual claimants and less on state agencies still appears to 
merit serious consideration. The main benefits of increasing the 
burden of proof for individual claimants include both increased 
self-compliance and increased effectiveness of state UC agency 
efforts to monitor and verify claimant eligibility. To the extent to 
which claimants were expected to assume greater responsibility 
for documenting their eligibility for UC support, administering 
compliance with stated UC eligibility criteria would be similar to 
the procedures utilized by the Internal Revenue Service in 
processing and auditing individual tax returns. For example, the 
receipt by the IRS of a tax return does not constitute acceptance 
by the IRS of the contents of that return; the individual taxpayer 
still remains subject to audit, and the burden of proof remains 
squarely on the taxpayer to provide appropriate documentation, 
if required. Similarly, under a revised approach in the UC 
system, timely payments could be made on the basis of only a 
cursory review of certification forms, but the payment of benefits 
would not preclude more comprehensive audits of benefit eligi 
bility at later dates. At any such subsequent review, the main 
burden of proof could be placed on claimants.
Some recent events have indicated that some changes may be 
forthcoming with respect to the burden of proof issue. For 
example, the Michigan Employment Security Act of 1984 
requires, among other things, that a claimant must provide 
"tangible evidence to the commission that he or she has engaged 
in a systematic and sustained worksearch effort during that 
week." 35 Similarly, an administrative law judge in the District
34. For a more complete discussion of the problems associated with this "burden of proof" 
issue, see Broden (1962: 311-324).
35. State of Michigan (1984: 69).
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of Columbia recently recommended that the District be found out 
of conformity with federal law because its appeal procedures— 
specifically the presumption of eligibility for claimants charged 
with disqualifying misconduct—failed to protect the financial 
integrity of the District's UC trust fund; the judge argued that 
state laws must not only insure the payment of UC benefits 
"when due," but also must prevent the payment of benefits 
when they are not due. 36 These developments suggest that 
shifting the burden of eligibility proof to claimants may be a 
viable possibility for increasing claimant compliance with UC 
eligibility criteria.
Increasing Nominal Penalties. Another facet of increasing the 
expected costs to claimants of receiving overpayments would 
involve increasing nominal overpayment penalties. Nominal 
penalties for violations that now carry no penalty—other than the 
repayment of the benefits to which the claimant was not 
originally entitled—could be increased in a number of different 
ways which (depending on the type of violation) could include: 
(1) imposing either definite or indefinite disqualification periods 
(which already are imposed for certain types of violations); (2) 
reducing claimant maximum benefit awards by the amount (or 
some multiple) of any overpayment established;37 (3) imposing 
monetary penalties in addition to requiring repayment of over 
paid amounts; and (4) assessing interest charges on outstanding 
overpayment balances. However, a possible problem that may 
arise in attempting to impose stricter nominal penalties should be 
noted. State agency personnel exercise considerable administra 
tive discretion in establishing the overpayments that result in the 
imposition of whatever nominal penalties may be contained in 
state laws/policies. One study of UC eligibility enforcement 
procedures concluded that increased nominal penalties may lead 
some agency personnel to ignore some violations that they detect 
because they believe the penalties for such violations are
36. Commerce Clearing House (1985: 4).
37. In this regard, however, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 
recommended that state laws be prohibited from reducing a claimant's entitlement to benefits, 
except in the case of fraud in the receipt of disqualifying income. See National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation (1980: 48).
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unreasonably severe. 38 Thus, as also would be the case with 
many other changes that might be made, the potential for 
unintended side effects must be considered and accounted for in 
evaluating how to effectively increase nominal penalties for 
established overpayments.
Effective Application of Nominal Penalties. For any given set 
of nominal penalties, increasing their effective application also 
would increase claimant self-compliance because of the 
resulting increase in the costs of noncompliance. Although some 
states already may have considered or adopted such measures, 
some possibilities that may merit consideration in many states 
could include: (1) removing legal or administrative provisions 
that allow for only a portion of a current benefit payment to be 
offset against prior overpayments; (2) not waiving outstanding 
overpayment balances; (3) fully computerizing the overpayment 
accounting and collection process; (4) adopting more effective 
collection techniques, such as the collection of outstanding 
balances through the state income tax collection process, 
telephone inquiries or by turning difficult recoupment cases over 
to private firms that specialize in such collections;39 and 
(5) simply increasing administrative resources devoted to 
overpayment recovery efforts (within the limits justified by 
resulting benefit/cost ratios). The appropriateness of these (or 
other) changes obviously varies among the states, but they are 
suggestive of the types of changes that may merit 
consideration.
Covered Employers
One characteristic of the UC program in the United States that 
distinguishes it from similar programs in other countries is the
38. As explained by Corson et al., increased nominal penalties may have two quite different 
effects: (1) claimant self-compliance may increase because claimants may be less willing to 
accept overpayments due to increased penalties, but (2) state UC agency personnel—who 
exercise considerable administrative discretion—may become less willing to hold claimants 
ineligible for benefits because of the increased penalties. See Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky 
(1986: 127-128).
39. As noted in chapter 3, for example, three of the states that participated in the Quality 
Unemployment Insurance Project (Illinois, North Dakota and Pennsylvania) during 1985-1986 
have determined how to improve their overpayment collection activities.
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manner in which benefit payments are financed. In this section, 
some background on the purposes and extent of the experience 
rating method of financing the UC program in the United States 
is first provided. Then, the effects of these financing provisions 
on the incentives of covered employers to monitor both claimant 
compliance with eligibility criteria and the general efficiency of 
UC program operations are discussed. Finally, the impact of 
improved experience rating on such incentives is briefly consid 
ered.
Experience Rating Background
Many other countries obtain funds to pay UC benefits from 
employers, employees and from general government revenues. 
Typically, other countries also tax employers at a uniform rate. 40 
In contrast, the UC system in the United States is financed by 
taxes levied only on employers in almost all states,41 and tax 
rates are supposed to vary according to the individual employer's 
"experience" with unemployment. This is usually accomplished 
by assessing higher tax rates on firms whose employees experi 
ence a considerable amount of insured unemployment than on 
firms that rarely lay off their employees.
Experience rated UC tax rates are intended to stabilize 
employment by forcing employers faced with declining or 
variable sales to weigh the UC tax costs of laying off current 
employees against the wage (and other) costs of smoothing their 
employment level fluctuations. "Perfect" experience rating 
would cause all of a firm's UC benefit costs to be reflected in its 
tax rate so that the costs of laying off workers would be paid by 
the individual firms responsible for the layoffs. Consequently, in 
addition to its impact on layoff decisions made by firms, 
effective experience rating of UC taxes also provides incentives 
for covered employers to participate in the administration of the
40. See Blaustein and Craig (1977) for an excellent comparison of the features of UC systems 
in the United States and 21 other countries.
41. As of January 1985, both employers and employees contributed to finance the payment 
of UC benefits in Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. See National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation & Workers' Compensation (1985b: 29).
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UC program to control the amount of benefits paid to former 
employees.
Effective experience rating was strongly encouraged by the 
original federal interpretation of one of the major provisions of 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act; this provision stipulated 
that a state could not give employers reduced tax rates except on 
the basis of their individual "experiences" with unemployment 
or other factors related to the risk of unemployment. 42 This 
provision originally was interpreted by federal officials to imply 
that all benefits paid to former employees must be charged to 
individual employer reserve accounts. In 1944, however, this 
interpretation was altered by federal officials so that states were 
required to charge only those benefits that assured a tax structure 
reflecting a "reasonable measure" of the experience of individ 
ual employers with respect to unemployment risk. 43 This revised 
1944 position was partly justified on the basis that individual 
employers should not be held liable for the continued unemploy 
ment of claimants following a period of disqualification from UC 
support due to voluntary quits or other factors deemed to be 
outside the control of employers. Also, since labor market 
conditions (rather than individual employers) were deemed 
responsible for extended periods of unemployment, it was 
believed that some deviations from "full" experience rating 
should be permitted.
Even though only one UC jurisdiction currently does not use 
some form of experience rating, the extent of experience rating 
varies dramatically among jurisdictions. 44 Existing research 
indicates that deviations from "perfect" experience rating occur 
primarily because of two features of UC program financing: the 
noncharging of benefits and the ineffective charging of bene 
fits. 45 Noncharging occurs when the cost of the benefits paid to 
a former employee of a given firm are not charged to that
42. UBA, Inc. (1981: 1).
43. UBA, Inc. (1981: 2).
44. Only Puerto Rico had no experience rating in its law as of January 1986. See National 
Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers' Compensation (1987: 13-14).
45. See Becker (1981: 79-86) and U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General 
(1985d).
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particular employer's reserve account, but rather are "social 
ized" and charged to all employers. All state laws permit some 
noncharging, particularly in those instances in which it is 
considered inappropriate to hold the individual employer respon 
sible for a worker's unemployment, but the details of these 
provisions vary considerably among the states. The most fre 
quent noncharging provisions are for benefits paid following a 
period of disqualification for voluntary quits, discharges for 
misconduct or refusals of suitable work. 46 Noncharged benefits 
represent a significant percentage of UC benefits paid in many 
states. For example, according to a study undertaken by Joseph 
Becker, noncharged benefits in 1978 amounted to at least 10 
percent of UC benefit payments in 32 states, at least 20 percent 
of benefit payments in 21 states and at least 25 percent of benefit 
payments in 13 states. 47
The second major deviation from "perfect" experience rat 
ing—ineffective charging—occurs when benefits are charged to 
the reserve accounts of employers whose UC tax rates already 
have reached the maximum rates established by law because 
their reserve accounts have been exhausted by prior benefit 
charges. In such cases, charging additional benefits to employer 
accounts neither draws on reserves accumulated from past tax 
collections nor increases such employers' tax rates. Experience 
rating becomes essentially irrelevant to such employers, at least 
if it also is the case that no reasonable attempts to reduce 
(expected) future benefit charges would result in expected 
reductions in tax rates. Becker has argued that the ineffective 
charging of benefits is, for most states, the most important factor 
in explaining the reduction in experience rating that has occurred 
in the UC program. 48 A more recent study by Becker indicates 
that the percentage of total benefits ineffectively charged ex 
ceeded 20 percent in many states between 1971 and 1978. 49
Additional information on the extent of experience rating in
46. National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers' Compensation 
(1985b: 23-24).
47. Becker (1981: 81).
48. Becker (1972: 109).
49. Becker (1981: 85).
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the UC program recently has become available from a study 
conducted by USDOL's Office of the Inspector General. 50 The 
study was conducted in 12 states, which jointly paid about 35 
percent of total UC benefits for the nation as a whole in 1983. 
Among the findings of this study were the following: (1) the 
percentage of benefits charged to active employers with positive 
reserve balances fell from 51 percent in 1970 to 36 percent in 
1983; (2) nearly one-half of the $6.3 billion in benefits that were 
paid in 1983 represented "socialized" costs that were not 
charged to individual employers; (3) the degree of effective 
charges ranged from a low of 35 percent to a high of 75 percent 
among the 12 states studied; and (4) on the average, the UC 
systems in these 12 states were about 50 percent experience 
rated. 51 Among the principal causes of the low (and declining) 
extent of experience rating in these states, the following were 
identified: (1) low maximum tax rates, which accounted for about 
39 percent of socialized costs; (2) noncharging, which accounted 
for about 17 percent of socialized costs; (3) writing off past 
benefit charges from the benefit payment histories used to set 
employer tax rates; (4) utilizing alternative tax schedules, which 
often assign the largest tax increases to employers with the most 
favorable employment histories; and (5) using fixed taxable 
wage bases that do not increase as benefit levels increase. 52
The effects of less than "perfect" experience rating have 
received a great deal of attention from economists in recent 
years. For example, a study by Brechling revealed that industrial 
layoff rates among the states during the 1962-1977 period were 
significantly correlated with minimum and maximum UC tax 
rates. 53 More recently, Topel estimated that the typical experi 
ence rated employer pays only about 75 cents per dollar of UC 
benefits drawn by that employer's former workers and that a 
one-third reduction in the extent of this implicit employer 
cross-subsidy would reduce the layoff unemployment rate in the
50. U.S. Department of Labor, (1985d).
51. U.S. Department of Labor, (1985d: iii.).
52. U.S. Department of Labor, (1985d: v-vi.).
53. See Brechling (1979) and Wandner and Crosslin (1980: 274).
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sample he analyzed by a "nontrivial" amount. 54 These studies 
illustrate the basic point that most of the recent academic 
attention given to experience rating in the UC system has 
emphasized its effects on temporary layoff unemployment. The 
particular interest in experience rating within the context of the 
present study, however, is in terms of its implications for 
employer monitoring of both UC agency administrative efficien 
cies and the compliance of former employees with UC eligibility 
criteria.
Experience Rating and Employer Monitoring Incentives
In considering experience rating and employer incentives, it is 
useful to distinguish between what might be referred to as 
"macro" and "micro" employer interests in the UC system. 
From a macro viewpoint, employers as a group have strong 
incentives to seek relatively strict eligibility criteria for claimants 
as a whole in order to constrain UC benefit payments. For similar 
reasons, employers as a group have strong interests in encour 
aging effective UC agency administrative operations in order to 
minimize administrative costs for any level of service. In effect, 
employers have a strong interest in advocating measures that 
minimize UC program costs because of the expected UC tax 
savings that may result. Thus, one would expect to find strong 
lobbying efforts by employers at both the federal and state levels 
to attempt to constrain UC program costs. Such activities also 
probably occur to some extent as a defensive device to check the 
activities of organized labor or other groups that may seek to 
expand program coverage and the amount or duration of program 
benefits. Similarly, it would be expected that employers would 
actively participate in advisory groups that stress administrative 
efficiencies in both USDOL and state UC agency operations. It 
should be noted, however, that the incentives for employers, as 
a group, to engage in the above types of activities arise because
54. Topel (1984: 88). More recently, Topel has concluded that in a typical year as much as 
20 percent of unemployment among covered workers can be attributed to the operation of the UC 
program. See Topel (1986: 28).
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UC taxes are levied on employers as a whole, regardless of the 
experience rating of individual employers. 55
The motivation of individual employers to engage in micro 
monitoring to control charges to their individual reserve accounts 
are quite different from the macro monitoring incentives dis 
cussed above. In particular, micro monitoring incentives for 
employers vary directly with the extent to which employer tax 
rates are effectively experience rated and inversely with the costs 
incurred by firms in monitoring the compliance of their former 
employees with UC eligibility criteria. As a result, it is likely 
that the trend towards reduced experience rating in the UC 
program has contributed to an overall weakening of employer 
incentives to engage in micro monitoring activities. Evidence 
available from the recent study undertaken by USDOL's Office 
of Inspector General supports this view. The frequency with 
which employers filed appeals (and hence participated in the 
enforcement of UC eligibility criteria) was found to be greater 
for those whose tax rates could increase with a rise in benefit 
charges, compared with employers whose tax rates were already 
at the maximum rate. 56
Even in a world of "perfect" experience rating, individual 
employer incentives for monitoring many types of issues might 
be extremely limited because of either low payoffs or high costs. 
For example, an employer would have no direct financial 
incentive to report a refusal of suitable work if the person 
involved was not a former employee who was collecting UC 
benefits that would be charged to the employer's reserve ac 
count. Similarly, an employer probably would not find it cost 
effective to monitor and evaluate the job search activities of 
former employees because of the high costs involved; recall, for 
example, that several hours per case were devoted to attempting 
to verify job search contacts reported by claimants for a single 
week of unemployment in the K-B and B-K-S studies, often with 
inconclusive results. In fact, most employers would have little
55. This assumes that employers are unable to fully shift UC taxes either forward to 
consumers in the form of higher prices or backward to workers in the form of lower wages. For 
analysis of this issue, see McLure, Jr. (1977).
56. U.S. Department of Labor, (1985d: iv.).
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direct and continuing contact with their former employees that 
would allow them to determine if such employees continued to 
meet all UC eligibility criteria throughout their compensated 
unemployment spells. 57
Even though improved (or even perfect) experience rating 
probably would have only a modest impact on employer incen 
tives to monitor claimant compliance with eligibility criteria, the 
extent of experience rating in the UC program is an important 
matter. In fact, the extent of experience rating has an important 
impact on employer layoff decisions and consequently on the 
temporary layoff rate of unemployment. Hence, the trend to 
wards a decline in experience rating in the UC system continues 
to merit careful study and appropriate policy action.
The basic conclusion of this section is that employer partici 
pation in the UC system is likely to focus primarily on macro 
efforts to constrain UC program costs. With the exception of 
monitoring separation issues and the monetary eligibility of 
former employees, employer incentives for independently en 
gaging in micro efforts to monitor claimant compliance with the 
weekly eligibility criteria are likely to remain fairly weak. As a 
result, in the absence of additional measures to increase self- 
compliance by UC claimants, the primary burden of enforcing 
the weekly eligibility criteria will remain with state UC agency 
personnel. The incentives confronted by this group are consid 
ered in the following section.
State UC Agency Personnel
The employees of state UC agencies also confront incentives 
that affect both payment accuracy and overall UC program 
quality. Little direct evidence is available, however, to assess the
57. It is interesting to note that some indirect evidence from the B-K-S study suggests that 
individual employers may even have relatively weak incentives to monitor the monetary 
eligibility of their claimants. As one aspect of each case reviewed in the B-K-S study, the 
qualifying wage credits reported for the claimant's base period were verified. Incorrect base 
period wages were found for more than 70 percent of the sample cases in one state, and for more 
than one-fourth of the sample cases in two other states [Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 
50)]. A substantial number of these base period wage errors were due to misreporting of base 
period wages by employers.
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impact of these incentives on the efforts of state UC program 
personnel to prevent or detect overpayments. Consequently, the 
discussion in this section tends to be quite general and the 
evidence presented to support the conclusions tends to be less 
direct than that presented in most other sections.
Incentive Problems
It certainly is not possible to prove that state UC agency 
personnel typically operate in an environment characterized by 
inappropriate incentives. Somewhat less directly, however, it is 
possible to deduce from known operating characteristics of state 
UC programs a number of fundamental issues and problems 
related to payment errors and overall program quality. The 
complexity of UC program eligibility criteria interacts with 
limited administrative financing of the program so that it simply 
is not possible to ascertain with any reasonable degree of 
precision whether the great majority of UC claimants satisfy UC 
eligibility criteria. Federal time lapse standards even further tend 
to frustrate serious attempts by state UC agency personnel to 
ensure that benefits are paid only to eligible claimants. Also, the 
effectiveness of monitoring efforts by state UC program person 
nel depends to a large degree on the motivations of employers 
and claimants to cooperate in such efforts. However, as ex 
plained earlier in this chapter, incentives for both claimant 
self-compliance and for employer assistance in terms of micro 
monitoring are quite limited. Also, substantial administrative 
discretion necessarily is exercised by UC agency personnel who 
process UC claims. In light of the minimal emphasis that has 
been placed on preventing or detecting overpayments prior to 
very recent years, the existence of frequent overpayments and 
other quality problems perhaps should not be unexpected.
Some limited evidence that supports the above views was 
obtained during the K-B study. Although unscientific in nature 
(because the survey respondents were not randomly selected to 
represent all state UC program personnel), this evidence is 
summarized and discussed here because each of the respondents 
was well qualified to express an informed view about the issues 
considered in this section. Also, it should be emphasized that
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even though this evidence reflects only the views of those who 
participated in the K-B study, the strong opinions expressed by 
the great majority of those surveyed have not been contradicted 
in our subsequent (direct) interactions with state UC program 
personnel in at least the first 15 of the states to participate in the 
Random Audit program.
The survey was conducted among all of the project supervisors 
and field investigators assigned to the K-B study in each of the 
six metropolitan areas. Nearly all of these individuals had 
substantial UC program experience, either as adjudication dep 
uties in UC local offices or as investigators in fraud/investigation 
units. The following summary is based on excerpts taken from 
the composite responses that were developed to reflect the 
consensus views of the individual respondents:
Unfortunately, the work environment and the "incentives/ re 
ward" system for local office employees do not effectively en 
courage the prevention of overpayments. Even though the UI cost 
model provides minutes per unit (MPUs) for the prevention of 
overpayments by local office personnel, the primary emphasis 
within the local office is on "production" and not on preventing 
overpayments. Local office employees do not believe they are 
given sufficient time to effectively conduct the activities described 
above and, beyond the cost-model time credited for issuing a 
nonmonetary determination, local office personnel believe that 
they receive no positive encouragement to prevent overpayments. 
Employees with the least experience oftentimes are placed on the 
new claims line and, because they lack training and experience, 
they are unable to detect a number of potential issues that should 
be referred for adjudication. Moreover, once potential issues are 
referred for adjudication, the local office deputies are under great 
pressure to issue nonmonetary determinations within a relatively 
short period of time. Personnel performance evaluations for these 
local office deputies often place a great weight on the number of 
determinations issued per day or per week. . . .
Local office personnel also are not encourged to prevent 
overpayments because there is no system in place to measure, let 
alone reward, local office personnel for preventing overpay-
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ments. In the absence of any means by which this dimension of 
performance could be assessed, it is not surprising that relatively 
little emphasis is placed on the types of activities that would tend 
to prevent overpayments. Rather, local office employees are 
encouraged to achieve relatively high rankings for their local 
offices, as measured by the monthly reports of first pay timeliness 
performance. 58
This summary includes a brief comment on the impact of the 
federal time lapse criteria. If an increased emphasis on either 
payment accuracy or overall program quality conflicts with these 
criteria, state agency personnel could be under heavy pressure to 
trade off those factors for increased production speed. This 
indeed appears to be the case, based on the responses to a 
number of questions included in the K-B study survey (see table 
6-1). These findings indicate that 76 percent of the respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the idea that federal 
time lapse criteria for first payments had little or no effect on 
efforts to prevent overpayments in local UC offices (Line 1). In 
contrast, more than two-thirds of the respondents indicated that 
the first-payment time lapse criteria greatly reduced local office 
efforts to prevent overpayments (Line 2). It also is interesting to 
note that only 16 percent of the respondents believed that local 
office personnel understood that these time lapse criteria suppos 
edly include a quality, as well as a quantity, dimension. These 
findings also reveal that three-fifths of the respondents either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that the timeliness criteria for 
nonmonetary determinations had little or no effect on efforts to 
prevent overpayments in local offices (Line 4). In fact, nearly 
two-thirds of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that these 
criteria had greatly reduced local office efforts to prevent 
overpayments (Line 5). In addition, four-fifths of the respon 
dents believed that the nonmonetary determination time lapse 
criteria were not commonly understood to include a quality, as 
well as a quantity, dimension (Line 6). The following composite
58. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: J-l and J-2).
TABLE 6-1
Kingston-Burgess Study Survey Results on 
Federal Time Lapse Performance Criteria Impacts
Response Distribution
Statement
Don't
Know or
Blank
Strongly 
Agree Agree
Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree Disagree
Strongly 
Disagree
1. Federal timeliness requirements for FIRST 
PAYS have had little or no effect on efforts 
to prevent overpayments in local offices. 0% 12% 12% 0% 36% 40%
2. Federal timeliness requirements for FIRST 
PAYS have greatly reduced efforts to 
prevent overpayments in local offices. 0% 36% 32% 4% 20% 8%
3. The federal timeliness criteria for FIRST 
PAYS are commonly understood by local 
office personnel to include a quality as well 
as a quantity standard. 4% 0% 16% 4% 48% 28%
4. Federal timeliness requirements for NON- 
MONETARY DETERMINATIONS have 
had little or no effect on efforts to prevent 
overpayments in local offices. 4% 12% 24% 0% 36% 24%
5. Federal timeliness requirements for NON- 
MONETARY DETERMINATIONS have 
greatly reduced efforts to prevent over 
payments in local offices. 4% 24% 40% 8% 20% 4%
6. The federal timeliness criteria for NONMONE- 
TARY DETERMINATIONS are commonly 
understood by local office personnel to 
include a quality as well as a quantity 
standard. 4% 0% 16% 0% 56% 24%
na
3m
90 
Os
Source: Kingston and Burgess (1981: 52).
State UC Agency Personnel 191
response was prepared to summarize respondent views on the 
time lapse performance criteria:
Federally mandated timeliness requirements for making first 
payments and issuing nonmonetary determinations, and compe 
tition among local office managers to exceed these time lapse 
standards, are perceived to be the basis of the pressure to 
emphasize the rapid payment of benefits over the accurate 
payment of benefits. 59
The composite response suggests that federal time lapse 
criteria have adversely affected the overall incentive environ 
ment faced by local office workers who represent the "first line 
of defense" for payment accuracy and overall UC program 
quality. It appears that state agency personnel typically receive 
few positive incentives to encourage either payment accuracy or 
overall UC program quality.
Improving Incentives for UC Agency Personnel
Implementing major improvements in the incentive environ 
ment confronted by state UC agency personnel would be 
extremely difficult unless at least some of the improvements in 
USDOL procedures or policies discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
were implemented. These included: (1) improvements in the 
process of providing administrative funds to state UC agencies;
(2) development of additional measures of program quality; and
(3) a more balanced emphasis on the accuracy and speed with 
which payments are made. In addition, reduced program com 
plexity and measures to encourage additional self-compliance 
with UC eligibility criteria by claimants would be particularly 
important steps in obtaining more effective administration of 
program requirements by state agency personnel. If these im 
provements occurred, some specific changes in the incentive 
environment for state agency personnel could have a major 
impact. The fundamental change required to improve the incen 
tives of state UC program personnel is an effective emphasis on
59. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: J-2).
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both payment accuracy and overall program quality. Once useful 
quality indicators for state UC program performance have been 
developed, their use in both performance and merit pay evalua 
tions for state agency personnel should be carefully considered. 60
Conclusions
The incentives confronted by state UC program participants— 
claimants, employers and state agency personnel—obviously 
have an important impact on the interactions of these participants 
with the UC system. The analysis in this chapter indicates that 
the incentives in many state systems fail to encourage and may 
even discourage a strong emphasis by these participants on either 
payment accuracy or more broadly defined program quality. 
Employers as a group have strong macro incentives to advocate 
measures restraining UC program costs and tax rates. However, 
current incentives for individual employers to engage in micro 
monitoring of claimant compliance with the weekly eligibility 
criteria typically are quite weak, and these incentives would be 
very limited even in a system with substantially increased 
experience rating.
The above conclusion suggests that efforts to improve claim 
ant compliance with stated UC eligibility criteria almost neces 
sarily must be directed at state agency personnel and at claimants 
themselves. In this context, the main change that appears to be 
necessary in the typical incentive system for state agency 
personnel is to implement an effective emphasis on payment 
accuracy. Nonetheless, the most effective technique for increas 
ing claimant compliance with UC eligibility criteria probably 
would be to induce claimants themselves to increase their 
self-compliance. Claimant self-compliance with many aspects of
60. More open communication among the various divisions of at least some state UC 
agencies probably would be desirable. For example, in at least some state UC agencies, the local 
office personnel who approve claims for payment are not routinely informed about which of those 
claims result in overpayments. Similarly, benefit payment control/investigation units often have 
information or insights that could be very useful to local office personnel in the prevention of 
overpayments, but opportunities for such interactions apparently do not routinely occur in at least 
some state UC agencies.
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stated eligibility criteria is likely quite low in the existing UC 
system simply because the expected costs of noncompliance 
(relative to the weekly benefits that can be obtained) are 
extremely low. However, claimant self-compliance could be 
increased by: (1) increasing the likelihood of detecting noncom 
pliance with eligibility criteria (perhaps by utilizing computer 
ized screening profiles to identify "high-risk" claimants); (2) 
increasing the rate at which overpayments are established for 
detected instances of noncompliance; (3) increasing the nominal 
penalties for nonfraud overpayments; and (4) more effectively 
applying whatever nominal penalties are assessed for established 
overpayments.
Needless to say, the overall effectiveness of the approaches 
discussed in this chapter would depend somewhat on the extent 
to which the changes discussed in other chapters also were 
implemented. Nonetheless, it appears that improved incentives 
for state program participants—particularly claimants and also 
state agency personnel—could contribute to an improved UC 
system. Moreover, it appears that some progress along these 
lines could be initiated by individual states, even in the absence 
of the improvements in USDOL incentives for state programs 
discussed in the previous two chapters.

Administering Weekly UC 
Eligibility Criteria
State UC program personnel face major difficulties in attempt 
ing to effectively monitor claimant compliance with the eligibil 
ity criteria that must be satisfied on a weekly basis. Such criteria 
include provisions that claimants must not have earnings (or days 
of work) that exceed specified amounts, must not refuse suitable 
work and must be able/available for work. Most UC jurisdictions 
also require active job search as an additional test of a claimant's 
availability for work.
The difficulties involved in enforcing the active worksearch 
requirement are the focus of this chapter. This emphasis was 
selected for several reasons. First, as noted in chapter 2, 
available evidence indicates that the most frequent cause of 
detectable overpayments is noncompliance with the worksearch 
requirement. Second, the worksearch requirement actually ap 
pears to be more specific and conducive to enforcement than at 
least several of the other weekly criteria. Accordingly, analysis 
of the problems involved in attempting to enforce the worksearch 
requirement provides insights about similar, but perhaps even 
more severe, problems involved in attempting to enforce claim 
ant compliance with general availability requirements. Third, as 
information on statewide overpayments becomes more widely 
understood, noncompliance with worksearch requirements pre 
sumably will become a major policy issue that must be con 
fronted by the UC system. The problems discussed in this 
chapter, however, generally would be relevant to enforcement of 
the broader availability-for-work (and other) requirements in 
cluded in all state law/policies.
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Although all states require that claimants be available for 
work, forty states, as of 1985, imposed a separate statutory 
requirement that claimants demonstrate their availability for 
work by actively seeking work. There tends to be considerable 
variation among the states, however, in precisely what actions 
claimants must take to satisfy the worksearch criterion, as 
illustrated by the five states participating in the B-K-S study. In 
one state, the worksearch criterion was satisfied if the claimant 
had made one job search contact during the key week that could 
be verified by state agency personnel. In another state, three 
worksearch contacts per week were required, although appar 
ently not all of them had to be verifiable. In the remaining three 
states, the actions that would satisfy the worksearch requirement 
tended to be much less uniform or specific, but were generally 
supposed to be consistent with actions of a "reasonable" person 
who was seeking work in similar circumstances.
Worksearch requirements may be specified in a state's em 
ployment security law but also may be found in policy rules used 
to implement state employment security statutes. As one exam 
ple, the Arizona Benefit Policy Rules manual, upon which the 
claimant eligibility flowchart presented in chapter 3 is based, 
contains the following language with respect to the worksearch 
requirement:
In order to maintain continuing eligibility for unemployment 
insurance a claimant shall be required to show that, in addition to 
registering for work, he has followed a course of action which is 
reasonably designed to result in his prompt reemployment in 
suitable work. Consideration shall be given to the customary 
methods of obtaining work in his usual occupation or for which he 
is reasonably suited, and the current condition of the labor 
market. Subject to the foregoing, the following actions by a 
claimant either singular or in combination may be considered a 
reasonable effort to seek work.
a. Registering and continuing active checking with the claimant's 
union hiring or placement facility.
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b. Registering with a placement facility of the claimant's profes 
sional organization.
c. Applying for employment with former employers.
d. Making application with employers who may reasonably be 
expected to have openings suitable to the claimant.
e. Registering with a placement facility of a school, college, or 
university if one is available to the claimant in his occupation 
or profession.
f. Making application or taking examination for openings in civil 
service of a governmental unit.
g. Registering for suitable work with a private employment 
agency or an employer's placement facility.
h. Responding to appropriate "want ads" for work which appear 
suitable to the claimant.
i. Any other action found to constitute an effective means of 
seeking work suitable to the claimant. l
In addition, Arizona claimants would be found in violation of the 
worksearch requirement if they willfully acted to discourage prospec 
tive employers from offering suitable work. 2 However, if the prospects 
of obtaining suitable work through sources other than the Job Service 
are so remote that an active search would be "fruitless" to the claimant 
and "burdensome" to employers, then registration with the Job 
Service is deemed sufficient to satisfy the worksearch requirement. 3 
This overview of state worksearch requirements, though 
certainly not exhaustive, is sufficient to indicate the type of 
language typically found in state employment security law and 
policy related to the worksearch requirement. Evidence to 
document the problems involved in enforcing the worksearch/ 
availability criteria is provided in the next section. Then, some 
possible strategies or responses to deal with worksearch 
noncompliance are considered. A brief conclusion completes the 
chapter.
1. Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: Section R6-3-52160).
2. Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: Section R6-3-52160).
3. Arizona Department of Economic Security (n.d.: Section R6-3-52160).
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Evidence on Worksearch/Availability Overpayments
Evidence on the frequency of worksearch/availability overpay 
ments is available from a number of sources, including: (1) 
overpayment studies; (2) studies of nonsearch by UC claimants; 
and (3) USDOL and state reports. Each of these is discussed 
below, followed by a summary of the monitoring implications of 
this evidence.
Overpayment Studies
Violations of the active worksearch requirement were detected 
in both the K-B and B-K-S studies on the basis of extremely 
intensive eligibility verification procedures. At the time each 
case was randomly selected for audit in these studies, it was 
assumed that the claimant had met the worksearch as well as 
other UC eligibility requirements. Only in those instances in 
which sufficiently strong evidence of noncompliance was found 
was the decision made to establish a worksearch (or other) 
overpayment. As noted earlier, these investigations generally 
required between 8—13 hours per case, with much of this time 
devoted to efforts to verify the job-seeking activities of claim 
ants.
One of the principal findings of the 1980 K-B study was that 
the most common type of noncompliance detected was the 
failure of claimants to actively seek work. 4 Additional evidence 
subsequently provided by the 1982 B-K-S study of the Random 
Audit program pilot tests also indicated that the single most 
frequent cause of UC overpayments was noncompliance with 
active worksearch requirements. 5 In fact, the B-K-S study 
findings indicated that nearly half or more of the dollars overpaid 
in each of the five study states, and more than seven-tenths of the 
dollars overpaid in two states, were due to worksearch viola 
tions. 6 Even in states with a worksearch requirement, however,
4. This was the case even though only five of the six cities actually had active search 
requirements. See Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 43).
5. Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 58).
6. Burgess, Kingston and St. Louis (1982: 53-58).
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not all claimants were required to search for work; further 
analysis of the B-K-S data revealed that the rate of noncompli- 
ance among just those who were required to search for work was 
even more pronounced than indicated by the estimated overpay 
ment rates alone. For example, of the claimants who were 
required to actively search for work in the five study states, over 
25 percent failed to do so in one state and over 20 percent failed 
to do so in another; the simple average of these worksearch 
noncompliance rates for the five states was 14.2 percent. 7
Another B-K-S study finding also is indicative of the difficul 
ties involved in monitoring compliance with the active 
worksearch requirement. Even though the intensive eligibility 
verifications required an average of 8-13 hours of investigative 
time per week of compensated unemployment, it was found that 
nearly half or more of claimant-reported job contacts could not 
be verified as either acceptable or unacceptable in three of the 
five states, and at least one-fourth of these reported contacts 
could not be verified as acceptable or unacceptable in all five 
states. 8 Such reported worksearch contacts were classified as 
"unverifiable" but were not used as a basis to establish 
overpayments.
Nonsearch Studies
In a study conducted for the National Commission on Unem 
ployment Compensation, Black and Carr analyzed data collected 
in conjunction with the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance 
Experiments to determine the extent to which low-income UC 
recipients actually searched for work. The Black-Carr findings 
for the 1971-1973 period in Seattle indicate that: (1) about 
one-third of the "person-weeks" of unemployment analyzed 
involved the payment of benefits to individuals who were not 
searching for work; and (2) about one-fifth of the "person- 
weeks" analyzed involved individuals who were neither search 
ing for work nor available for work. 9 The results reported by
7. See Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 329).
8. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 330).
9. Black and Carr (1980: 529-530, 539). In this study, UC claimants were assumed to have
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Black and Carr for Denver for the 1972-1974 period were nearly 
identical to the above results for Seattle. 10 Even though the 
low-income UC recipients analyzed by Black and Carr obviously 
were not typical of all UC recipients, the findings nonetheless 
suggest very substantial noncompliance with worksearch re 
quirements, at least among the low-income UC recipients ana 
lyzed.
Although the Black and Carr findings might be appropriately 
discounted because they applied only to a fairly atypical group of 
(low-income) UC recipients, additional analysis of the B-K-S 
study data suggests that the tendency to conduct no search (as 
opposed to insufficient search to satisfy active search require 
ments) also is a major problem among the general population of 
UC recipients. This further analysis revealed that an estimated 
18.7 percent of all claimants who were required to search for 
work actually made no job search contacts during single weeks 
for which benefits were claimed and paid. 11 Moreover, this 
tendency to make no job search contacts was not randomly 
distributed among the sample analyzed, but rather tended to vary 
systematically with various personal and labor market character 
istics. St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston found that the subgroups 
with the largest proportions of persons who had zero job search 
contacts were: women (23.4 percent); young persons (26.0 
percent); those with unemployment durations of at least 20 
weeks (27.4 percent); those not laid off from their prior jobs 
(29.3 percent); and nonunion workers (22.4 percent). 12 In 
addition to providing additional documentation of the problems
engaged in job search if they looked for work at any time during the same month that included 
a given week of UC-compensated unemployment. This procedure tends to overstate the 
job-seeking activities of the UC recipients included in the SIME-DIME samples. For individuals 
who did not search for work, as defined above, their reported reason for nonsearch was 
examined. Persons who reported that they did not look for work because of personal or family 
reasons, labor disputes, illness or disability, school enrollment or because they simply "didn't 
want to work" were classified as unavailable for work.
10. Black and Carr (1980: 530).
11. St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986: 98). This percentage is based on the 1074 
claimants who were required to seek work and who had at least one job search contact verified 
as acceptable or unacceptable.
12. St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986: 98). These percentages also were calculated for 
the 1074 claimants who were required to seek work and who had at least one job contact verified 
as acceptable or unacceptable.
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associated with administering the worksearch requirement in the 
UC program, these results also provide some insight into 
possible causes for higher reported unemployment rates among 
certain labor force groups. 13
USDOL/State Reports
The evidence presented above indicates that there are substan 
tial difficulties involved in attempting to detect worksearch 
violations, once payments have been made to UC recipients. It 
would be useful, however, to also examine the impact of the 
worksearch requirement in terms of screening UC claims before 
they actually are paid. Unfortunately, no separate USDOL/state 
statistics are available on the number of weeks claimed that were 
denied payment because claimants had not conducted an ade 
quate search for work. Instead, the available evidence combines 
nonmonetary determinations issued both to prevent and to 
establish overpayments.
For FY 1983, a total of 2.5 million nonmonetary determina 
tions were issued for potential violations of able/available 
(including worksearch) requirements in state UC programs, and 
these determinations accounted for about one-half of all those 
issued for nonseparation reasons. 14 This total of 2.5 million 
determinations for able/available/worksearch issues amounted to 
slightly more than one determination per 100 weeks claimed 
during FY 1983, and about two-fifths of these determinations 
resulted in the disqualification of claimants from benefits for one 
or more weeks. 15 In an earlier study, the National Commission 
on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) reported that about 
1.3 million claims for calendar year 1979—representing about 
0.7 percent of the total 194.5 million claimant contacts for the 
year—were denied or postponed because of violations of the
13. Official unemployment rates are computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the basis 
of responses to the Current Population Survey. Individuals who satisfy other criteria and report 
that they have looked for work in a recent period are included among the unemployed. Because 
these unemployment rates are based on reported rather than actual job-seeking efforts, it is quite 
possible that high measured unemployment rates for some groups could be due at least in part to 
a tendency to overreport job search efforts.
14. U.S. Department of Labor (1984b and 1984c).
15. U.S. Department of Labor (1984b and 1984c).
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able/available requirement. 16 In an even earlier study conducted 
in Arizona, it was found that 82,000 nonmonetary determina 
tions were issued for approximately 60,000 Arizona claimants 
who established benefit years during the first three quarters of 
FY 1976; nearly 25,000 of these determinations were for 
availability issues, and inadequate job search was the most 
frequent basis for these determinations. 17 Approximately one- 
half of the Arizona determinations issued for inadequate 
worksearch resulted in the disqualification of claimants from 
benefits. 18
The above evidence from USDOL, NCUC and state-agency 
sources is consistent with the possibility that some screening of 
claims to prevent payments (and thus overpayments) to ineligible 
claimants does occur because of the existence of the able/avail 
able and active worksearch requirements in state UC programs. 
The existence of such an effect is an important consideration in 
evaluating the merits of these eligibility criteria. More specifi 
cally, even if the existence of the worksearch requirement does 
result in many overpayments (because of the difficulty of 
monitoring claimant compliance), the worksearch requirement 
may constitute an effective screen in preventing at least some 
payments to claimants who are not actually available for or 
seeking work. Additional evidence on this point would be very 
useful in evaluating the overall impact of the worksearch 
requirement.
Summary of Monitoring Problems
In discussing the problems of administering the able/available 
eligibility criteria (including the worksearch requirement), Roche 
concluded that:
If the issues about ability and willingness to work and availability 
are hard to resolve, the decisions on them are even harder to 
document in a way that meets the requirements of due process of
16. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 46).
17. Green et al. (1978: 14-16).
18. Green et al. (1978: 16).
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law. Nonetheless, it is in them that the unemployment insurance 
program most directly comes face to face with the realities of the 
labor market. . . . The confrontation has been very painful, and 
the wisdom of Solomon would barely be adequate to cope with it. 
Trying to summarize or to characterize the various outcomes of 
claimstaking and appeals appears to be next to impossible and 
would not be very informative. Every outcome is imbedded in the 
particular labor market situation of an individual claimant as seen 
by a claims examiner, referee, or appeals board and is, in a sense, 
unique. Many of these outcomes have been made into precedent 
cases ... but the unique features of the precedent case and its 
factual matrix are not always clearly described so that the "rule" 
in the case is often hard to figure out. . . .
It should be noted, finally, that the frustrations engendered by 
inability to handle some kinds of availability issues have routinely 
led to the use of more tangible ways to disqualify suspect 
claimants (e.g., on an issue of refusal of suitable work) or to 
legislation of the kind discussed in the following chapter which 
denies insured status to some group about which an availability 
issue frequently is raised (e.g., by provisions about those quitting 
for domestic reasons). 19
What was written by Roche more than a decade ago continues to be an 
apt description of the problems associated with monitoring claimant 
compliance with the weekly eligibility criteria. In fact, given the 
pressures placed on the UC system during the 14 years since Roche's 
study, it is quite likely that the administrative problems he discusses 
have increased. In any case, the findings strongly suggest that effective 
monitoring of any substantive worksearch requirement for all UC 
claimants simply is not feasible within the UC system as it currently 
operates. Furthermore, if the worksearch requirement is actually more 
objectively defined and easily monitored than the broader availability 
criteria, then effective monitoring would be even more difficult for 
these other requirements. Despite these problems, however, it must be 
recognized that the worksearch requirement also may serve a screening 
function in preventing some payments to ineligible claimants.
19. Roche (1973: 82).
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Responses to Worksearch/Availability Monitoring Problems
The discussion below focuses narrowly on responses that 
might be considered because of the difficulties of monitoring the 
worksearch requirement, although some of the issues discussed 
also would be relevant for other features of the weekly eligibility 
criteria. The possibility of responding to the problem by greatly 
increasing the administrative funds provided to states for moni 
toring worksearch compliance is not considered in this chapter 
because, as noted earlier, such additional funding is likely to be 
neither available nor (in the absence of other fundamental 
changes) effective. The responses discussed include: (1) elimi 
nation of the worksearch requirement, with no compensating 
changes in other criteria; (2) elimination of the worksearch 
requirement, with compensating changes in other criteria; 
(3) imposition of stricter requirements; (4) improved administra 
tion of existing (or altered) requirements; and (5) use of direct 
reemployment incentives.
It should be emphasized from the outset, however, that none of 
the approaches discussed constitutes an entirely satisfactory 
response to the worksearch problem. Claimants differ markedly 
in their job-seeking skills, in their motivations to work and to 
seek work, in their preparation for employment and in the job 
market circumstances they confront. To subject all claimants to 
the same job search requirements, whether more or less strict 
than those presently imposed, will no doubt cause hardships for 
some or benefit others. To subject different claimants to different 
job-seeking requirements may create uncertainties as to what 
requirements apply and confusion about how they are to be 
satisfied, with the result that equity in the application of 
eligibility criteria will not be achieved. Nearly all of the 
approaches described will either increase or decrease claims 
filing by both those with strong and weak attachments to the 
labor force, and they will also influence the frequency with 
which overpayments occur. Consequently, each of the four 
approaches examined represents, at best, a starting point from 
which a more careful examination may begin.
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Elimination of the Worksearch Requirement 
Without Compensating Changes20
One response to the difficulties encountered in attempting to 
monitor claimant compliance with the worksearch requirement 
would be to eliminate this criterion. In fact, 13 UC jurisdictions 
did not have such a statutory requirement as of 1985; some of 
these jurisdictions used as principal tests of availability for work 
the actions of claimants in registering with the Job Service or 
their reactions to offers of suitable work. 21 In its 1980 report, the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation recom 
mended that all states eliminate specific "actively seeking 
work" requirements. 22
One obvious result of eliminating the worksearch requirement 
would be an immediate reduction in the rate of detected 
overpayments. This conclusion is based on the fact that the 
single most frequent cause of the overpayments detected in both 
the K-B and B-K-S studies was noncompliance with state 
worksearch requirements. However, a number of other issues 
would be important in evaluating the desirability of eliminating 
the worksearch requirement, including the effects of such a 
change on: (1) the overall volume of UC claims filed; (2) the 
proportion of claims filed that would be paid; and (3) the overall 
volume of UC benefits paid. 23 Each of these effects is briefly 
summarized below.
Elimination of the worksearch requirement would be expected 
to increase the overall volume of UC claims filed (for any given 
level of aggregate demand). Because such a change would 
reduce the costs of filing, some otherwise eligible claimants who 
previously did not file because of the worksearch requirement 
would be expected to file for benefits. The worksearch require-
20. For a much more detailed analysis of the issues raised in this section, see Kingston and 
Burgess (1986).
21. U.S. Department of Labor (1985a: Table 400). The states without a statutory worksearch 
requirement were Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas. Some of these states 
(e.g., Arizona) did have a worksearch requirement in their Benefit Policy Rules.
22. National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980: 49).
23. For a detailed discussion of these and other effects of eliminating the worksearch 
requirement, see Kingston and Burgess (1986).
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ment undoubtedly discourages some persons—who actually are 
not unemployed for UC purposes because they are not interested 
in immediately finding suitable employment—from filing for 
benefits because they are not willing to certify that they are 
actively seeking work. Removal of the worksearch requirement 
would be expected to induce some of these persons to file for 
benefits.
Elimination of the worksearch requirement also would be 
expected to result in an increase in the proportion of claims paid 
out of any given number filed. Existing worksearch requirements 
prevent payments to some claimants who file for benefits 
because UC personnel are able to detect that they actually are not 
actively seeking work, despite certifications signed by such 
claimants to the contrary. Furthermore, worksearch requirements 
probably increase the extent to which UC agency personnel can 
effectively enforce general availability criteria and job refusal 
provisions. Accordingly, elimination of the worksearch require 
ment would eliminate its associated screening effects and, 
consequently, would be expected to increase the proportion of 
filed claims that would be paid, other things equal.
The above two effects—increases in claims filed and in the 
proportion of filed claims paid—would result in an increase in 
the overall volume of UC benefit payments (for any given level 
of aggregate demand). Employer tax rates also would be ex 
pected to increase in order to finance the resulting increase in 
benefit payments.
Elimination of the Worksearch Requirement 
With Compensating Changes
One basis for requiring that claimants actively seek work is to 
prevent payments to those who have weak or no intentions of 
finding immediate reemployment. Since it is extremely difficult 
for UC personnel to evaluate claimant job-search activities, a 
possible response would be to replace the worksearch require 
ment with other criteria that could be more easily measured and 
enforced. A number of such replacements might be considered. 
For example, a claimant's past work attachment in terms of
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covered earnings or employment can be measured much more 
objectively, consistently and less expensively than can search 
activities or intentions to return to work. Moreover, all states 
already impose monetary eligibility criteria which claimants 
must meet in order to obtain benefits, so that changing such 
criteria would be relatively simple from an administrative view 
point.
The approach discussed in this section focuses on imposing 
additional or stricter measures of past work attachment to replace 
the active worksearch requirement. 24 One possibility would be to 
substitute stricter earnings and/or weeks-of-work requirements 
for the worksearch requirement. Such an approach merits at least 
some consideration to the extent that: (1) UC system support is 
intended to "insure" the loss of past wages; (2) objectively 
measurable and easily monitored criteria are considered superior 
to vague and difficult-to-monitor criteria; and (3) enforcing 
claimant compliance with stated eligibility criteria at relatively 
low administrative cost is considered desirable.
The attractiveness of this approach would be enhanced if those 
who could not satisfy stricter criteria related to past work 
attachment also tended to be the same individuals who do not 
comply with current availability/active search requirements. 
There is a strong conceptual basis for linking past work attach 
ment to present intentions to actively seek work. The logic 
underlying this expected relationship is that (currently) foregone 
earnings due to unemployment presumably are larger for claim 
ants who have higher prior wages and more stable prior employ 
ment. Such individuals would have greater incentives to return to 
work (and hence to seek work) than otherwise similar individuals 
with lower prior wages and less stable prior employment. The 
limited evidence currently available on this topic suggests that 
the relationship between past work attachment and current 
worksearch noncompliance may indeed be a valid one. This 
evidence, based on an analysis of the B-K-S study data, indicates 
that claimants with weaker past work attachments—proxied by 
lower past wage and employment stability levels—were more
24. This approach also is discussed in Kingston and Burgess (1986).
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likely to overreport job search contacts. 25 Nonetheless, consid 
erably more research is required before any systematic and stable 
relationship may be presumed between past work attachment and 
current worksearch noncompliance.
If measures of past work attachment were substituted for the 
active worksearch requirement, an important issue would be 
exactly how to measure past work attachment, and whether that 
attachment should be measured over a period of more than one 
year. Although apparently little consideration has been given to 
the possibility of utilizing base periods that encompass more than 
one year, it would be possible to lengthen UC base periods. 
Another way of increasing the emphasis on past work attachment 
would be to add weeks-of-work requirements in those states that 
do not have such requirements. Weeks-of-work requirements 
could be utilized as an alternative to or in combination with 
longer UC base periods.
While such changes merit consideration, 26 it should be noted 
that, depending on the types of requirements imposed, the 
overall volume of UC claims filed and paid could rise, fall or 
remain unchanged. If more stringent monetary eligibility and 
weeks-of-work requirements were substituted for the worksearch 
requirement, implementation should be carefully monitored to 
identify impacts on the size and composition of UC claim filing 
so that any unintended and undesirable side effects could be 
identified and evaluated. It is quite clear, for example, that more 
stringent monetary (including weeks-of-work) requirements
25. St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1986).
26. Presently, four different measures of prior work attachment are used by state UC 
agencies: weeks of work; multiples of weekly benefit amounts; multiples of high quarter earnings; 
and flat earnings minimums. A major study was conducted a number of years ago to investigate 
the desirability of using these measures as indicators of past work attachment [see Pleatsikas, 
Bailis and Dernburg (1978)]. For details on the monetary eligibility criteria, including weeks of 
work requirements, used by state UC agencies as of January, 1985, see National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation and Workers' Compensation (1985c: 37-39). A number of studies 
have recommended that states without weeks-of-work requirements should be encouraged to 
adopt them for evaluating the extent of past work attachment by claimants. See, for example, 
Haber and Murray (1966: 43); Hamermesh (1977: 95); W.E. Upjohn Institute Unemployment 
Insurance Research Advisory Committee (1975: 17); and National Commission on Unemploy 
ment Compensation (1980: 37). For additional analysis of the weeks-of-work requirement, see 
Munts (1980).
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would reduce the number of labor market entrants or reentrants 
who would be eligible for UC program support.
Stricter Worksearch Requirements
The possible responses discussed in the previous two sections 
involved the elimination or replacement of the worksearch 
requirement. However, it also would be possible to implement 
stricter worksearch requirements than those currently imposed. 
This approach is illustrated by the introduction of relatively strict 
worksearch (and suitable work) provisions in the federal-state 
Extended Benefits (EB) program. Under the original 1970 
legislation which authorized the EB program, worksearch (and 
suitable work) requirements were the same as those for benefits 
paid under regular state programs. Stiffer suitable work provi 
sions were first introduced in the Federal Supplemental Benefits 
(FSB) program in 1977 (Public Law 95-19) and subsequently in 
the EB program in 1980 and 1981. However, the provisions of 
particular interest in the context of this section are the stricter 
worksearch criteria contained in Public Law 96-799. Under these 
provisions, which became effective as of April 1981, EB 
claimants were required to provide tangible evidence that they 
were actively seeking work. To implement these new require 
ments, USDOL issued the following directions to state UC 
agencies:
An EB claimant is expected to make a more diligent and active 
search for work than would normally be required of an individual 
receiving UI benefits. To meet EB eligibility requirements, the 
claimant's search for work must be "systematic and sustained." 
A "sustained" effort to obtain work is a continual effort 
maintained at length throughout each week. Under the require 
ment to actively seek work, passive availability for work is not 
sufficient. A "systematic" effort to obtain work is a work-search 
conducted with thoroughness and with a plan or methods to 
produce results. 27
27. U.S. Department of Labor (198la: 8).
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Furthermore, no exceptions to this policy were supposed to be 
permitted (as otherwise would be allowed in most states) for illness, 
jury duty and other factors.
Other provisions of the stricter EB worksearch requirements 
included the following: (1) registration with a referral union was 
to be considered as only partially meeting the active worksearch 
requirement, with individual job-seeking efforts required in 
every case to demonstrate an active search for work; (2) a 
broadening of the types of work claimants must seek with 
prolonged unemployment;28 and (3) more stringent disqualifica 
tion penalties for not meeting the above criteria (including 
subsequent employment in at least four weeks and earnings not 
less than four times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in 
order to remove such a disqualification). 29 In each of six states 
involved in a special study of the impact of these new EB 
regulations, 30 a minimum number of worksearch contacts was 
required each week and, in two of these states, the same 
employer could not be listed as a worksearch contact more than 
once during the EB claim period. 31 Yet another change brought 
about by the more stringent EB eligibility criteria was the 
increased use of eligibility reviews for EB claimants. 32
To assess the relative merits and the likely impact of imple 
menting stricter worksearch requirements, it is useful to consider 
the intended effects of the worksearch criterion. Stevens has 
emphasized two administrative rationales for the worksearch 
requirement: (1) a conscious desire to increase the costs to 
claimants of maintaining benefit eligibility, in order to discour 
age some potential claimants from filing for benefits; and (2) a 
belief that such requirements, as administered through state 
employment security offices, actually enhance claimant pros 
pects of reemployment. 33 Some other plausible justifications 
include a recognition that: (3) more stringent requirements may
28. U.S. Department of Labor (198la: 8).
29. U.S. Department of Labor (198la: 9).
30. Corson and Nicholson (1984).
31. Corson and Nicholson (1984: 77).
32. Corson and Nicholson (1984: 78).
33. Stevens (1977: 41).
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provide needed clarification and specificity to relatively vague 
availability requirements, so that such criteria can be more 
effectively enforced; and (4) public support for the UC program 
may depend, to a great extent, on perceptions that claimants are 
active job seekers. Each of these rationales for the existence of 
the worksearch requirement (and implicitly for the imposition of 
stricter requirements) is discussed in more detail below. The 
importance of administrative commitment in terms of effectively 
enforcing either present or stricter worksearch requirements also 
is considered.
Impact on Volume of Claims Filed. There is little doubt that 
stricter worksearch requirements will, at some point, signifi 
cantly reduce the volume of UC claims filed. Stevens has 
summarized this point succinctly as follows:
The fundamental issue is this: the eligible claimant population can 
be adjusted to any desired size, by simply increasing or relaxing 
the burdensomeness of eligibility requirements. So, there really is 
no question whether a work test, or any other continuing 
eligibility requirement, can be performed. The only question is 
whether the requirement can be carried out consistent with other 
efficiency and equity considerations. 34
Evidence to support this view is available from a recently 
completed study of the impact of the more stringent requirements 
imposed on EB claimants. 35 The findings indicated that the 
stricter EB provisions caused significant declines in: (1) the 
likelihood that claimants would participate in the EB program; 
(2) the number of weeks of EB benefits drawn; and (3) the 
likelihood that EB benefits would be exhausted. 36 Similarly, in 
another study, Burtless and Saks reported that:
In our judgement, the legal and administrative reforms in UI 
provide an explanation for most of the decline in insured 
unemployment relative to total unemployment that has occurred
34. Stevens (1980: 53).
35. Corson and Nicholson (1984).
36. Corson and Nicholson (1984: 60-65).
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since 1980. Without more careful study of the experiences in 
individual states it is, however, impossible to suggest the precise 
impact of each of the individual changes. Nonetheless, there is 
considerable evidence of a widespread and systematic trend 
toward restricting benefit payments and toughening administra 
tive procedures, and this trend is evident at both the state and 
federal levels. This survey of recent UI changes suggests that the 
relative decline in insured unemployment is primarily the result of 
executive, legislative, and administrative decisions to restrict or 
reduce the scope of the UI program. 37
It should be noted, however, that the decline in claim filing 
documented in the above studies most likely did not result from 
increased detection of UC overpayments to ineligible claimants, 
but rather from the screening effects discussed earlier in this 
chapter, which would directly reduce the volumes of claims filed 
and paid (probably for both ineligible and potentially eligible 
claimants). In fact, evidence from the B-K-S study with respect 
to enforcement of the stricter EB worksearch requirement sup 
ports this view. EB claims affected by the stiffer eligibility 
requirements initially were included in the Random Audit 
program pilot tests. Once the virtual impossibility of verifying a 
claimant's compliance with these stricter requirements became 
evident, EB claims were dropped by USDOL from the RA 
program pilot tests. 38 The irony of this decision is that, while 
federal policymakers attempted to tighten eligibility criteria, 
those responsible for administering them determined that com 
pliance could not be effectively monitored even in the Random 
Audit program in which the time devoted to processing each case 
was at least 50 times that available in the routine operating 
system! 39
Additional evidence on the impact of enforcing a stricter work 
test for UC claimants is available from the Claimant Placement
37. Burtless and Saks (1984: 79). Also see Vroman (1985: 4-8).
38. Kingston and Burgess (1981a).
39. Information supplied by state agency personnel indicated that, in some of the Random 
Audit pilot-test states, the difficulties of (equitably) enforcing the stricter EB requirements also 
tended to reduce the efforts by some agency personnel to enforce regular state UC program 
worksearch requirements as well. However, we are aware of no other evidence on this point.
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and Work Test Demonstration project conducted in Charleston, 
South Carolina in 1983. 40 The design of this experimental 
project provided for improved communications between the 
state's UC and Employment Service offices to facilitate a more 
intensive application of the weekly eligibility criteria. All claim 
ants in each of three "treatment" groups were required to report 
to an Employment Service office once they had received their 
first UC payment, whereas control group claimants were not so 
required to report. Claimants in two of the three treatment groups 
were given enhanced employment services, including job refer 
rals and job development support and, in one group, workshop 
training in job search. Failure to report to an Employment 
Service office by a treatment group claimant triggered both a 
call-in notice for the claimant to report to a local UC office, and 
an order to stop payment until any issues had been resolved 
through the formal nonmonetary determination process. A com 
prehensive evaluation of the results of these procedures revealed 
that the average duration of benefits drawn for the treatment 
groups was about six-tenths of a week less than for the control 
group, but no important differences in average duration were 
found among the treatment groups that received differing levels 
of employment services. 41 In assessing the likely causes of the 
observed reduction in UC benefit payments to the treatment 
groups, Corson, Long and Nicholson concluded that:
The final explanation (i.e., that claimants responded to the 
demonstration by leaving the UI rolls without necessarily finding 
a job) was probably also an important factor in the outcome. The 
data on responses to the call-in notices showed that many 
claimants did not respond to the notices, and the data on UI 
benefit receipt showed that the treatments had a significant impact 
on the rate at which claimants stopped claiming UI benefits early 
in their benefit period. Yet, no strong evidence indicated that 
these claimants necessarily found jobs, although no information
40. Johnson, Pfiester, West and Dickinson (1984).
41. Corson, Long and Nicholson (1984: 68). The results also showed that the number of 
weeks of benefits drawn by treatment-group claimants, compared with the control group, 
averaged about one week less for men but were not significantly different for women.
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was available on whether claimants who left the UI roles 
continued to search for work or whether they dropped out of the 
labor force.
In conclusion, it appears that the reporting requirements, 
coupled with the cessation of UI payments for failure to report, 
were probably the most important elements of the treatments. And 
a major way in which these components had an impact on benefits 
was to cause claimants to leave the UI rolls both because some 
were formally denied benefits and because some simply stopped 
claiming benefits. 42
The evidence from the study also suggests that more rigorous enforce 
ment of the work test does reduce UC benefit payments, partly by 
denying payments to ineligible claimants and partly by reducing filing 
by (probably both) ineligible and potentially eligible persons.
Impact on Job Search and Reemployment. Stricter job-seeking 
requirements (or more vigorous enforcement of existing require 
ments) might be expected to increase the likelihood that claim 
ants would search more effectively and thus: (1) return to work 
more quickly; (2) obtain more stable reemployment; and/or 
(3) obtain higher wage rates or otherwise obtain jobs of higher 
quality. However, what little direct evidence is available on 
these positive effects seems to suggest that they either are small 
or perhaps nonexistent. For example, as one part of the Charles 
ton Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration Project, 
an effort was made to compare the reemployment experiences of 
treatment group claimants with control group claimants. Corson, 
Long and Nicholson found that: (1) the proportion of claimants 
who had some employment in the quarter following the one 
during which they began to receive UC support was not 
significantly different between treatment groups and the control 
group; and (2) the ratio of reemployment wages to preunemploy- 
ment wages was not significantly different between the treatment 
groups and the control group. 43 Furthermore, even though a 
recent study of the impact of the stricter EB eligibility criteria 
revealed that UC claimants made more frequent use of the
42. Corson, Long and Nicholson (1984: 107-108).
43. Corson, Long and Nicholson (1984: 60-67).
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Employment Service because of those criteria, actual job place 
ments apparently were unaffected by the increased use of the 
services provided. 44
Other evidence bearing on the impact of stricter worksearch 
requirements or enforcement efforts is much more indirect in 
nature. If it were assumed that the effects of stricter requirements 
on the search activities of claimants would be similar to those 
resulting from the specialized job search assistance provided in 
several special studies, some additional insights may be ob 
tained. Evaluations of the service-to-claimants (STC) projects 
conducted in five cities over a decade ago by Burgess and 
Kingston indicated that specialized reemployment assistance 
significantly reduced the duration of single spells of unemploy 
ment in some cities, but had no consistent impact on reducing 
either the number of subsequent unemployment spells or the total 
benefits received by claimants for an entire year. 45 Furthermore, 
the findings indicated that the specialized job search assistance 
had no significant impact on the subsequent earnings or employ 
ment experiences of the groups that received such assistance. 46 
The findings by Austermann, Crosslin and Stevens for STC 
projects conducted in other areas were even less optimistic that 
positive results could be attributed to such specialized services. 47 
This indirect evidence collectively suggests that more stringent 
worksearch requirements/ enforcement efforts and increased 
attempts to provide positive reemployment assistance may not 
positively affect either the job search or reemployment experi 
ences of UC claimants.
Moreover, it is even possible that stricter worksearch require 
ments or enforcement procedures could produce some unin 
tended and undesirable effects. For example, in assessing the
44. Corson and Nicholson (1984: v). As Nicholson emphasized a number of years ago, 
however, measurement of the effects of services provided by the Employment Service involves 
a number of complexities that merit careful consideration. For example, some studies have found 
that those who use the Employment Service ultimately receive lower wages than those who don't, 
but this could simply reflect the fact that employers tend to list only low-wage jobs with the 
Employment Service. For more discussion on this point, see Nicholson (1981: 172-175).
45. Burgess and Kingston (1973: 4).
46. Burgess and Kingston (1973: 4).
47. Austermann, Crosslin and Stevens (1975: 96-101).
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likely impact of UC program provisions designed to encourage 
additional worksearch activity, Stevens has concluded such 
measures may cause both claimant job search costs and employer 
recruitment costs to increase; furthermore, he has argued that 
requiring UC claimants to register with the Employment Service 
may cause some additional inefficiencies. 48 In yet another study, 
Stevens concluded that the Employment Service was not influ 
ential in facilitating a return to work by UC claimants, and that 
the blanket referral of virtually all UC claimants to an ES office 
was "patently undesirable." 49 Support for this view has come 
from a number of additional studies. In a study undertaken a 
number of years ago, Reid emphasized the importance of 
informal job-seeking methods and reached a qualified conclusion 
that a public employment service should serve as a last resort for 
those unable to obtain reemployment without such assistance. 50 
Some years later, Barron and Mellow reported that requiring UC 
claimants to register with the Employment Service may tend to 
decrease the use of the ES both by other unemployed workers 
and by employers who have job openings. 51 Shulenburger, 
Krider and Pichler also reported that the services provided by the 
Employment Service had no measurable impact on the earnings 
of reemployed workers, 52 although their approach has been 
subjected to some methodological criticisms. 53 More recently, 
Keeley and Robins concluded that UC program job search 
requirements may tend to result in sub-optimal search strategies, 
and are not likely to significantly reduce the duration of 
unemployment spells. 54 Consequently, any assessment of the 
impact of stricter worksearch requirements or enforcement pro 
cedures should be based on an evaluation of unintended and 
negative side effects as well as on the positive results expected 
from such policies.
USDOL has recognized that relatively little factual informa-
48. See Stevens (1977: 40, 61-62).
49. Stevens (1974: 97).
50. Reid (1972: 493-494).
51. Barron and Mellow (1982: 381, 386).
52. Shulenburger, Krider and Pichler (1979: 78).
53. See Dong et al. (1980) and Katz (1980).
54. Keeley and Robins (1985: 351-353).
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tion is available on the impact of the worksearch requirement on 
the job search or reemployment experiences of UC claimants. A 
1985 Request for Proposal distributed by USDOL noted that:
Finally, neither the study of denial rates nor the random audit data 
reveal any information about the effects that variations in active 
search-for-work provisions have on actual claimant behavior 
and/or on the job finding success of claimants. Very specific and 
consistently enforced active search-for-work requirements may 
increase denial rates and may either increase or decrease payment 
error rates but not lead to any significant change in the rate of 
reemployment among claimants or even to a significant decrease 
in benefit payments. Claimants may simply alter their benefit 
duration. Even more importantly, some types of specific require 
ments may lead to increased job-finding while others do not.
... the research shall attempt an investigation of the relation 
ship among the denial rate for nonseparation issues, payment 
error rates attributable to active search-for-work provisions of UI 
law, and the rate of job-finding success of the UI claimant 
population, abstracting from such factors as differences in claim 
ant characteristics and local economic conditions. 55
It is hoped that the study solicited in the above proposal request will 
provide insights into the impacts of worksearch requirements on the 
unemployment and reemployment experiences of UC claimants that 
will be of use in assessing whether this requirement should be 
eliminated or altered in particular ways.
Impact on Enforcement of Criteria. The utilization of more 
stringent and specific criteria could increase the extent to which 
state UC program personnel could effectively monitor claimant 
compliance with such provisions. For example, the EB program 
provisions that narrow the definition of "suitable work" and that 
require "tangible evidence" of a "systematic and sustained" job 
search could combine to facilitate a more efficient identification 
of those who do not actively seek work. A study of the
55. U.S. Department of Labor, (1985c: C-ll). USDOL funded a research project on the 
worksearch requirement in response to this Request for Proposal. This study currently is being 
conducted in 10 UC jurisdictions, with results available in 1987.
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administration of the nonmonetary eligibility criteria by Corson, 
Hershey and Kerachsky clearly suggests that: (1) the states with 
more comprehensive and specific policies detailing such require 
ments had UC staffs who better understood their laws/policies; 
and (2) in such states, less administrative discretion was exer 
cised by UC personnel in considering eligibility issues, conse 
quently increasing the consistency with which laws/policies were 
applied. 56 Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky also concluded that 
more specific program requirements and enforcement procedures 
need not force UC agency personnel into unreasonable enforce 
ment activities, and that such requirements/procedures probably 
do provide for more equity in the treatment of claimants. They 
state:
Not having clear written rules, in contrast, makes it more difficult 
for adjudicators to justify their decisions, and more difficult for 
claimants to understand the standards they must meet and to 
prepare arguments in their defense. Agency adjudicators then 
apply unwritten standards which may be quite differently under 
stood and interpreted by different adjudicators, and leave claim 
ants with no reasonable basis for predicting the relationship 
between their behavior and the adjudication outcome. In such 
circumstances, high standards of due process may be difficult to 
achieve. 57
In addition to increasing the equity with which UC claims are 
processed, it also should be noted that the presence of clear, written 
rules would tend to reduce nondeliberate payment errors on the part of 
both UC claimants and state UC agency personnel. Given the 
complexity and the vagueness of UC eligibility criteria, especially 
those that must be satisfied on a weekly basis, the presence of clear, 
written guidelines for the administration of these requirements would 
be expected to reduce overpayments by reducing misinformation and 
uncertainty about these eligibility criteria.
Impact on Public Perceptions. The introduction of stricter 
worksearch and perhaps other eligibility criteria could have a
56. Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky (1986: 129-131).
57. Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky (1986: 130-131).
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positive impact on public attitudes about the UC program and 
public perceptions of the needs of the clientele served by the 
program. The results of two different surveys discussed by 
Adams indicate that it is commonly believed that UC claimants 
could return to work more quickly if they so chose. 58 In a more 
recent study undertaken by Curtin and Ponza for the National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation, it was reported 
that the majority of households surveyed supported the notion of 
jobsearch requirements, and that over three-fifths of those 
surveyed believed that UC claimants should be required to take 
any "fitting" job. 59 To the extent to which the imposition of 
more stringent worksearch requirements received widespread 
publicity, it could generate additional support for a program that 
might then be perceived by the public as serving "deserving" 
claimants. This conclusion also is consistent with the findings of 
a special study recently conducted by the Missouri UC agency 
and reported on at a February 1986 meeting of the Quality 
Unemployment Insurance Project states. The Missouri agency 
found very strong support for the worksearch requirement among 
employers, even though employers admitted that it was difficult 
to suggest concrete and administratively feasible procedures for 
actually enforcing such a requirement. 60
Importance of Administrative Commitment. Another important 
issue in assessing the likely impact of stricter worksearch 
requirements, especially if no additional resources were made 
available for administering such criteria, is the extent to which 
substantive efforts would be made to monitor compliance with 
the new requirements. Effective enforcement of seemingly 
similar jobsearch requirements appears to vary considerably 
among state UC programs. Given the extent of administrative 
discretion that exists in enforcing such criteria, it is useful to 
consider whether stricter (stated) criteria actually would materi 
ally affect the manner in which UC claims would be evaluated 
and processed.
58. Adams (1971: 21,56).
59. Curtin and Ponza (1980: 770).
60. See Missouri Division of Employment Security (1986) for the views of claimants and 
state agency personnel as well as for employer views.
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Relatively little evidence is available on the administrative 
commitment issue. However, some indications of at least a 
potential problem were evident in both the K-B and B-K-S 
overpayment studies. In the former study—conducted in six 
cities in 1979-1980—it was found that one of the state UC 
agencies consistently chose not to establish overpayments for 
violations of the availability/worksearch criteria detected after 
payments already had been made. 61 In the latter study—con 
ducted in five states during 1981-1982—some administrative 
resistance to the more effective application of existing employ 
ment security laws and policies also surfaced. 62 In at least one 
B-K-S study state, providing formal warnings to claimants 
instead of establishing overpayments became increasingly fre 
quent during the course of the study. 63 Inferences from these 
events for the present discussion may be appropriate to the extent 
that more complete and consistent enforcement of existing 
employment security law and policy—as implemented in the 
K-B and B-K-S studies—may be viewed as essentially equiva 
lent to the establishment of stricter criteria. On the basis of this 
and similar evidence—much of which is indirect and somewhat 
speculative in nature—it does appear that a strong administrative 
commitment to enforce stricter eligibility requirements will be 
necessary if more than superficial changes are to be realized.
Stricter Requirements Summary. The above analysis indicates 
that the desirability of implementing stricter worksearch require 
ments (or more comprehensive enforcement procedures) depends 
on a number of considerations. Evidence suggests that the effects 
of stricter requirements would include the following: (1) the 
volumes of claims filed and benefits paid would decline, with 
perhaps much of the decrease coming from reduced claim filing 
rather than from increased disqualification of claimants for 
detected worksearch violations; (2) some impact on the job 
search and reemployment experiences of claimants might occur, 
but available evidence suggests that any positive effects would 
likely be very small and might even be accompanied by
61. Kingston and Burgess (1981b: 35).
62. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 326-327).
63. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis (1986: 327).
Responses to Worksearch/Availability Monitoring Problems 221
potentially adverse side effects; (3) more precise and formal 
statements of worksearch requirements might result in more 
effective enforcement of both worksearch requirements and other 
eligibility criteria; (4) public support for the UC program might 
increase, because those served by the program might be per 
ceived as more "deserving" claimants; and (5) the effects of 
introducing stricter requirements (or enforcement procedures) 
would largely depend on the extent to which administrative 
commitment to such changes tended to be substantive.
Improved Administration of Existing (or Altered) 
Worksearch Requirements
In addition to the elimination of worksearch requirements or 
the imposition of stricter worksearch requirements, states also 
could respond to the worksearch problem by implementing 
improved procedures for enforcing existing (or altered) require 
ments. Essentially, two relatively distinct (but not mutually 
exclusive) approaches have been undertaken by state UC agen 
cies in their efforts to effectively monitor claimant compliance 
with the weekly eligibility criteria, given the constraints imposed 
by available funding levels. These approaches are (1) specific 
monitoring and verification of worksearch contacts reported by 
claimants on a weekly basis, and (2) evaluations over longer 
periods (e.g., 8-10 weeks) to determine if substantive and 
reasonable efforts are being made by claimants to find employ 
ment. 64 Either of these approaches, which are separately dis 
cussed in the next two sections, could involve the use of 
statistically based screening profiles to target the use of admin 
istrative resources on certain claims or claimants. Such profiles 
are discussed separately in the third section below. The possible 
role that computer-based expert systems could play in improving 
the administration of existing (or altered) eligibility criteria is 
considered in the fourth section.
Weekly Verification of Contacts. This approach to monitoring 
claimant compliance with worksearch requirements typically
64. Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky (1986: 124).
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requires that a minimum number of job search contacts be made 
each week. As noted earlier, however, the B-K-S study findings 
provide strong evidence that claimant-reported job contacts are 
extremely difficult to verify, even with an extremely large 
resource commitment for such verifications. Accordingly, it 
appears that the weekly reporting of job search contacts would 
not be very effective as an operational strategy. Supporting 
evidence for this view was recently supplied by Corson, Hershey 
and Kerachsky, who concluded that:
Without serious review of and consistent response to insufficient 
employer contacts, routine weekly reporting of contacts is open to 
serious abuse and may serve little detection purpose. In State 4, 
for example, employer contacts are regularly reported, but only 
the most apparent fabrications of employer names prompt deter 
minations, and the frequency of determinations on availability 
issues is at the bottom of the state ranking. 65
Although weekly reporting of job contacts may not be an 
effective monitoring strategy for most or all claimants, it still 
should be noted that comprehensive audits of carefully selected 
samples of claimants might be used to induce greater claimant 
compliance with UC eligibility criteria. Indeed, this approach is 
suggested as a viable possibility in a subsequent section of this 
chapter.
Evaluation of Search Strategies. An alternative approach— 
and one that appears to have been more commonly adopted 
(though with many variations)—focuses on the substance of 
claimant search strategies over a number of weeks. This search- 
strategy approach places less emphasis on a claimant's work- 
search activities during any specific week than on the pattern of 
those activities over a period of time. It emphasizes search 
techniques and efforts as they relate to the type of work sought. 
The geographic focus, occupational content, and claimant wage 
expectations all might be considered in evaluating overall search 
strategies under such an approach.
65. Corson, Hershey and Kerachsky (1986: 124-125).
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To some extent, the search-strategy approach to administering 
the worksearch requirement may have grown out of the experi 
ments designed to provide "employability services" to claim 
ants, which were conducted in a number of state UC programs 
during the 1970s. 66 A basic element of the employ ability service 
approach was to allow job-ready claimants substantial freedom 
in determining how they would look for work during the early 
weeks of an unemployment spell, with increasing direction and 
control provided for individuals who had not returned to work 
after a month or two of unemployment. This orientation also is 
found in the very comprehensive Statewide Worksearch Activity 
Program recently implemented in the State of Washington; the 
program provides that:
So as not to lower the working standards of individuals out of 
work through no fault of their own, the Department will allow 
claimants an adequate and reasonable amount of time to find work 
in a comparable position to one previously held. After this period, 
it becomes the Department's responsibility to actively assist 
claimants in finding employment. The Department may require 
the claimant to intensify work search activity based on individual 
work skills, length of time unemployed, local labor market, and 
customary local hiring practices.
As the length of unemployment increases, work search activity 
will increase, and may include, but should not be limited to, an 
increased number of work search contacts each week; increased 
number of days seeking work; work search in a secondary 
occupation; assessment and referral for potential participation in 
training including OJT, and supportive service (agency and/or 
community based) and/or intensified worksearch planning.67
Other details of the program include the acquisition and use of more 
effective labor market information than that previously available to 
claimants, and the provision of different levels/types of service and 
monitoring for different claimant groups.
66. See Burgess and Kingston (1972: 1-2); Burgess and Kingston (1973); and Austermann, 
Crosslin and Stevens (1975).
67. Washington State Employment Security, Unemployment Insurance Division (1985: 1).
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Little direct evidence is available on the extent to which the 
provision of job search assistance or increased monitoring of UC 
claimant worksearch activities affect either the unemployment or 
reemployment experiences of UC claimants. As previously 
noted, evidence from the Charleston Claimant Placement and 
Work Demonstration Project indicates limited success with 
respect to either the reemployment assistance or the eligibility 
review objectives of the experimental study. 68 With no increase 
in administrative resources to support the new program in 
Washington, it would seem as if the overall impact of the 
program would depend importantly on the extent to which 
available assistance/monitoring efforts could be effectively tar 
geted on claimant groups most likely to be affected by such 
measures. If the Washington program attempts to provide more 
than a minimal level of service to most claimants—whether such 
services tend to emphasize reemployment assistance or eligibility 
verifications—available resources would probably be spread so 
thin that significant overall impacts would not be likely to occur. 
In any case, the Washington Statewide Worksearch Activity 
Program should be closely observed and carefully evaluated to 
determine the impact of such services on the labor market 
experiences of claimants and to assess the cost effectiveness of 
the program.
Beginning July 1986, Washington's new program was being 
tested as part of an experiment implemented in a local office in 
Tacoma, Washington. 69 In this experiment, with the assistance 
of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, claim 
ants were being assigned to a control group and to various test 
groups that would provide for considerably different levels of 
pressure and assistance to claimants in terms of finding work. At 
one extreme, the claimant merely signs the back of the benefit 
payment check certifying continued eligibility for benefits. At 
the other extreme, claimants who don't find work after a few 
weeks are given substantial assistance in seeking work. This 
experiment, covering a one-year period, should provide useful
68. Corson, Long and Nicholson (1984: xvii, 107-108).
69. This description of the Washington project is based on information provided to the 
authors by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
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information on how altering existing worksearch requirements 
and procedures affects claimant unemployment and reemploy- 
ment experiences.
Screening Profiles. 70 Another approach to dealing with the 
worksearch problem in the existing UC system would be to 
develop procedures to enforce greater compliance with existing 
requirements and/or to emphasize the reemployment assistance 
objective of such requirements. Screening profile approaches for 
these purposes have previously been used in both experimental 
and operational settings. The specialized employability services 
provided in the various services-to-claimants projects, for exam 
ple, were available only to job-ready claimants. 71 As another 
example, the "model cross-match" programs developed for 
states to implement postaudit procedures to detect overpayments 
due to unreported earnings contain a number of local options that 
allow states to target certain types of claims or claimants. 72 
Currently, the State of Utah is undertaking experimental work to 
assess the operational feasibility of using screening profiles to 
identify claimants with high overpayment probabilities. 73
What are the prospects for using statistical profiles to target 
state UC agency resources on claimants who (1) have high 
probabilities of violating worksearch/availability requirements 
(the negative emphasis) and/or (2) are most in need of employ- 
ability services (the positive emphasis)? In addressing this issue, 
Stevens contends:
Administrative sanctions for failure to satisfy continuing eligibil 
ity requirements affect claimant decisions about whether, and 
how, to seek employment. Local-office involvement in claimant 
job search behavior serves two not necessarily complementary 
functions: Continuing UI benefit eligibility enforcement, and 
positive job search assistance. One purpose for allocating local- 
office staff resources to revealing claimant job search activity is to 
fulfill the administrative enforcement function. The objective of
70. The discussion in this section draws heavily on Kingston and Burgess (1986) and 
Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and DePippo (1983).
71. Burgess and Kingston (1972: 1-2).
72. Porterfield, St. Louis, Burgess and Kingston (1980: 575-576).
73. See Utah Department of Employment Security (1986).
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this enforcement activity is to assure that availability, active 
search, and willingness to accept available (suitable) employment 
conditions for continuing eligibility are satisfied. . . . This means 
that attempts to accomplish both enforcement and assistance 
objectives with a single claimant selection procedure will create 
target inefficiencies in pursuing each goal. (A target inefficiency 
occurs when program resources are not restricted to serving the 
intended target population.) Furthermore, the procedures required 
to elicit information appropriate to the enforcement activity may 
be counterproductive in determining the need for positive job 
search assistance. 74
To the extent to which Stevens' assessment is correct, separate 
statistical profiles would be required to efficiently identify claimants 
for reemployment assistance v. eligibility enforcement. Given limited 
administrative resources, a fundamental policy issue may be whether 
the enforcement function is to take priority over the reemployment 
assistance function. Since available evidence does not provide much 
basis for optimism about the possibility of effectively emphasizing 
reemployment assistance, the remainder of this section focuses on 
eligibility enforcement.
The use of screening profiles to increase claimant compliance 
with UC eligibility criteria by increasing overpayment detection 
likelihoods already was discussed in chapter 6. Alternatively or 
in combination with that approach, such profiles also could be 
used to prevent overpayments by identifying benefit claims that 
should receive more intensive review prior to payment. Most 
claimants could be paid simply on the basis of their certification 
that they had met the eligibility criteria, while very detailed 
verifications could be conducted for claimants identified as 
high-risk claimants by computerized screening profiles. Obvi 
ously, the number of claimants subjected to detailed eligibility 
reviews would depend on the availability of administrative 
resources, as well as on target-efficiency insights gained during 
experimentation with this approach. Evidence to support the use 
of statistical profiles for preventing overpayments is extremely
74. Stevens (1977: 12-13).
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limited. However, based on the experimental work undertaken to 
construct such profiles for each of the five B-K-S study states, it 
was found that:
The overall conclusion of the study is that much more work with 
the techniques explored in this report clearly appears to be 
justified. Although the results differ among the states, the 
potential of utilizing screening profiles to target administrative 
resources on "high-risk" claimants in order to prevent overpay 
ments that otherwise would occur certainly is established by the 
findings of this study. 75
Similarly, in a more recent analysis, Kingston and Burgess concluded 
that:
... the results discussed above, combined with the findings of St. 
Louis, Burgess and Kingston on reported v. actual job contacts 
for the five states combined, strongly suggest that 
worksearch/availability noncompliance is systematically related 
to the expected benefits and costs of noncompliance, rather than 
randomly distributed among the claimant population. Accord 
ingly, it appears that statistical profiles could be used to effec 
tively identify high-risk v. low-risk claimants for differential 
administrative scrutiny. 76
As discussed in chapter 6, screening profiles have been criticized as 
being potentially discriminatory in nature; hence political and legal 
factors also will be relevant in determining whether such profiles could 
be used on an operational basis in the UC system.
Computer-Assisted Monitoring. Monitoring claimant compli 
ance with worksearch requirements and other aspects of the 
weekly eligibility criteria using "expert (computer) systems" 
was discussed in chapter 3. A basic implication of that discussion 
was that state UC agencies could better adapt to any given level 
of program complexity if computerized screening could be 
utilized for most claims. Such procedures could provide for a
75. Burgess, Kingston, St. Louis and DePippo (1983: ix).
76. Kingston and Burgess (1986: 38).
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less expensive and more comprehensive screening of claims and 
claimants than typically is possible under current procedures. 
This approach also would allow "human experts" in UC 
agencies to direct their attention to more difficult cases that could 
not be handled by computerized expert systems. Presumably, 
such an approach would make it possible for UC agencies to 
more effectively prevent overpayments for any given level of 
administrative funding and program complexity.
Although many state agencies use computerized monetary 
eligibility determinations, computerized monitoring of claimant 
compliance with weekly eligibility criteria is virtually nonexis 
tent in the UC system. 77 Accordingly, substantial research and 
pilot tests would be required before the expert system approach 
could be operationally implemented. Since it could be inefficient 
to have numerous state UC agencies working simultaneously on 
essentially the same project, it would be useful to have several 
(coordinated) research and demonstration projects initiated in 
this area, either through federal leadership or through the 
cooperative efforts of state UC agencies. As noted in chapter 3, 
evidence to establish the feasibility of computer-assisted moni 
toring is quite limited, but the potential benefits are so great that 
it is an approach that merits serious consideration.
Direct Reemployment Incentives
Consistent with the focus of this study on affecting claimant 
behavior through economic incentives, another approach that 
could be taken to encourage availability for work or active job 
search by UC claimants would involve increasing the financial 
returns to such activities. Such an approach contrasts with the 
emphasis of other approaches on obtaining increased claimant 
self-compliance by increasing the costs of noncompliance. Par 
ticularly interesting in terms of inducing faster reemployment by 
claimants are some experimental studies that have been initiated
77. Some experimental work has been conducted in this area. We are aware of no state that 
has actually adopted this approach on an operational basis, although some states do utilize 
computer-generated eligibility determinations (once agency personnel have gathered the neces 
sary facts and made a decision).
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during the past three years to determine the impact of various 
incentive schemes on the job search and reemployment experi 
ences of UC claimants. These experiments, conducted in Illinois 
and New Jersey, are briefly described below.
Illinois Project.™ During 1984, the Illinois Department of 
Employment Security, with the assistance of the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, conducted two experiments 
that involved the use of reemployment vouchers to encourage job 
search and reduce the duration of compensated unemployment. 
The first experiment provided for the payment of a cash bonus of 
$500 to any member of a randomly selected group of UC 
claimants who had obtained employment of 30 hours per week or 
more before the end of the eleventh week of unemployment 
following an initial claim for UC benefits; in order to qualify for 
the cash bonus, the claimant had to hold the new job for a 
minimum of four months. An analysis of this experiment by 
Spiegelman and Woodbury has indicated that the duration of 
insured unemployment for the test group that was eligible for the 
reemployment cash bonuses was significantly less than that 
recorded for an otherwise similar control group not eligible for 
such bonuses. The amount of benefits paid to test group 
members over their entire benefit years was about $200 per 
claimant less than the amount paid to otherwise similar control 
group members. Since only part of the test group received bonus 
payments, the bonus cost per test claimant was less than $100. 
No information is yet available, however, on the quality of the 
reemployment jobs obtained by test v. control group members, 
but such an analysis will be possible with the information being 
collected from the Illinois study.
The second experiment conducted in Illinois provided for the 
payment of a reemployment bonus to the UC claimant's new 
employer, rather than to the claimant. In this case as well, 
reemployment must have occurred by the end of the eleventh 
week following the filing of the initial claim, and it was 
necessary that the claimant hold the new job for at least four
78. See Spiegelman and Woodbury (1986) for details of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance 
Experiments.
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months in order for the employer to be eligible for the cash 
bonus. A preliminary assessment by Spiegelman and Woodbury 
has indicated that there may have been some initial reduction in 
regular state UC benefits received by the group whose new 
employers were eligible for the cash bonus, compared with an 
otherwise similar control group of UC claimants whose new 
employers were not eligible for such a bonus. This reduction in 
state UC benefit payments, however, did not persist throughout 
the benefit year for the entire test group involved in the study, 
although the effect did persist for white, female claimants. Based 
on the information now available, it appears that, overall, the 
payment of $500 cash bonuses to UC claimants had a larger 
impact in reducing the duration of their compensated unemploy 
ment spells than did the payment of $500 bonuses to the new 
employers of claimants.
The New Jersey Project. 79 The New Jersey Department of 
Labor and the U.S. Department of Labor recently approved the 
final design of an experiment that provides for, among other 
services and assistance, the payment of cash reemployment 
bonuses to those likely to exhaust their UC benefits and to have 
difficulties returning to jobs that are similar to their previous 
ones. This group includes those who are laid off, not subject to 
recall, and who are predicted, on the basis of additional 
demographic and labor force data, to experience reemployment 
problems.
The demonstration project is being conducted in 10 UC local 
offices in New Jersey, with approximately 9,000 claimants to be 
randomly selected for the experiment; this number is expected to 
produce the approximately 3,000 individuals who will receive 
the full range of services (including eligibility for the reemploy 
ment cash bonus) provided by the special study. Those who 
reach the fifth week of UC-compensated unemployment will be 
screened to identify those predicted to experience reemployment 
problems, and this group then will be randomly divided into a 
test and control group. Specialized assistance, including eligi-
79. See U.S. Department of Labor (1986a) for details of the New Jersey Unemployment 
Demonstration Project.
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bility for the reemployment cash bonus, then will be provided to 
the test group, and the impact of the specialized assistance 
provided will be assessed by comparing the experiences of test v. 
control group members.
The following factors were considered in developing the 
design for the reemployment bonus payments: (1) the payment 
should encourage claimants to return to work quickly (i.e., it 
should reduce the reemployment wage rate they are willing to 
accept); (2) the bonus should be structured so that it provides 
claimants with clear incentives for reemployment that they can 
fully comprehend; (3) the bonus should be structured so as to 
discourage reemployment in minimum wage jobs, jobs far below 
the earnings potential of claimants, or very short-term jobs; (4) 
the bonus should resemble a UC "cash-out program" in which 
claimants receive a part of their remaining entitlement in 
exchange for not exhausting all of it; and (5) the bonus should 
have the potential of saving the UC program money if imple 
mented on a statewide basis. 80
Consistent with these criteria, the reemployment bonus was 
structured so that it would provide claimants with offers of 
one-half of their remaining UC benefit entitlements in exchange 
for becoming reemployed (it is estimated that this amount will 
equal about $1,500 for the average participant). Of interest as 
well is the fact that the amount of the bonus will decline at a 
steady rate of 10 percent per week after the fifth week until it 
reaches zero, again providing a strong financial incentive for 
rapid reemployment. Claimants become eligible for the bonus 
after five to seven weeks of their current claims filing period. Job 
tenure requirements also were established for the bonus pay 
ments; the individual must be employed four weeks to qualify for 
60 percent of the bonus, and an additional eight weeks to qualify 
for the remaining 40 percent. Participation in the bonus program, 
however, does not necessarily exhaust the claimant's entitlement 
to benefits for the entire benefit year. If, for example, the 
individual becomes unemployed through no fault of his or her
80. U.S. Department of Labor (1986a: 15).
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own, the claimant once again becomes eligible for any remaining 
weekly benefits.
An interim report on the New Jersey experiment is planned for 
the summer of 1987. The final report on this New Jersey project 
is anticipated in September 1988.
Conclusions on Reemployment Incentives. Evidence on the 
impact of reemployment bonus or subsidy schemes is only now 
becoming available and will continue to accumulate over the 
next several years. Current findings indicate that claimants do 
respond to the availability of reemployment bonuses by returning 
to work more quickly than in the absence of such bonuses. We 
believe that these limited findings provide additional evidence 
that UC claimants do respond to variations in the benefits and 
costs associated with job search activities. In light of the 
difficulties involved in enforcing either current or perhaps even 
revised availability for work and active job search eligibility 
criteria, we believe that additional experimentation with the 
payment of reemployment bonuses or similar incentive-altering 
schemes is warranted and should be encouraged. Needless to 
say, further work on appropriately increasing the costs of 
claimant noncompliance provides a complementary approach to 
such reemployment incentive schemes.
Conclusions
There can be no doubt that state agency personnel confront 
substantial difficulties in attempting to monitor claimant compli 
ance with weekly UC eligibility criteria. Although the specific 
difficulties of attempting to enforce active worksearch require 
ments are discussed in this chapter, similar but even more serious 
problems probably are involved in attempting to monitor claim 
ant compliance with the broader availability requirements in 
cluded in all state laws. In any case, available evidence certainly 
indicates that noncompliance with existing worksearch/avail- 
ability requirements may be quite substantial. Accordingly, 
policymakers and UC program administrators should consider 
the possibility of adopting new policies for dealing with such 
noncompliance.
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A number of different responses to relatively high levels of 
noncompliance with stated worksearch/availability requirements 
might be considered, including: (1) elimination of the worksearch 
requirement; (2) replacement of the worksearch requirement with 
criteria that can be more objectively defined and enforced; (3) 
imposition of stricter worksearch requirements; (4) improved 
administration of existing (or altered) worksearch requirements; 
and (5) use of direct and positive reemployment incentives. The 
desirability of any of these approaches or others that might be 
considered obviously will depend on subjective evaluations that 
will vary among the states. However, as indicated by the analysis 
in this chapter, certain impacts of each approach can be clearly 
identified.
In our view, the analysis in this chapter suggests that some 
combination of the following approaches could make a substan 
tial contribution to improving both agency monitoring efforts and 
claimant self-compliance with stated eligibility criteria: (1) 
research and demonstration projects to determine the impacts on 
the unemployment and reemployment experiences of insured 
workers of existing or altered worksearch requirements (includ 
ing the elimination of such requirements); (2) research and 
demonstration projects to determine the impact of imposing 
stricter monetary eligibility criteria that include weeks-of-work 
requirements as either replacements for or as supplements to 
existing worksearch requirements; (3) adopting more specific 
and objectively identifiable measures for determining compli 
ance with availability for work and active search provisions; (4) 
improving the administration of existing or altered worksearch 
requirements through the use of computerized screening profiles 
to target administrative resources on high-risk claimants; (5) the 
use of computerized expert systems to further screen claimants 
for compliance with the weekly eligibility criteria prior to the 
payment of benefits; and (6) further experimentation with direct 
and positive reemployment incentive schemes. Given the diffi 
culty of effectively administering the weekly eligibility criteria, 
it is probable that the most effective solution will involve some 
combination of these approaches.

8 
Summary and Conclusions
The principal findings and recommendations of this study are 
summarized in this chapter. Brief summaries are included for the 
analyses of: payment errors (chapter 2); adverse effects of 
program complexity (chapter 3); adverse federal impacts of 
administrative funding procedures (chapter 4) and performance 
criteria (chapter 5); adverse incentives within state systems that 
affect claimants, employers and state agency personnel (chapter 
6); and the difficulties involved in attempting to monitor claim 
ant compliance with weekly UC eligibility criteria (chapter 7). 
Some overall study conclusions complete the chapter.
Principal Findings
1. The high overpayment rates documented for some states, 
combined with the analysis in this study, indicate that overpay 
ments constitute a major problem for the UC system as a whole. 
Moreover, many actual overpayments are not detected by routine 
operational procedures.
2. High overpayment rates are symptomatic of more funda 
mental problems that appear to be relevant for all states. These 
problems include: (a) difficulties posed by system complexity; 
(b) adverse incentives for system participants; and (c) the 
extreme difficulties state agencies have in attempting to effec 
tively monitor claimant compliance with weekly eligibility 
criteria.
3. Although all social payment systems must have some 
criteria to distinguish eligible from ineligible participants, costs 
and benefits determine the optimum detail of such criteria. By
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this measure, the UC system appears to be excessively complex, 
particularly since existing complexity levels likely result in a 
large number of adverse impacts.
4. The federal administrative funding procedures utilized from 
the mid-1970s through at least FY 1987 contained numerous 
incentives that very likely have adversely affected state UC 
systems.
5. Federal performance criteria neglect many important as 
pects of state UC program quality and tend to create adverse 
incentives by overemphasizing the speed v. the quality of claim 
processing and payments.
6. Adverse incentives within state UC systems typically do not 
discourage and may even encourage ineligible claimants to file 
for benefits.
7. With limited exceptions, employer participation in the UC 
system is likely to focus primarily on macro efforts by groups of 
employers to constrain overall program costs, since the tax 
incentives for individual employers to engage in micro monitor 
ing of individual claimant compliance with eligibility criteria are 
quite weak.
8. State agency personnel typically have very limited incen 
tives to prevent either underpayments or overpayments, to detect 
or recover overpayments or to emphasize certain other aspects of 
overall UC program quality.
9. The interaction of excessive program complexity, limited 
administrative funding and adverse incentives makes it ex 
tremely difficult for state agencies to effectively monitor claim 
ant compliance with many UC program requirements, especially 
those that must be met on a weekly basis.
Recommendations
The appropriate responses to the problems analyzed in this 
study obviously depend on value judgments that federal/state 
policymakers and UC program administrators ultimately must 
make. Also, the specific applicability of particular responses to 
individual states obviously varies with state-specific circum 
stances. Nonetheless, the analysis strongly suggests that certain
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policy responses generally should be given serious consideration 
for the UC system as a whole. In our opinion, the most important 
of these generally applicable responses—for which details were 
provided in the pertinent chapters of this study—include the 
following:
1. Comprehensive analyses of the data bases available from 
both the Random Audit program in 46 states and from the 
Quality Control program in all states should prove useful in 
developing appropriate corrective plans in particular states.
2. Federal and state efforts should be undertaken to reduce the 
complexity of UC eligibility criteria and the forms, procedures 
and policies utilized to administer such criteria. Legislative 
contributions could include a greater awareness of the feasibility 
of effectively administering current or proposed UC program 
provisions, especially given limited administrative funding allo 
cations. Legislators also could eliminate, revise or replace UC 
provisions that are inconsistent or particularly difficult to admin 
ister. Administrative contributions could include the develop 
ment of less complex forms and procedures for implementing 
federal and state laws.
3. Because political realities undoubtedly will significantly 
constrain attempts to reduce complexity, another major contri 
bution to an improved UC system would be to develop better 
policies and procedures for administering existing (or reduced) 
levels of program complexity. Detailed, written guidelines for 
administering law/policy would represent such an improvement 
in states that do not have such guidelines. Computerized expert 
systems appear to have the potential for cost effectively improv 
ing the consistency with which UC eligibility criteria are applied. 
Similarly, computerized screening profiles may represent a 
cost-effective technique for better utilizing existing administra 
tive resources by identifying high-risk claimants for special 
scrutiny. Further experimentation and operational pilot tests 
should be conducted in order to better assess the feasibility of 
implementing both expert systems and computerized screening 
profiles as operational techniques.
4. The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) should reduce the 
complexity of both its administrative funding and performance
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evaluations required in carrying out its responsibilities under 
federal law.
5. Major changes should be made to correct the numerous 
adverse incentives/impacts of USDOL's administrative funding 
process, or an alternative funding system should be developed. 
The changes implemented by USDOL in making FY 1987 
funding allocations represent an important step in reducing the 
complexity of its past funding process and in giving the states a 
needed increase in spending flexibility. Alternative funding 
systems could include a system of federal block grants to states 
or "devolution" of administrative funding responsibility from 
the federal government to the states. However, adoption of either 
alternative alone would not eliminate all of the current problems 
associated with the allocation of administrative funds.
6. Existing USDOL performance criteria should be improved 
by introducing an effective emphasis on payment accuracy to 
balance the existing emphasis on processing and payment 
promptness. Such a balanced emphasis now would be possible, 
given the Quality Control program for detecting payment errors 
in state programs. In addition, substantial revisions should be 
made in USDOL's Quality Appraisal system, including a revised 
system for measuring overall program quality.
7. Steps should be taken to greatly increase the incentives of 
state agency personnel to prevent both underpayments and 
overpayments, to detect and recover overpayments that occur 
and to emphasize other aspects of overall UC program quality.
8. Existing claimant incentives for deliberate noncompliance 
with stated UC eligibility criteria should be altered substantially 
to encourage self-compliance by increasing the claimant's cur 
rently very low costs of noncompliance. A potentially effective 
technique for raising claimant noncompliance costs may be the 
application of computerized screening profiles to target admin 
istrative resources on high-risk claimants who belong to groups 
with above average likelihoods of violating availability/work- 
search criteria; such profiles should be developed and tested.
9. Claimant self-compliance with UC eligibility criteria also 
could be increased by: (a) increasing the nominal penalties for 
detected instances of noncompliance; (b) applying any nominal
UC System Payment Errors 239
penalties assessed for detected overpayments much more effec 
tively; and (c) shifting more of the burden of proof for establish 
ing eligibility for benefits from state agencies to claimants. 
Another possibility for increasing claimant compliance incen 
tives and possibly speeding claimant reemployment may be to 
offer reemployment bonuses, such as those included in some 
recent experimental studies; these studies should be carefully 
evaluated to determine the benefits and costs of such bonuses.
10. States should adopt more specific and more clearly 
understood weekly eligibility criteria; they should develop more 
objective ways to assess claimant compliance with these criteria.
11. Research and demonstration projects should be undertaken 
to determine the impacts on the unemployment and reemploy 
ment experiences of insured workers of existing or altered 
worksearch requirements, the elimination of such requirements, 
and the use of direct reemployment incentives.
12. Research and demonstration projects should be undertaken 
to determine the impact of imposing stricter monetary eligibility 
criteria that include weeks-of-work requirements as either re 
placements for or as supplements to existing worksearch require 
ments.
13. Interstate cooperation in the research, policy formulation 
and evaluation stages of developing reform proposals should be 
strongly encouraged because of the substantial benefits many 
state programs can derive from the testing and evaluation of 
particular changes in a small number of states. In this regard, the 
efforts of the states involved in the Quality Unemployment 
Insurance Project from August 1985 to the present are particu 
larly encouraging.
14. USDOL should provide substantial funding for the re 
search, demonstration projects and technical assistance required 
to evaluate alternative proposals for improving the existing UC 
system.
UC System Payment Errors
Prior to 1980, accurate and substantive evidence on the extent 
of overpayments in the UC system was not available. Although
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concerns about fraud and abuse often surfaced during the first 
45 years of the program, the first valid estimates of UC system 
overpayments were produced by the Kingston-Burgess study 
conducted for the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation during 1979-80. Some principal findings of the 
study—conducted in six major metropolitan areas over a 
six-month interval—were that: (1) the average overpayment rate 
for dollars of benefits paid for the six cities was nearly 14 
percent; and (2) the resource-intensive methods used to verify 
claimant eligibility for benefits in the special study produced 
estimated overpayment rates at least four times (and in one city 
42 times) the comparable rates detected by the regular 
operational procedures in five of those six cities. Subsequently, 
the Burgess-Kingston-St. Louis analysis of the U.S. Department 
of Labor's Random Audit program pilot tests, which were 
conducted in five statewide UC programs during 1981-1982, 
disclosed similar findings: (1) the average overpayment rate for 
dollars of benefits paid in the five states was just over 13 percent 
(and the percentage of weeks overpaid was even higher); (2) the 
total dollar amount of overpayments estimated for these five 
states for a one-year period ($392 million) exceeded by 60 
percent the total dollar amount of overpayments detected/ 
reported through regular operational procedures by all 53 UC 
jurisdictions combined for a comparable one-year period; and 
(3) violations of the worksearch requirement accounted for a 
substantial proportion of all UC dollars overpaid in these five 
states.
More recent evidence for the 46 states that participated in the 
Random Audit program during FY 1985 was released by 
USDOL in May 1987. The simple average overpayment rate for 
these states during FY 1985 was 15.6 percent. Given that 
approximately $14.3 billion in UC benefits were paid during FY 
1985, USDOL estimated that overpayments could have amounted 
to as much as $2.2 billion during that one-year period. Further 
more, if UC program outlays average $16 billion per year over 
the next four years, as USDOL recently projected, a 15 percent 
overpayment rate would result in overpayments during this 
interval of about $9.6 billion.
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Payment Error Conclusions
The evidence on UC payment errors presented in this study 
and summarized above strongly suggests the existence of a 
significant overpayment problem that is much more serious than 
indicated by the overpayments routinely detected and reported by 
state agencies to USDOL. However, a major theme of this study 
is that high overpayment rates per se are not necessarily the 
fundamental issue to be addressed by policymakers and UC 
program administrators. Overall UC program "quality" in a state 
clearly cannot be judged solely on the basis of that state's 
overpayment rate. It is hoped that policymakers and UC program 
administrators will recognize that high overpayment rates are 
symptomatic of more fundamental problems which very likely 
represent important issues for all states, whether their detected 
rates of overpayments are low or high. These more fundamental 
problems are: (1) UC system complexity; (2) adverse incentives 
in federal-state relationships; (3) adverse incentives within state 
UC systems; and (4) largely because of the first three problems, 
extreme difficulties in attempting to monitor claimant compli 
ance with UC eligibility criteria.
Payment Error Responses
Because payment error problems are not basically distinct 
from the fundamental problems just noted, responses to high 
payment error rates should focus primarily on these underlying 
causal factors. Some useful information about both high over 
payment rates and the more fundamental problems could be 
obtained through comprehensive analyses of the Random Audit 
program data bases that exist in 46 states and the Quality Control 
program data bases that now are available in all states. Such 
analyses could provide insight into issues such as: (1) What are 
the main operational sources or causes of payment errors? (2) 
How are quarterly changes in error rates to be interpreted? (3) Do 
error concentrations suggest certain types of corrective actions? 
and (4) Are payment errors more likely to occur among certain 
types of claims or claimants? Certainly, information related to 
these questions would be useful in formulating specific correc-
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tive action plans in particular states. Interstate cooperation in the 
research, policy formulation and evaluation stages also would be 
desirable because of the similarities among state programs. 
Although the above analyses would yield some useful insights, 
responses to the fundamental problems noted would be central to 
any major effort to substantially improve the existing UC 
system. Consequently, those fundamental issues are stressed in 
the remainder of this chapter.
Adverse Effects of UC Program Complexity
The complexity of the UC program, particularly in regard to 
eligibility rules, is described in some detail in chapter 3. 
Although a number of different examples of such complexity are 
presented, the most compelling evidence is provided by the time 
required to fully verify claimant eligibility for benefits, given the 
specified rules. It was found in both the Kingston-Burgess and 
Burgess-Kingston-St. Louis studies, for example, that an aver 
age of between 8 and 13 hours of direct case time was required 
to determine if an individual claimant was actually eligible for a 
single week of compensated unemployment that already had 
been paid! Furthermore, as noted in chapter 7, even these 
comprehensive investigations often were not sufficient to deter 
mine if claimants actually had made the job search contacts they 
reported to meet eligibility requirements.
Conclusions on Adverse Effects of Complexity
Although the issue of whether existing eligibility rules are too 
complex is a matter about which reasonable individuals may 
disagree, this study strongly suggests that the existing UC system 
is excessively complex in terms of the costs, relative to the 
benefits, of such complexity. If existing levels of complexity 
remain unchanged, the costs (relative to a less complex system) 
almost certainly would include some or all of the following: (1) 
considerable uncertainty by both claimants and state agency 
personnel as to whether particular circumstances make a claim 
ant eligible or ineligible for support; (2) perceptions by many
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claimants that substantive eligibility verifications could not be 
routinely conducted, and reduced incentives for claimants to 
engage in self-compliance because of the costs of doing so in a 
complex system; (3) reduced incentives for employers to assist 
state UC agency personnel in monitoring claimant compliance 
with weekly eligibility criteria because UC system complexity 
greatly reduces the net monetary returns of monitoring activities 
by employers; (4) reduced incentives for state agency personnel 
to prevent or detect payment errors because UC eligibility 
criteria may be perceived as too complex for effective or 
equitable enforcement in any case; (5) substantial discretionary 
authority for individual claim processors to selectively enforce 
eligibility criteria; (6) frequent violations of horizontal equity for 
claimants and employers who interact with the UC system under 
similar circumstances; (7) frequent payment errors (whether 
routinely detected or not); (8) very high administrative costs 
from attempting to fully administer complex provisions; and (9) 
possibly some effects on the volume of claims filed, either 
because potentially eligible claimants are discouraged from filing 
by complexity or because ineligible claimants are encouraged to 
file because of confusion or the relatively limited ability of 
agency personnel to identify some types of ineligible claims.
Responses to Adverse Effects of Complexity
Responses to the effects of program complexity could include 
a substantial increase in administrative funding, a reduction in 
program complexity or improved methods of administering any 
given level of program complexity. Because a substantial in 
crease in administrative funding seems neither likely nor even 
desirable, particularly in the absence of other changes discussed 
in this study, chapter 3 focuses on either reducing program 
complexity or improving law/policy/administrative procedures. 
Given the variety of viable responses that might be considered 
and the strong likelihood that many of them undoubtedly would 
result in unintended side effects, however, it is difficult to 
overemphasize the importance of pilot studies in correctly 
assessing possible approaches for program improvements.
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Reducing complexity in eligibility requirements would require 
policymakers and UC program administrators to confront the 
controversial issue of which subtle distinctions they are willing to 
forego. This issue also should be evaluated in light of the costs 
and difficulties involved in attempting to administer relatively 
complex eligibility distinctions. A policy dilemma in this process 
is that simplifying complex rules would almost inevitably alter the 
mix of claimants somewhat, perhaps allowing some "undeserv 
ing" claimants to receive benefits or precluding some "deserv 
ing" claimants from the receipt of benefits. Regardless of one's 
views on the desirability of distinguishing among various eligi 
bility circumstances, it must be recognized that administrative 
resources represent a major constraint in terms of how much 
complexity can be effectively and equitably administered.
Even if the benefits of less complex rules and procedures 
might be substantial, there can be little doubt that political 
realities are likely to substantially constrain overall system 
simplification. Accordingly, implementing better policies and 
procedures for administering any given level of program com 
plexity could represent an important contribution to an improved 
UC system. It appears that, at least in some states, more clearly 
specifying legislative intent could represent an improvement in 
this context. Other changes emphasized in chapter 3 include the 
following: (1) the development of detailed, written guidelines for 
administering state law/policy (in states that do not currently 
have such guidelines); (2) the development of computerized 
expert systems to improve the administration of UC eligibility 
criteria (particularly because of the increased consistency and 
presumably reduced costs that would result from this approach); 
and (3) the development of computerized screening profiles to 
identify high-risk v. low-risk claimants, so that claimant com 
pliance can be increased by targeting administrative resources 
more heavily on the former group.
Adverse Incentives in Federal-State Relationships
The two dimensions of federal-state UC program relationships 
emphasized in this study relate to USDOL's administrative
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funding procedures for state programs and the performance 
criteria by which USDOL evaluates state programs. The incen 
tives confronted by state UC agencies in these areas exert a 
strong influence on the quality of state UC programs.
Administrative Funding
USDOL's administrative funding system, as explained in 
chapter 4, has adversely impacted on payment accuracy and 
overall UC program quality in a number of ways. Consensus or 
near-consensus views on such impacts, at least by informed 
observers outside of USDOL, include the following: (1) the 
administrative funding system has been excessively complex; (2) 
funding complexity has discouraged long-range planning and 
made it extremely difficult for state administrators to accurately 
estimate the funding impact of implementing innovative pro 
grams or procedures; (3) underestimation of national workloads, 
combined with a conscious policy of underfunding the unit time 
factors implied by those workloads, has adversely affected state 
programs because of the base-contingency funding procedures 
utilized to allocate funds to the states; (4) administrative funding 
procedures often have forced states to rely heavily on part-time 
and seasonal employees, and this reliance may have increased 
the frequency of payment errors and otherwise may have reduced 
program quality; (5) administrative funding shortages have been 
particularly acute for nonpersonal services, which include com 
puter costs; (6) administrative funding procedures have contained 
strong disincentives for states to automate their claim processing 
and payment systems; (7) funding procedures have failed to 
reward cost efficiencies in state programs and even may have 
encouraged states to increase the complexity of their programs; 
(8) funding procedures have failed to provide direct incentives 
for states to emphasize payment accuracy, overpayment preven 
tion or overpayment detection and recovery efforts; and (9) 
largely as a reflection of the above factors, the funding process 
has contained strong disincentives for emphasizing overall UC 
program quality. It should be noted that USDOL does not accept 
each of the above statements as valid characterizations of the 
administrative funding process. Details of the positions taken by
246 CHAPTER 8
various parties on these issues are discussed in chapter 4. Some 
potentially important changes in the administrative funding 
process were implemented by USDOL for FY 1987 state 
allocations.
Administrative Funding Conclusions. Most states contend they 
are seriously underfunded. The analysis in this study indicates 
that they actually are much more underfunded than even they 
contend, relative to the funding that would be required to attempt 
to fully verify claimant compliance with existing law/policy. In 
fact, the evidence from the Kingston-Burgess and Burgess- 
Kingston-St. Louis studies cited earlier strongly suggests that, in 
the absence of other changes, it would take perhaps 30-50 times 
existing funding levels for state agencies to attempt to fully verify 
the weekly benefit eligibility of each claimant paid. Such a large 
increase in administrative funding obviously is neither feasible 
nor desirable. Although specific underfunding of automation 
costs appears to be especially acute in the existing system, an 
increase in overall funding levels certainly does not appear to be 
the appropriate solution for the administrative funding problems 
analyzed in this study. Rather, the focus should be on either 
eliminating the adverse incentives/impacts of USDOL's past 
funding procedures or on replacing that funding process with an 
altogether different one. Also, it appears that states should be 
encouraged to consider program simplification and administra 
tive improvements as more effective responses to perceived 
underfunding of state operations than substantially increased 
administrative funding levels.
Administrative Funding Responses. The following four ap 
proaches to revising the existing administrative funding process 
are considered in chapter 4: (1) maintaining but greatly improv 
ing USDOL's funding system; (2) federal funding for "model" 
state UC systems; (3) a system of federal block grants to the 
states; and (4) devolution of administrative funding from the 
federal government to the states.
The main features of maintaining but improving USDOL's 
past funding system would include: (1) a much less complex 
system that would allow states to determine how funding 
allocations would be affected by organizational/operational
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changes; (2) incentives for states to adopt less complex eligibility 
criteria, other things equal; (3) incentives for states to minimize 
administrative costs for any given set of eligibility criteria and 
any given level of overall program quality; (4) incentives to 
encourage all state UC system participants (claimants, covered 
employers and UC agency personnel) to emphasize compliance 
with state law/policy, including incentives for payment accuracy 
and the prevention of payment errors; (5) incentives for state 
agencies to detect/recover benefit overpayments; (6) incentives 
to encourage appropriate administrative innovations, particularly 
appropriate automation of state operations; (7) considerable 
flexibility in allowing states to determine how to most efficiently 
allocate any given total administrative funding level among 
various expenditure categories; (8) incentives for states to 
emphasize overall UC program quality; and (9) incentives for 
states to conduct the research/pilot tests necessary to evaluate 
various proposals for improving the existing UC system. Many 
of the above issues and incentives also would be directly relevant 
for the other three approaches to revising USDOL's funding 
process. Significantly, it appears that USDOL's changes in its 
administrative funding process for FY 1987 include some of the 
above changes, especially greater spending flexibility (item 7 
above) and apparently a less complex funding system that may 
help states determine how possible changes could affect their 
funding levels (item 1 above). Thus, it appears that USDOL 
already has taken some steps that could contribute to a greatly 
improved administrative funding system.
The second and third approaches to revising the administrative 
funding process also would leave control over the allocation of 
administrative funding among the states with USDOL, as would 
be the case with the first approach discussed above. Under the 
second approach, USDOL would fund each state only for 
performing the tasks contained in a model UC system that 
included cost standards to reflect efficient administrative opera 
tions; under this approach, a consensus view of an ideal or 
acceptable UC system would have to be developed, with federal 
funding provided to (efficiently) administer just the provisions of 
such a model system in each state. Funding for the administra-
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tion of additional program provisions beyond those included in 
the model system would not be provided by USDOL, but rather 
would have to be provided by individual states. However, 
obtaining a consensus among the parties involved as to the 
components of such a model system obviously would be very 
difficult.
Under the third approach to improving the administrative 
funding process, USDOL would provide block grants to the 
states for administering their UC systems. This approach would 
allow each state to determine how best to allocate its grant 
among various administrative expenditure categories. USDOL's 
FY 1987 changes, and particularly the emphasis on increasing 
state spending flexibility, may be a step towards a funding 
system that more nearly approaches such a block grant concept. 
If this proposed approach were combined with the other im 
provements in USDOL's past funding system suggested above, it 
could represent a very substantial improvement over that past 
funding system.
The fourth approach to revising the administrative funding 
process would completely alter the existing responsibility and 
authority for determining administrative funding levels for state 
programs by shifting it from USDOL to the states themselves. 
One rationale for the devolution of administrative funding 
authority and responsibility to the states would be to correct 
several of the adverse incentives in USDOL's funding process 
noted above. In particular, making each state responsible for its 
own administrative funding might result in less complex state 
programs and greater incentives for administrative efficiency, 
automation and innovations than have existed in the past. In 
addition, such a change would effectively eliminate the inflexi 
bility of USDOL in recognizing state diversity which has been a 
common complaint among the states. Another rationale for 
devolvement proposals is simply to make administrative funding 
(the smaller part of total UC program costs) comparable to 
benefit payment funding (the larger part of total UC program 
costs). Under devolution, the dollars spent for all UC program 
costs within a state—whether for benefit payments or for 
program administration—would be funded by employment se-
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curity taxes collected from the covered employers of that state 
(and, in a few states, also from covered employees).
Decisions about the most appropriate responses to the funding 
problems confronted by the UC system obviously depend on 
value judgments which policy makers will have to make. Despite 
the difficulty of dealing with the issues raised, it probably is the 
case that fundamental improvements in the existing UC system 
would, at the very least, be quite difficult to achieve without 
either substantial revisions in or replacement of USDOL's past 
administrative funding process. USDOL's FY 1987 changes in 
its funding process appear to be an important start toward 
potentially significant improvements.
Performance Criteria
The analysis in chapter 5 indicates that federal performance 
criteria also impact significantly on the operation of state UC 
systems. For nearly a decade, USDOL has utilized the Quality 
Appraisal system (or its predecessor) as a major source of 
information about the overall quality of state UC program 
operations. Fundamental to the portion of this system that deals 
with benefit and claim operations is the measurement of state 
compliance with a number of Desired Levels of Achievement 
(DLAs) related to both the quality and speed of claim processing 
and benefit payments. It is quite clear that these DLAs created 
adverse incentives for payment accuracy, the control of overpay 
ments and overall program quality. In previous years, these 
performance criteria have reflected an overemphasis on the 
promptness with which claims were processed and paid, quite 
possibly at the expense of a reduced emphasis on payment 
accuracy. It should be noted, however, that a number of USDOL 
performance criteria—including those for prompt payments— 
have been introduced as a result of judicial decisions outside of 
USDOL control. Despite some encouraging steps to begin 
correcting this imbalance in very recent years, an effective 
emphasis on payment accuracy still appears to be lacking.
Performance Criteria Conclusions. The benefit and claim 
portion of the UI Quality Appraisal program contains a number 
of characteristics that limit its usefulness for evaluating the
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overall quality of state UC programs. These features include, but 
are not limited to, the following: (1) no DLA for payment 
accuracy, and no statistically valid quality measurement system 
for statewide UC programs; (2) an overemphasis on the speed v. 
the quality of claim processing and benefit payments; (3) 
inappropriate statistical design and sampling procedures to ob 
tain valid, statewide estimates for the quality (but not for the 
promptness) measures included in the system; and (4) a relatively 
limited set of criteria for evaluating overall program quality. 
Other limitations are discussed in chapter 5.
Performance Criteria Responses. A major improvement in 
existing USDOL performance criteria would be to introduce an 
effective emphasis on payment accuracy to offset the existing 
emphasis on processing and payment promptness. The Quality 
Control program provides a statistically valid basis for estimating 
statewide payment errors for both overpayments and underpay 
ments, though not erroneous denials of benefits. Thus, measures 
of payment accuracy could be added to existing performance 
criteria by utilizing results from this recently implemented 
program. In addition to payment accuracy criteria, it also would 
be important to recognize other dimensions of program quality, 
and to develop reasonable measures of those dimensions as part 
of an overall system for measuring state performance. Formula 
tion of these additional criteria would be an extremely difficult 
task which would require both the expertise of federal/ state UC 
program personnel and technical research assistance. However, 
assuming USDOL continues to have a major role in state UC 
programs, the development of a better system for measuring 
program quality is important. Clearly, the costs as well as the 
benefits of developing/implementing additional criteria must be 
carefully identified and evaluated to determine appropriate re 
sponses. In many cases, this would require extensive research 
and pilot tests to evaluate the intended, as well as any unin 
tended, effects of proposed performance criteria. Furthermore, 
the diversity of state UC systems should be recognized in the 
above process, but such diversity does not appear to justify 
arguments against implementing additional measures of program 
quality (including payment accuracy criteria).
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Adverse Incentives Within State UC Systems
The incentives confronted by covered employers, state UC 
agency personnel and claimants also contribute to payment errors 
and other program quality problems. These issues are analyzed 
in chapter 6. Incentives for each of these UC system participants 
are briefly summarized below.
In considering employer incentives, it is useful to distinguish 
between macro and micro employer interests in the UC system. 
From a macro viewpoint, employers as a group have strong 
incentives to seek relatively strict benefit eligibility criteria for 
all claimants and to encourage effective administrative opera 
tions and strict eligibility interpretations by UC agency person 
nel. These macro interests are motivated by employer incentives 
to constrain UC program costs and therefore employer tax costs. 
In contrast, the incentives of individual employers to engage in 
micro monitoring to control charges to their own individual 
reserve accounts are quite different. In particular, holding aside 
job separation issues and the monetary eligibility of former 
employees who apply for benefits, the micro incentives for 
typical employers to attempt to monitor the compliance of their 
former employees with the weekly eligibility criteria (e.g., 
active job search) are quite low. The associated monitoring costs 
would be very high in most cases. Moreover, relatively weak 
experience rating of UC program costs further erodes the micro 
incentives of individual employers for such monitoring.
The incentives of state UC agency personnel to prevent 
underpayments or overpayments, to detect overpayments or to 
recover overpayments also are quite limited. Excessive program 
complexity, limited funds for administering UC eligibility crite 
ria, performance criteria that place relatively greater emphasis on 
speed v. quality and typical state pay/promotion systems con 
tribute to an environment in which the prevention, detection and 
recovery of payment errors typically have not been emphasized.
UC claimants also are confronted with a set of incentives that 
fail to discourage, and actually may encourage, payment errors 
and low levels of self-compliance. Payment errors may occur 
accidentally (particularly given UC program complexity), but
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UC claimants also may knowingly accept UC benefits to which 
they are not entitled if the expected benefits of such actions 
exceed the expected costs. The costs of receiving UC benefits as 
an ineligible claimant are dependent on claimant estimates of: (1) 
the likelihood that noncompliance with UC eligibility criteria 
will be detected; (2) the likelihood that an overpayment will be 
established in instances of detected noncompliance; (3) the 
nominal penalties associated with established overpayments; and 
(4) the extent to which nominal penalties will be effectively 
enforced. It appears that the costs of noncompliance typically are 
quite low in the UC system, so that substantial (and deliberate) 
noncompliance with eligibility criteria would be expected.
Conclusions on Incentives Within State UC Systems
Employer participation in the UC system is likely to focus 
primarily on group efforts to constrain UC program costs. With 
the exception of monitoring separation issues and the monetary 
eligibility of former employees, employer incentives for attempt 
ing to independently monitor claimant compliance are likely to 
remain fairly weak.
It also appears that the incentives for state agency personnel to 
emphasize payment accuracy (and overpayment detection/ 
recovery efforts) and to consistently apply employment security 
law/policy are very limited. These limited incentives for state 
employees appear to be closely related to the adverse USDOL 
funding procedures and performance criteria that state systems as 
a whole confront. Nonetheless, careful reviews of the training, 
evaluation, pay and promotion systems in individual states 
undoubtedly would suggest many specific improvements, even 
in the absence of changes by USDOL.
The most effective approaches to reducing payment errors and 
increasing other dimensions of program quality—for any given 
degree of program complexity, administrative funding levels and 
performance criteria—are likely to be those designed to increase 
claimant self-compliance with UC eligibility criteria. These 
responses are discussed below.
Administering the Weekly Eligibility Criteria 253
Responses to Increase Claimant Self-Compliance
A number of measures could be introduced to increase 
claimant self-compliance with UC eligibility criteria. The use of 
computerized screening profiles to target administrative re 
sources on high-risk claimants may be an especially effective 
response. The advantages of using such techniques, however, 
have not yet been demonstrated because experimentation with 
this approach has only recently begun. Even though the limited 
available evidence suggests that the construction of screening 
profiles is technically feasible, some state agencies have ex 
pressed reservations about the development of such techniques 
because of legal or political concerns. These concerns obviously 
would have to be resolved before screening profiles could be 
utilized on an operational basis. Use of screening profiles, 
however, would induce claimants to increase self-compliance 
with UC eligibility criteria. Altering "burden of proof" require 
ments so that claimants had additional responsibilities to dem 
onstrate their eligibility for benefits also might increase both 
claimant incentives for self-compliance and the effectiveness of 
state agencies in monitoring claimant compliance with UC 
eligibility criteria. Other measures that would increase claimant 
self-compliance include: (1) increasing the rate at which over 
payments actually are established for detected instances of 
noncompliance; (2) increasing the nominal penalties for estab 
lished overpayments; (3) more effectively applying any nominal 
penalties assessed for established overpayments; and (4) increas 
ing the financial benefits associated with successful job search, 
including direct reemployment incentive schemes.
Administering the Weekly Eligibility Criteria
The difficulties confronted by state agency personnel in 
monitoring claimant compliance with weekly UC eligibility 
criteria—especially worksearch and availability-for-work re 
quirements—are analyzed in chapter 7. Evidence of the difficul 
ties involved is quite compelling. The most frequent cause of the 
overpayments detected in both the Kingston-Burgess and Bur-
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gess-Kingston-St. Louis studies was noncompliance with 
worksearch/availability requirements. In three of the five Bur- 
gess-Kingston-St. Louis study states, nearly half or more of all 
worksearch contacts listed by claimants could not be verified as 
either acceptable or unacceptable (even though an average of 
between 8 and 13 hours of direct case time was devoted to each 
case). Despite the inability to verify a substantial proportion of 
all reported job contacts in these states, it still was possible to 
document that an estimated one-fifth of those who certified that 
they had made one or more job contacts definitely had made 
none.
Monitoring Conclusions
Effective monitoring of any substantive worksearch require 
ment for all claimants simply is not feasible within the UC 
system as it currently operates. Furthermore, because the 
worksearch requirement actually can be more objectively defined 
and more easily monitored than the general availability-for-work 
criteria (or certain other aspects of the weekly eligibility criteria), 
it appears that the monitoring problems for these other criteria 
almost certainly are more serious than those specifically docu 
mented above for worksearch/ availability requirements. Despite 
any monitoring problems, however, it must be recognized that 
worksearch requirements also may serve a screening function in 
preventing payments to at least some ineligible claimants who 
actually are not available for or seeking work. However, so little 
evidence presently is available on this screening effect—and 
other effects of the worksearch requirement on job search and 
reemployment experiences—that additional evidence on this 
point would be very useful in evaluating the overall impact of the 
worksearch requirement.
Monitoring Responses
The monitoring problems summarized above suggest that 
policymakers and program administrators should consider the 
possibility of adopting new approaches to both the content and 
the administration of the weekly UC eligibility criteria. With
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respect to the worksearch requirement, a number of approaches 
might be considered, including: (1) elimination of the require 
ment, with or without compensating changes in other criteria; (2) 
imposition of stricter requirements; and (3) improved adminis 
tration of existing (or altered) requirements. Some expected 
effects of adopting any of these approaches are briefly summa 
rized below.
Elimination of worksearch requirements in states that currently 
have them clearly would reduce overpayment rates in those 
states, even without any other changes. However, elimination of 
the worksearch requirement (without any other changes) also 
would be expected to: (1) increase the overall volume of UC 
claims filed for any given level of aggregate demand; (2) reduce 
the ability of UC program personnel to effectively administer 
other aspects of the weekly eligibility criteria, particularly the 
general availability-for-work provisions; (3) increase the propor 
tion of claims filed that would be paid; and (4) increase the 
overall volume of UC benefits paid and, consequently, increase 
employer tax rates. The research and demonstration projects 
required to evaluate the extent of such effects should be 
undertaken as a basis for determining whether existing work- 
search requirements should be retained or eliminated.
Replacement of the worksearch requirement with more con 
crete criteria may appear to be a more viable option to many 
states than merely eliminating this requirement. Assuming that 
the UC system should emphasize the insurance of lost wages, a 
strong contender as a replacement for the worksearch require 
ment would be stricter monetary eligibility criteria that would 
include weeks-of-work requirements. Emphasizing such (objec 
tive) measures of past work attachment—rather than measures of 
current (and subjective) intentions to seek or accept work— 
would make it possible for UC program personnel to more 
objectively, consistently and inexpensively monitor claimant 
compliance with UC eligibility criteria. Consequently, the re 
search and demonstration projects required to evaluate the 
impact of stricter monetary criteria (including weeks-of-work 
requirements) should be encouraged. In fact, these experiments 
should be designed to reveal the impact of the stricter require-
256 CHAPTER 8
ments, both with and without current worksearch requirements. 
It may be the case that the difficulties of enforcing compliance 
with the worksearch requirement would be substantially reduced 
for the group of claimants who would continue to qualify for 
benefits once stricter monetary (and weeks-of-work) require 
ments had been imposed. Such insights, combined with those 
obtained from the studies designed to determine the impact of 
existing worksearch requirements, would facilitate more in 
formed judgments about the impact of imposing stricter mone 
tary (and weeks-of-work) requirements, as either a replacement 
for or as a supplement to existing worksearch requirements.
Another approach already utilized in some states and in the 
federal-state Extended Benefits program is to adopt stricter or 
more specific worksearch requirements. Among other effects, 
available evidence indicates that stricter requirements (other 
things equal): (1) would tend to decrease the volumes of claims 
filed and benefits paid; (2) might have some impact on the job 
search and reemployment experiences of claimants, but it ap 
pears that any positive effects likely would be very small; and (3) 
might result in potentially adverse side effects on claimant search 
strategies and employer recruitment costs. However, more spe 
cific worksearch requirements—as opposed to just stricter re 
quirements—might result in more effective enforcement of both 
worksearch requirements and other eligibility criteria.
Another possible response to the worksearch problem in the 
existing UC system would be to improve the administration of 
existing (or even altered) worksearch criteria. One possibility 
that merits serious consideration would be to develop computer 
ized screening profiles to identify high-risk claimants who 
belong to groups with above average overpayment rates. The 
high-risk group would receive special administrative scrutiny 
before payment, whereas most (low-risk) claimants would be 
paid simply on the basis of their certifications that they had 
complied with stated eligibility criteria. Although only limited 
experimental evidence is available, it appears that such an 
approach to preventing overpayments and inducing increased 
claimant self-compliance might be an operationally feasible one. 
As either a supplement to the above screening-profile approach
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or as a separate approach, it also might be possible to more 
effectively screen claimants for compliance with the weekly 
eligibility criteria by introducing computerized expert systems to 
screen claims for potential eligibility issues prior to payment.
The above considerations suggest that some combination of 
the following approaches could make a substantial contribution 
to improving both agency monitoring efforts and claimant 
self-compliance with UC eligibility criteria: (1) undertaking the 
research required to determine the impact of existing worksearch 
requirements on the unemployment, reemployment and UC- 
related experiences of insured workers; (2) conducting the 
research necessary to identify the impact of imposing stricter 
monetary (including weeks-of-work) requirements, either as a 
supplement to or as a replacement for existing worksearch 
requirements; (3) adopting more specific and objectively identi 
fiable measures for assessing compliance with availability-for- 
work and worksearch requirements; (4) exploring the impact of 
using screening profiles to target administrative resources on 
high-risk claimants who are less likely than most claimants to 
comply with stated worksearch/availability requirements; and (5) 
utilizing computerized expert systems to further screen claimants 
for compliance with the weekly eligibility criteria prior to the 
payment of benefits.
Overall Study Conclusions
The analysis provided in this study strongly suggests that the 
existing UC system could be substantially improved by adopting 
a number of the within-system reforms summarized in this 
chapter. Although a number of responses are suggested for the 
particular problems identified in the individual chapters of this 
study, it is important to emphasize that a systems approach 
should be taken in devising any overall set of reform proposals, 
either for federal-state relationships or for individual states. Such 
an approach is needed because of the interactive nature of the 
various components of the UC system. Because of these inter 
relationships, apparently plausible responses to specific prob 
lems might well generate unintended and undesirable side effects
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in terms of other program aspects. Consequently, it would be 
difficult to even evaluate the desirability of certain changes, 
except in the context of whatever overall changes might be 
considered for federal-state relationships and in particular state 
systems. Moreover, because of uncertainty about the exact 
impacts of many suggested changes, the importance of further 
research and experimental pilot studies to fully evaluate many of 
these changes must be reemphasized. In this context and given 
the existing administrative funding mechanism, USDOL has an 
important role to play in initiating, funding and providing 
technical assistance for such efforts. Interstate cooperation 
through the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agen 
cies or other organizations and through smaller groups of states 
interested in particular issues also would greatly facilitate UC 
system reform. In this latter regard, the recent efforts of some 
states in the Quality Unemployment Insurance Project appear to 
be important.
Although within-system reform is emphasized in this study, it 
very well could be that society's long-run interests might be 
better served by completely replacing the existing UC system 
with one that would be quite different from even a reformed 
version of the present system. However, a serious analysis of the 
many issues that would be involved in designing an optimal 
replacement for the existing system was completely beyond the 
scope of this study. Accordingly, such issues were not ad 
dressed.
Whether the within-system policy responses emphasized in 
this study, still other within-system responses, or a major 
restructuring of the entire UC system ultimately is selected by 
policymakers, the analysis in this study strongly suggests that 
certain guidelines would be important in evaluating whatever 
proposals might be advanced. These general features of a 
desirable UC system—some of which obviously entail tradeoffs 
with others—would include at least the following: (1) appropri 
ate economic incentives for all system participants, including 
strong incentives for claimant self-compliance; (2) to the extent 
possible, simple rather than complex system features and eligi 
bility criteria; (3) to the extent possible, little emphasis on
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intensive administrative scrutiny of claimant behavior and mo 
tives in the routine operational system, with emphasis instead 
placed on claimant self-compliance with relatively objective and 
easily measurable criteria; (4) minimizing the administrative 
discretion that makes selective application and enforcement of 
eligibility criteria possible; (5) horizontal equity for system 
participants; and (6) incentives for both administrative efficiency 
and smaller administrative bureaucracies.
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